Achim Hurrelmann (Professor of Political Science; Co-Director, with Joan DeBardeleben, of the Centre for European Studies, a Carleton University Research Centre focused on European affairs; cross-appointed to the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies) has offered his views on Brexit, its ramifications and implications from a European and transatlantic perspective, in the interview given to Geostrategic Pulse Magazine.

Professor Achim Hurrelmann (© Photo Carleton University Research Centre, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies)

Geostrategic Pulse: Professor Achim Hurrelmann, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland leaving the EU brings back under discussion the future of the European Union. What is the lesson the EU is learning from Brexit?

Achim Hurrelmann: There are at least two key lessons from Brexit. The first is that Euroscepticism has to be taken seriously as a political force. The UK always stood out among the member states because Euroscepticism was deeply rooted in the mainstream parties, not just the fringes. But Eurosceptic positions exist in other member states as well, we only need to look to Italy for instance, and I think it took Brexit for many European politicians to realize that they must make a much more sustained effort to respond to them. The second lesson is more positive; it derives from the Brexit negotiations with the UK. Here, what we have seen is that, with the right strategy and leadership, the EU can remain united even on issues where the member states’ interests are not necessarily aligned. In this sense, the Brexit negotiations were a success for the EU, and chief negotiator Michel Barnier deserves a lot of credit for this.

How will the EU define itself in the post-Brexit horizon? Will we have more or less Europe? Or, on the contrary, a multiple-speed Europe?

In the long term, I think there is no alternative to a multi-speed Europe. The EU is simply too large, and too diverse, to get all member states to agree on all contentious issues. The issue of refugee policy is the most visible illustration at the moment. We have of course already seen a lot of flexible integration in past decades, including the Euro, Schengen and recently the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defence policy – all of these have been adopted only by a subset of member states.  But up to now, such flexible integration initiatives have always come about on an ad-hoc basis. I think the EU needs a more fundamental, conceptual debate about when to use flexible mechanisms, and how they can be used in a way that does not undermine the benefits of European integration.

Against the background of Brexit, the crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the prospect of elections that will take place this year in several EU member states, can we expect a more integrated, united and supportive Union, or conversely, more division? What are the main prospects and challenges related to the EU identity projection in a post-Brexit context?

The European integration process has never developed in big shifts, but always incrementally. That will remain to be the case. The EU has been fairly successful in 2020 on a number of fronts, not only in the Brexit negotiations but also in bringing about an agreement on the next long-term budget and the COVID recovery fund, for instance. But COVID has also shown that, in a crisis situation, the member states’ first instinct is to act unilaterally, rather than consulting the European partners. So the picture is mixed, and I think it will remain mixed. European identities are getting stronger, but only slowly and only in parts of the population. I don’t expect the EU to develop in the direction of a United States of Europe. It will need to chart its own course and find a governance model that continues to build strongly on the member states.

What are the prospects for the EU enlargement in the Balkans? What about Scotland joining the EU?

EU enlargement in the Balkans is proceeding, but progress is slow. It is not really a priority for the EU, which is something that I personally regret. The recent Bulgarian veto against the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia illustrates how individual member states are playing politics with the issue, rather than working in the EU context to develop a coherent and forward-looking strategy. Scotland for now remains an internal issue of the UK. Should there be another independence referendum and Scotland votes to leave the UK, I am sure the EU would welcome it with open arms.

What can you tell us about the way Brexit will influence the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?

The effects will be less dramatic than some people predicted. While it was a member state, the UK played a double role in the CSDP, on the one hand it was one of the EU’s most capable military powers that had helped launch the policy, but on the other hand it strongly resisted initiatives that would have moved the CSDP into a more supranational direction. Initially after Brexit, some observers thought that, without the UK, there would be a major push to develop the CSDP. But that hasn’t really happened, despite PESCO. And with Donald Trump’s election loss, the argument that Europe must become more independent from the US has become somewhat less pressing, even though it remains correct in the long term.

The European Union can become a global actor if it continues to maintain, even under the current circumstances, a high degree of involvement in the economic development, at regional and global levels. However, in order to become more influential, it needs to improve in certain fields. What are the areas where the EU is still weak but that can improve vis-à-vis the other global actors?

You are right that the EU, at present, is a superpower mainly in economic terms. And even here, the picture is mixed. As a regulatory power, for instance in establishing new rules for data protection with a global reach, it is unmatched in the world. But if you look at the global players in digital industries, these tend to be American or Chinese, not European. In terms of security, the EU is even weaker, as we just discussed. Personally, I don’t think the EU’s ambition for the future should be to play the superpower game. It should build on its existing strengths in the economic realm, continue to make trade and investment agreements, enhance its regional policies particularly vis-à-vis Africa, and promote multilateral cooperation.

What is the best course for the EU to navigate in order to ensure its citizens' security and prosperity, amid competition from Russia, China and even the US?

In my view, the right approach is to keep channels of communication open with all of these powers, even if means holding your nose and dealing with regimes which one dislikes. As I said, the EU is not in a position to enter into a superpower competition. This is not the purpose for which it was set up, and it is not institutionally equipped for such an approach. But one thing that the EU’s own history shows is that economic and political cooperation across borders can promote peace and prosperity. I think the most credible approach for the EU to take is to project this insight into the global sphere.

What about the way Washington will see and approach the overall transatlantic relationship during Joe Biden’s mandate, in the light of Brexit and of Europeans promoting the concept of strategic autonomy?

Biden is a friend of the EU. Transatlantic relations will improve under his administration. That does not mean that all disagreements will disappear. The issue of burden-sharing within NATO will remain an area of contention. But there will be more cooperation on climate change issues, and a much smaller risk that disagreements on trade will escalate into a full-scale “trade war”. Regarding strategic autonomy, I think this will remain a buzzword in Europe, but with Trump gone, advocates of this approach will find it much harder to convince governments to put their money where their mouth is, and to make actual investments in strategic capabilities.