President of Moldova Igor Dodon (left) with Prime Minister Maya Sandu, whose government was defeated in a vote of no confidence on November 12 (Source: Reuters)
On November 12, Moldovan President Igor
Dodon’s Socialist Party joined forces with the opposition Democratic Party
(formerly led by the now-fugitive tycoon Vladimir Plahotniuc) to overthrow the
ACUM (“NOW”) bloc–led government of Prime Minister Maia Sandu in a
parliamentary vote of no confidence (see EDM, November 12). The Socialists and the
Democrats mustered a situational majority of 63 votes in the 101-seat chamber.
The ACUM bloc holds 26 parliamentary seats (Moldpres, November 12).
The Socialists’ move precipitates the
collapse of the broad-based governing coalition that took power from Plahotniuc
in June this year. Comprised of the Russophile Socialists and the
Western-oriented ACUM bloc (with 36 seats and 26 seats, respectively), this
coalition undertook an experiment in joint governance by political and cultural
opposites. Such an experiment was not only unprecedented for the fractured
Moldova but also without par in contemporary Europe writ large.
This coalition’s declared purpose was
not merely to muddle through (as is often the case with multi-party coalitions)
but to overhaul Moldova’s governance, economy and external relations, all of
which had previously been subordinated to interest groups shaped as political
parties—most recently and most thoroughly Plahotniuc’s. The coalition’s
domestic consensus included promises to refrain from exploiting issues of
national identity and external orientation for internal partisan purposes (the
“de-geo-politicization” of domestic politics). This consensus found expression
in a “balanced foreign policy,” based on adhering to the Moldova–European Union
Association Agreement while seeking to normalize commercial relations with
Russia (see EDM, June 21, 26, 27, August 7, 8) .
Four months after the regime change,
however, Dodon’s Socialists revealed intentions to take over key posts in the
judiciary and prosecution systems, replacing Plahotniuc’s appointees at the
top. Thus, a Socialist parliamentary deputy became chair of the Constitutional
Court, and an advisor to President Dodon became the new head of the National
Anti-Corruption Centre. Working with the Plahotniuc-staffed, unexpurgated
National Audio-Visual Council (media regulatory agency), the Socialists
obtained new broadcast licenses for several party-affiliated media outlets,
including a television channel to rebroadcast Russia’s Channel One TV (highly
popular in Moldova, rebroadcast hitherto by Plahotniuc’s media holding)
(Newsmaker, November 1–12).
These moves clashed with the ACUM’s
agenda of freeing the judicial and prosecution systems and market-regulatory
agencies from political influence. The Socialists had initially subscribed to
that agenda, under the heading of “de-oligarchization” in the coalition’s
mission statements in June and the detailed coalition agreement signed in
September. Yet, the Socialists seemed, by October, to embark on inheriting
Plahotniuc’s system—working with some of its holdovers in that process—instead
of joining forces with the ACUM-led government to dismantle that system
altogether.
Concurrently, the Socialist Party laid
claim to two ministerial portfolios in Sandu’s cabinet (comprised almost
entirely of ACUM ministers). This transfer was to occur imminently. And on
November 3, the Socialist Party’s Ion Ceban unexpectedly won Chisinau’s mayoral
election, against ACUM bloc co-leader Andrei Nastase (IPN, October 18 – November
4).
All those Socialist gains added to the
earlier concern (unsubstantiated thus far) that President Dodon had placed
Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service under his personal control. The
trends, on the whole, indicated a rapid accumulation of power and influence by
the Socialist Party at the expense of its coalition partner.
In view of these reverses, hard-line
supporters of unification with Romania (small but vocal groups within and
outside ACUM) deserted and turned against the bloc’s leaders. The hard-line
“unionists” had objected all along to this governing coalition, and their
agitation against the ACUM bloc’s leaders weakened the latter’s bargaining
position vis-à-vis the Socialists within the broad coalition (Ziarul National,
Deschide.md, passim).
These trends, in combination, caused
some key figures in the ACUM bloc to consider exiting from the coalition in the
next few months (with sufficient lead time to the 2020 presidential election
campaign), unless the Socialists would recommit to the “de-oligarchization”
agenda. Concerns that President Dodon was turning into a “Plahotniuc no. 2”
were, however, exaggerated or at least premature; and in any case, they could
have been addressed in the established format of discussions among the Moldovan
president, government, and the European Union’s and the United States’ missions
in Chisinau.
Maia Sandu’s government, however,
attempted to address those challenges through a make-or-break test over the
selection of a new head of the General Prosecutor’s Office. That office had
been the alpha and omega of Plahotniuc’s state capture and is, therefore,
widely perceived as a possible basis for recidivism, unless its independence
and political neutrality are fully secured. A government-organized, open
competition to short-list candidates for the general prosecutor’s post was,
however, torpedoed by the competition commission’s Socialist member, who gave
grotesquely high or ridiculously low scores to candidates depending on
political preference. With the botched contest for the Constitutional Court’s
chairmanship (taken over by a Socialist politician—see above) fresh in mind,
Sandu’s government declined holding a repeat competition for the general
prosecutor’s post. Instead, the government moved to change the relevant law and
to submit its own short list of candidates, in a three-stage process, whereby
the power of appointment to that post rests ultimately with the head of state
(Noi.md, October 28–November 12).
The government’s unilateral move used a
constitutional provision whereby a government ordinance can take legal effect
without parliamentary approval, unless overturned by parliament within 72 hours
by a vote of no confidence in the government. The Socialist Party pounced on
this opportunity to dismiss the ACUM-led government with the help of the
Plahotniuc-legacy Democratic Party (see above), at the cost of bringing the
latter back from ostracism and into the political power balance.
Western diplomatic missions in Chisinau
were not consulted by the government before it made its high-risk move. The US,
EU, German and Romanian missions came out, explicitly or implicitly, for
continuation of the governing coalition. The EU and US ambassadors, jointly as
well as individually, held multiple meetings with Dodon, Sandu, and other
Socialist and ACUM leaders, seeking to mediate a solution that could preserve
the coalition.
President Dodon is the undisputed
arbiter of any follow-up scenarios, a whole range of which are now under
consideration. A further increase in the presidency’s de facto power
and influence seems certain under any of these scenarios.
The governing coalition’s collapse was
neither foreordained nor predictable as an imminent outcome. Notwithstanding
the increase in the Socialists’ power at their partners’ expense, there was
counter-evidence that pointed toward continuity. Disagreements at the top of
the coalition did not percolate to local levels. Country-wide local elections,
held on the quadrennial schedule, on October 20 and November 3, were the
cleanest in many years, and resulted in major gains for the ACUM bloc, which
caught up with the Socialist Party in the overall vote for mayors and local
councils. These two political forces had agreed beforehand to observe mutual
“nonaggression” during the campaign, to support each other’s candidates in the
November 3 runoff, and to form coalitions at the level of district and town
councils, so as to reproduce the model of the central coalition at local
levels. While the ACUM bloc’s Nastase did breach those understandings in the
Chisinau mayoral race (see above), and ACUM went along with that breach (for
fear of antagonizing the “unionists”), the winner, Ceban, did not answer in
kind and offered to form a coalition with the bloc in the Chisinau Municipal
Council.
Surveying the coalition’s rubble, the net winners and net losers are to be determined. The net losers seem to be the largest category by far.