INTRODUCTION

         Compared to other policy fields, the involvement of the European Union (EU) in counter-terrorism is a relatively recent development. Traditionally, European countries faced with a terrorist threat, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, Spain and West Germany, addressed it largely on their own. One of the main reasons for this lack of European cooperation was the commonly held view that each European state was confronted by a distinct threat, namely the Irish Republican Army in the UK, ETA (‘Basque Fatherland and Liberty’) in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany. Formally, EU counter-terrorism cooperation only began after the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. This significantly changed in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Those can be seen as a ‘single precipitating event’ that led to the recognition of terrorism, especially Islamist terrorism, as one of the most serious security threats facing the EU and its Member States (Kaunert and Lonard, 2019). As a result, EU Member States decided to considerably strengthen their counter-terrorism cooperation, as evidenced by the adoption of various ambitious programmatic documents in the following years.

         Unfortunately, the CBRN dimension of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy have received considerably less attention. Amongst those, on can cite the fight against the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons for terrorist purposes. Some may argue that this is mainly due to the fact that CBRN weapons are rarely used by terrorists. As underlined by Newsome and Jarmon (2016: 169), ‘[for] the terrorist, firearms and chemical explosives are familiar, mature, portable, cheap, easy-to-use technologies’, whereas ‘the terrorist would need new intents and capabilities to acquire and use CBNR weapons’. Nevertheless, there has been a commonly held view amongst officials and academics, especially following the attacks on 11 September 2001, that the risk of the use of CBRN weapons in a terrorist attack is significant. For example, in June 2003, a report of the US Administration to the United Nations Security Council emphasised the ‘high probability’ of such an attack by al-Qaeda ‘within the next two years’ (Newsome and Jarmon, 2016: 169). Such fears can notably be explained by a shift in the expert discourse on the nature of the terrorist threat faced by Western countries. In 1999, Laqueur (1999) had argued in The New Terrorism that the nature of terrorism was evolving as it was moving away from the calculated use of violence for political gains towards fanaticism and the pursuit of catastrophic destruction. This had been confirmed by other experts, who warned against the threat of what came to be described as ‘super-terrorism’, ‘mega-terrorism’ or ‘hyper-terrorism’. Such terms aimed to denote that Western countries now faced a new type of terrorist groups, which were perceived to be more dangerous and less predictable than their predecessors (Neumann, 2009: 3). It was also assumed that these ‘new’ terrorists would be particularly interested in using CBRN weapons because of their catastrophically devastating effects.

         Although al-Qaeda, contrary to predictions, has not conducted any terrorist attacks involving CBRN weapons against the West to date, other political actors have. In particular, the Russian government has been accused twice over the last few years of having backed assassination plots involving the use of CBRN weapons in the UK, which can be considered instances of state terrorism. In November 2006, former spy Litvinenko was killed by radioactive polonium-210 (BBC News, 2016), whilst Sergei and Yulia Skripal were poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok in March 2018. They eventually managed to recover (BBC News, 2018), but another member of the public died following her exposure to the nerve agent. Moreover, European states have become increasingly concerned about the possibility that returning foreign fighters involved in the Syrian conflict may use chemical weapons. Indeed, since 2012, there have been allegations – some of which made by the United Nations-backed Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) - that chemical weapons, including chlorine, sarin and sulfur mustard agents, have been used in Syria (The New York Times, 2017; UN News, 2019). In its 2016 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) report, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) (2016: 8) noted that ‘[the] phenomenon of individuals travelling for terrorist purposes to conflict zones increases the risk that expertise in the use of chemical weapons can be transferred to the European Union by returning foreign terrorist fighters’. In addition, the frequent appearance of CBRN-related topics in online terrorist propaganda was highlighted in the 2018 TE-SAT report of Europol (2018: 14). In particular, there has been a significant increase in the number of tutorials for conducting small-scale CBRN attacks being uploaded on the Internet. Those usually recommend using toxic industrial chemicals that are available in the EU thanks to their dual-use nature (Europol, 2018). Thus, as highlighted by the European Commission (2017b), the threat of CBRN terrorism has been high on the EU’s agenda in the last few years, because, although it has a low probability, it carries high impact risks. ‘Even at a small scale, a CBRN attack may have a considerable impact on the societies and economies against which they are used, resulting in significant and lasting disruption, widespread fear and uncertainty’ (European Commission, 2017b: 2).

         The EU and CBRN Terrorism

         As previously mentioned, an ‘Anti-terrorism Roadmap’ was swiftly adopted by the EU in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. This identified five priorities as the main components of the nascent EU counter-terrorism policy, namely police and judicial cooperation, international legal instruments, measures against the financing of terrorism, air security, and the coordination of the EU’s global action (European Council, 2001). However, at the European Council meeting in Ghent in October 2001, tackling CBRN terrorism was also identified as an important area for EU action. This resulted in the adoption of key policy documents in the following years, in particular the ‘Programme to improve cooperation in the European Union for preventing and limiting the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorist threats’ in 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2002), the ‘EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ in 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003) and the ‘EU Solidarity Programme on the consequences of terrorist threats and attacks (revised/widened CBRN Programme)’ (Council of the European Union, 2004b). The important Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism also laid down in its Article 1 that the ‘manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons’ was to be deemed a terrorist offence. Furthermore, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted in December 2005, highlighted the importance of ‘[working] with partners and international organisations on […] non-proliferation of CBRN materials […], as well as [providing] technical assistance on protective security to priority third countries’ (Council of the European Union, 2005: 11).

          A first ‘EU CBRN Action Plan’ aiming to strengthen CBRN security in the EU was subsequently adopted in 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009). It is evident from the introductory section of this document that concerns about the potential acquisition of CBRN materials by terrorist groups played a crucial role in the development of this action plan (Council of the European Union, 2009: 2). It identified the ‘overall goal of the new CBRN policy’ as ‘[reducing] the threat and damage from CBRN incidents to the citizens of the European Union, by way of a coherent, prioritised EU CBRN Action Plan, which involves all relevant stakeholders, including industry Representatives’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2009: 5). The action plan, which comprised more than 100 measures, identified three main priorities, namely prevention, detection, as well as preparedness and response. ‘Prevention’ focuses on identifying high-risk CBRN materials and ensuring that these materials and the related facilities are kept secure and are controlled. ‘Detection’ concerns the important issue of having the capacity to actually detect CBRN materials, which is crucial for both prevention and response. Finally, ‘preparedness and response’ cover a wide range of issues involved in the response to and recovery from CBRN incidents, such as emergency planning, information flows, modelling tools, and criminal investigation capacity. The adoption of this action plan led to several achievements, including the adoption of three EU lists of high-risk substances (concerning chemical, biological and radioactive/nuclear materials, respectively) and the development of information exchange and training on CBRN-related issues at the EU level (Council of the European Union, 2014: 36).

         Further advances were made when, on the basis of a progress report published in 2012, the European Commission published a Communication on an Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks in 2017 (European Commission, 2017b). The introductory session of this document, which is titled ‘the evolving threat’ (European Commission, 2017b: 2), clearly shows that terrorism concerns have been the main source of impetus for the further development of EU cooperation against CBRN risks. The European Commission notably underlines that ‘there are credible indications suggesting that terrorist groups might have the intention of acquiring CBRN materials or weapons and are developing the knowledge and capacity to use them’ (European Commission, 2017b: 2). Against this backdrop, the action plan – which Member States have been called to fully implement by the end of 2019 (European Commission, 2018a: 14) - identified four priorities: (1) reducing the accessibility of CBRN materials, (2) ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents, (3) building stronger internal-external links in CBRN security with key regional and international EU partners, and (4) enhancing the knowledge of CBRN risks.

         Furthermore, as previously mentioned, particular attention has been given in recent years to the issue of terrorist attacks involving chemical weapons. As a result, a common list of chemical substances of concern has been agreed by experts from the European Commission and the Member States, whilst collaboration with the private sector has been reinforced, notably with regard to improving detection capabilities and reducing the access of terrorists to chemical substances (European Commission, 2018a: 14). In that context, the EU has adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 that puts in place new restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. This instrument enables the EU ‘to impose sanctions, consisting of travel bans to the EU and asset freezing for persons and entities involved in the development and use of chemical weapons anywhere, regardless of their nationality or location’ (European Commission, 2018a: 14). Thus, significant progress has been made with regard to EU cooperation for tackling the threats emanating from CBRN weapons, including their potential use by terrorists. Nevertheless, some challenges remain, such as the need to identify fewer priorities and the importance of ensuring better synergies amongst a large number of stakeholders. The next section examines in greater detail one of the main instruments used by the EU to tackle the CBRN threat, namely the UCPM, which is the cornerstone of the EU’s crisis response system.

          Conclusion

         This article set out to examine the CBRN terrorist threat faced by European states and how the EU has sought to address it to date. This is an important topic to analyse as the existing literature on the development of the EU counter-terrorism policy has tended to neglect this dimension of the European counter-terrorism cooperation. It is problematic since there have been growing concerns, especially after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, that terrorist groups could use CBRN weapons. More recently, some observers have been particularly alarmed that foreign fighters could return to Europe armed with the knowledge or the materials for conducting terrorist attacks involving chemical weapons, as there have been serious allegations of their use in the Syrian conflict. Although there has been more awareness of the possibility of a terrorist attack involving CBRN weapons, especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, their probability remains relatively low, which means that preparing for other types of crises has tended to be given precedence. Some actors, such as the European Commission, have therefore had to regularly remind Member States of the need to prioritise CBRN-related threats as well, given that their impact may be extremely severe and long-lasting. As the EU and its Member States have not been tested by any large-scale terrorist attack involving the use of CBRN weapons, it is not possible to offer any definite conclusions as to their preparedness and response capacities in the face of such an event with potentially devastating consequences.

        REFERENCES

BBC News (2016) ‘Alexander Litvinenko: Profile of murdered Russian spy’, 21 January 2016. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19647226 (last accessed on 8 January 2018).

BBC News (2018) ‘Russian spy: What happened to Sergei and Yulia Skripal?’. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43643025 (last accessed on 2 January 2018).

Commission of the European Communities (2009) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan’, COM(2009) 273, 24 June 2009, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
Council of the European Union (2002) ‘Adoption of the programme to improve cooperation in the European Union for preventing and limiting the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorist threats’, Doc. 14627/02, 21 November 2002, Brussels: Council of the European Union.
Council of the European Union (2003) ‘Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Doc. 15708/03, 10 December 2003, Brussels: Council of the European Union.
Council of the European Union (2004a) ‘EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism’, Doc. 10586/04. Brussels: Council of the European Union.
Council of the European Union (2004b) ‘EU Solidarity Programme on the consequences of terrorist threats and attacks (revised/widened CBRN Programme): Adoption’, Doc. 15480/04, 1 December 2004, Brussels: Council of the European Union.
Council of the European Union (2005) ‘The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy’, Doc. 14469/4/05, Brussels: Council of the European Union.

Council of the European Union (2009) ‘Council conclusions on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security in the European Union - an EU CBRN Action Plan: Adoption’, Doc. 15505/1/09 REV 1, 12 November 2009, Brussels: Council of the European Union.

Council of the European Union (2014) ‘Report on the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, Doc. 13971/14, 10 October 2014, Brussels: Council of the European Union.

European Commission (2017b) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks’, COM(2017) 610, 18 October 2017, Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2018a) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Seventeenth Progress Report towards an effective and genuine Security Union’, COM(2018) 845, 11 December 2018, Strasbourg: European Commission.

European Council (2001) ‘Anti-terrorism Roadmap’, Doc. SN 4019/01, Brussels: European Council.

Europol (2016) ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016’ (TE-SAT), The Hague: Europol.

Europol (2018) ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018’ (TE-SAT), The Hague: Europol.

Kaunert, C. (2010) European Internal Security: Towards Supranational Governance in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Kaunert, C. and Léonard, S. (2019) ‘The Collective Securitisation of Terrorism in the European Union’, West European Politics, 42(2) 261-277.

Laqueur, W. (1999) The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Neumann, P.R. (2009) Old & New Terrorism. Cambridge: Polity.

Newsome, B.O. and Jarmon, J.A. (2016) A Practical Introduction to Homeland Security and Emergency Management: From Home to Abroad, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press.

The New York Times (2017) ‘Australia Details “Sophisticated” Plot by ISIS to Take Down Plane’, 4 August 2017. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/world/australia/sydney-airport-terror-plot-isis.html (last accessed on 10 January 2019).

UN News (2019) ‘Security Council discusses chemical weapons use in Syria following latest global watchdog report’, 6 March 2019. Available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1034201 (last accessed on 10 March 2019).