On the 17th of October 2019, the Lebanese public space was reduced to a state of turmoil and turbulence, where tear gas, truncheons and repressive measures taken in such cases proved completely futile. It was preceded by fiery protests, caused by a long series of popular grievances regarding low living standards, with all the ethical, economic, social and institutional issues they entail. The final straw and the spark that ignited the “New Cedar Revolution” was in fact a simple austerity measure taken by the Government led by the Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who imposed an extra six USD monthly charge on the use of WhatsApp messenger. The measure per se was not harsher than other previous one imposed by the authorities, however its impact – following months of social discontent – was significant as it mobilised over two million protesters out of six million Lebanese. They suddenly decided to oppose a system accused of endemic corruption, inertia and incompetence. From claims pertaining to grey areas and daily economic and social deficiencies – attributed to the Lebanese system and gerontocracy, which ever since Lebanon gained its independence steered the destiny of Lebanon and that of its people arbitrarily and not always efficiently – the movements added more claims to their list oi grievances, which became more radical, due to the fact that the system refused to dialogue, and asked for “all”, who ever since 1943 exclusively ruled the country, “to leave”. “The people wish for all to leave” (kullu, “when we say all, we mean those who have turned Lebanon into what it is today”).

The resignation of the government led by Saad Hariri was nothing but a reiteration, expressed through a merely declarative narrative. For the first time after the civil war, the Lebanese, almost all represented by the younger generation, cast aside their social-economic claims, only to demand “a new-look for Lebanon”, which translates into wavering the Lebanese confessional system inherited from the French mandate following World War I. The generation demanded a “Lebanon for all Lebanese”, free from a colonial structure imposed from the outside, as well as a Lebanon free of confessionalism and truly belonging to its citizens.

The Lebanese Confessionalism Between Identity Affirmation and Its Opposite

The national identity of Lebanon was created after World War I, when in 1918, the famous British-French agreements – named after their engineers, the Englishman, Mike Sykes and the Frenchman, Francis-Georges Picot – divided the Middle East between France and Great Britain, following the principle of divide et impera. The authorities of the French mandate ordered the division of the former Syrian vilayet in five “statelets”, whose frontiers were established according to the territorial configuration of the denominations. Besides the sancak Alexandretta (Iskenderun district in today’s Turkish province of Hatay), which was donated as a reward to the post Ottoman Turkish republic, Syria was divided in the following “statelets”: Great Lebanon, Aleppo, Damascus, the Alawite State, and the “Jabal Druze” state, inhabited by the Druze confessional community. The constitution of “Greater Lebanon”, drafted by the authorities of the French mandate, in 1926, introduces confessionalism as a basic functioning principle and form of governance, which will be adopted once more, following the Lebanese independence, in 1943. It would be adopted as the “National Pact” – basically an unwritten constitution – agreed upon by the religious majorities, which thus share political power. According to this agreement, the president of the country must be Maronite Christian, the prime minister must be Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament must be a Shiite Muslim. This form of sharing of the main state powers between the components of the complicated Lebanese confessional mosaic becomes the ultimate reference system of the political and economic life. The system took root to such an extent that the political system answers to religion at a community level, without whose guidance and approval (if not exclusivity), the state institutions in their diversity cannot function properly or perhaps at all. Constitutionally speaking, the Lebanese confessional community landscape is dominated by Christianity and Islam, in coexistence with marginal religious communities, such as:

1. Christians – 45% somewhat smaller in numbers than the Muslims. The following active religious communities are recognized within this category:

     Maronite (Catholics)

     Greek-Orthodox

     Greek-Catholics

     Catholic Armenians

     Orthodox Armenians (apostolic)

     Syriac (Catholics)

     Jacobin (orthodox Syriac)

     Chaldean (Catholics)

     Nestorian (autocephalous church)

     Coptic (orthodox)

2. Islam – 54%, structured as follows:

     Sunnis, almost 27%

     Shiites, 27 %

     Druze (heterodox Muslims)

     Alawites, Twelver Shia

     Ismailites (Shiites)

3. Others: Baha'i Faith, Mormons, Buddhists, Jews (under 5.000 believers)

The Main Lebanese Confessions – Territorial Distribution

In Lebanon’s modern history, the confessional system has played a decisive part in the domestic national development as well as in the smooth function of the economic and social structure, a reality that made Lebanon known for a longer period as “Switzerland of the Middle East”. It is also true that the Lebanese civil war between 1975 and 1990 on one hand marked the beginning of domestic regression caused by foreign interference, and on the other, led to the confessional system becoming more politicized, to more isolation, religious distancing, and the use of religious identities – in order to involve religion in the political system, develop invasive cronyism and safeguard political, economic and social privileges that, in their turn, generate mass and institutional corruption, and last but not least, the separation of the elites and decision makers from the real problems and “malfunctions” of the national structure in all its key sectors. Far from bringing a positive change, the Lebanese civil war strengthened the alliance between clans and interest groups, and the arguments related to the religious identity became, more and more aggressively, tools to monopolise religion itself, as well as the main sectors of public, economic and financial life generating profit out of sight of the public legislation.

Revolution and Communitarism – A Difficult Cohabitation

Plagues by one of the most corrosive political, economic, social and institutional crisis in its entire history, Lebanon presents itself, three years from the start of the public protests, as a state increasingly threatened by bankruptcy and by the complete collapse of its social contract. Here is where many analysts see the country in danger of returning to civil war, if it does not come out of its current state any time soon.

The buildup of social tensions was brutally amplified by the terrible explosions that took place on the 4^th of August in the port of Beirut. They caused 200 deaths and 6000 injured, destroyed or paralyzed half of the capital and led to the radicalization of a civil society to which uprooting the political, religio us governing system incapable of generating a tangible national agreement and irrevocably damaged by corruption outpaced economic claims and daily shortcomings. Hence, the civil society focused on the viral slogan Irhal kullu – “Let all leave”, including the president of the republic and all the members of the ancient regime, as well the leaders of clans and groups.

However, despite this fragile situation the spirit of the political and religious community, the obstinate attachment to maintaining the sectarian privileges and the non-combat state of the parliamentary opposition, keep on ardently encouraging Lebanon’s road to collapse.

On the other hand, the “New Cedar Revolution” carries with it the germs of its own disintegration and fragility. It is enough to mention, in this respect, the fact that beyond the apparent cohesion in the public space, the “Lebanese Spring” is profoundly affected by the deeply rooted atavistic mentality. Beyond the radical discourse of “solidarity”, this mentality makes the protests dominated by political, religious, and provincial identities, and by a “cult of the leader” - be them of the clan, or a political or religious group - seen as the source, patron, infallible symbol and guarantor of the national and individual good. Thus, the Lebanese revolution is rather a conjecture of wills that actually reason according to the toll of the bells or to the callings of the muezzins, but also to the cultural and mercantile affinities with various non-Lebanese players, either from the region or from outside it. This identity affinity with politics and religion, just like those known as Al-Mula’ala – social clientele in contact with foreign countries, such as Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, France, the USA etc. – take advantage of these leverages to promote their own pawns on the Lebanese chessboard, against the pawns of the other sides. Ultimately we are referring to the same dichotomy that has always separated the Lebanese vis-a-vis the community identity of the sides.

Will the Phoenix Rise Anew from the Ashes?

Almost a month after the explosion in the Port of Beirut and the resignation of the “government on duty” led by Hassan Diab resigned, the Lebanese community elites are fervently negotiating to get Lebanon out of the crisis, starting with assigning a new prime minister, who would lead a reform cabinet. It is not an easy endeavour, to the extent that these steps are meant to lead to the sudden capitulation of the religious and political stipendiary sectarianism. From this point of view, the bone of contention is the lack of consensus over an alternative. In the more or less public conclaves, the opinions vary as follows (three scenarios):

1) Maintaining the (improved) Constitution in 1926, which is the basis of the Lebanese confessional system.

2) Redrafting (under no clear terms, for the time being) the National Pact from 1943.

3) Implementing, as a reference point, the National Reconciliation Accord, commonly known as the Taif Agreement, signed on the 22^nd of October 1989 in the above mentioned city, in Saudi Arabia. It was meant to end the civil war and restore Lebanese normalcy, including by limiting the privileges of political blocs and religious groups profiting from stipends and quotas (Muhasasa), through which they control the Lebanese politics and the economic, financial and services sectors.

Another complicated Gordian knot is the place and role of the pro-Iranian political-military group Hezbollah, an issue whose solution is a precondition for the reconstruction and development aid that the Western community and the international financial institutions are willing to provide to a “reformed and restructured Lebanon”.

In the beginning of August, the deputy of the US secretary of state Mike Pompeo visited Beirut to consult with the Lebanese side, and the French president Emmanuel Macron returned to the Lebanese capital, mainly to exert persuasive pressure over the Lebanese decision-makers caught themselves between popular protests that show no sign of stopping any time soon, and external pressure.

The drama of the Lebanese must not be compared to those who have been through great catastrophes such as Tsunamis, atomic bombings or the disaster that ruined Pompeii. What happened and what is still happening in Lebanon is the result of the doings and attitudes of the Lebanese. They are those who, with the support of the international community should rise the Phoenix anew from its ashes, by mending their country and rebuilding it, so that the old cedar country becomes, once more and forever, a “Lebanon for all Lebanese”.

NOTES

- On the 31^st of August, with 90 votes out of 120, the Lebanese Parliament approved the investiture of the Sunni diplomat and professor Mustafa Adib as the prime minister assigned to form the new Lebanese Government. The appointment of the new head of the Lebanese government was also endorsed by the Shiite parties Hezbollah and Amal, by Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (led by his son-in-law, Gebran Bassil), by the Future Movement (led by the former prime minister Saad Hariri), as well as by the former prime ministers Hassan Diab, Fouad Siniora, Najib Miqati and Talal Salman. A former ambassador to Germany, and a professor, just like his predecessor, Mustafa Adib is facing the need to deal with at least four major issues – reconstruction, after the damages caused by the explosion that took place on the 4^th of August, finalising the ongoing investigations regarding the tragedy that took place in the Port of Beirut, economic reform, and the reform of the system. Lebanese analysts believe that without the solid support of the political parties, electoral blocs and religious leaders, that is the entire system that needs to be reformed, Mustafa Adib will not have an easy task.

- Just a few hours after the appointment of the new prime minister, the French president Emmanuel Macron arrived to Beirut in his second visit in less than a month. The French leader gave Lebanon 90 days to implement its first reform measures, otherwise it would face severe international penalties. Emmanuel Macron also offered to host an aid conference in mid-October to help Lebanon.