The State of the Ottoman Military in 1914

Leadership

Perhaps the most fundamental flaw in the Ottoman initial war effort was the confused state of its military leadership. The Supreme Commander of the Turkish military was Enver Pasha, the newly self-ordained “Vice Generalissimo”. Enver became a national hero in 1913 when he recaptured the city of Edirne, a former capital of the Empire, from the Bulgarians. He was a relatively junior officer at the time but being married to the sultan's niece no doubt aided his ambitions. In 1914, he purged more than 1,000 officers from the Army. Some probably were too old, corrupt, or incompetent, but other were likely competent veterans who could have trained and led the raw new draftees. Enver’s senior Prussian advisor, Liman von Sanders, considered him to be a fool. The disastrous results of Enver’s eastern campaigns attest to Sanders’ ability to judge military talent.

Personnel

At the outbreak of war, the Ottomans quickly expanded their military forces from 200,000 to almost 1/2 million men. During the war, 2.8 million men would serve under arms which was about 12% of the population. Although impressive at first blush, it pales in comparison to all other major warring nations. Germany mobilized 13.2 million men. Russia utilized over 15 million men, France raised 8 million, and England mobilize a third of its male labor force, a significant portion of those for its powerful Navy. [1] Moreover, at that time Britain and France still had a huge pool of colonial manpower to draw on. Much of it, such as the Algerians and Indians were reluctant to be drawn into the war against fellow Muslims, but the Indian troops fought very well in Mesopotamia. Many other crack regiments were raised, particularly among the Anglo volunteers from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

Infrastructure

Jeremy Salt, in “The Last Ottoman Wars” aptly describes the state of the Eastern campaign of WWI as “a modern war in it pre-modern setting”[2]. Whereas the French and Germans could rush troops almost directly to the frontline via trains, the Ottomans normally had to transit the last 100 or more miles via unpaved dirt roads which were unpassable during severe weather. Outside of Istanbul and a few other major cities in Western Anatolia, the condition of electrification, medical facilities, banking, and communications were similarly poor. Agriculture, which had been a relative strength, was decimated by the drafting of hundreds of thousands of farmers into the army. An attempt had been made to rebuild the defense industrial base, but it was still in its infancy.

Equipment

Prior to the 19th Century, the Ottomans normally made their own weapons or hired westerners to build them within the Empire. These were manufactured to a very high, if not cutting-edge, standard.[3] After having lost that technical edge to the West they did make a strong effort to modernize their weapons, using mainly German manufacturers. “Unfortunately for the Ottoman Empire, many of the recently purchased arms were lost in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. The Ottoman Army went to war in 1914 with significant gaps in its arsenal, particularly machine guns and field artillery.”[4] The closing of the Bulgarian and Greek borders at the beginning of the war crippled the Ottoman’s ability to resupply, which had a devastating effect, particularly on its artillery. Germany was eventually able to open a supply route through the Balkans, but this never provided sufficient weapons and ammunition for the war effort.

Navy

Except for naval actions in and around the Dardanelles, there was relatively little maritime combat involving the Ottomans. This was especially true after the German battle cruiser Goeben and a light cruiser Breslau fled the Mediterranean for the safety of the Black Sea. After Gallipoli, Allied maritime operations were largely devoted to blockades managed by the British in the Aegean and the French along the northeastern and Levantine coasts of the Mediterranean. Of note, these two German warships were later sold to the Turkish Navy. This was seen as German compensation for two warships that Britain had built for the Ottomans but commandeered at the outbreak of the war. These additions gave the Ottomans naval supremacy in the Black Sea and ended all Mediterranean maritime intercourse between Russia and her allies. The Sultan's only impactful naval action was his first one. On the morning of 29 October 1914, surprised Russians in the Crimea awoke to the sound of a naval gunfire bombardment. The Ottoman Empire was successfully attacking the Russian Black Sea fleet. Up to that point the German-Ottoman treaty have been a well-kept secret. The Black Sea would become an Ottoman lake for most of the war. We will now examine the Ottoman land campaigns.

Balkan Ghosts

Although some significant combat took place in the Balkans, very little of it directly involved the Ottoman military. The ghost of past Balkan atrocities rose once again, this time with the Austrians, Germans, and Bulgarians facing off against various combinations of Serbs, Brits, French, and Albanians. During the vicious 1915 campaign in the Balkan Mountains, Austrian casualties “amounted to 227,000 out of 450,000 engaged. Serbian losses were approximately 170,000 out of 400,000.”[5] Austria was forced to retreat which could have led to a catastrophic failure of German resupply lines to the Ottomans. However, first Romania and then Bulgaria were encouraged to join the war tipping the balance in the Central Power’s favor and securing its lines of communication. Greece briefly entered the war on the side of Serbia, but in a surprising move King Constantine of Greece fired his pro-allied Prime Minister and made Greece neutral for most of the rest of the war. At this point, the Allies only forward position in the Balkans was at Salonika. That beachhead became tenuous after the Greek withdrawal. In 1917, after the abdication of Constantine, Greece reentered the war on 27 June 1917, but no major offensive resulted.

Defending the Straits

Within days of Turkey’s engage­ment in the war, the British began a naval campaign to open the Turkish Straits to Russian and Allied shipping. The campaign’s ultimate goal was no less than the capture of Istanbul and the withdrawal of Turkey from the war. For the Ottoman military, the unquestioned gem of its WWI military performance was its defense of the Turkish Straits. Since this is by far the most well-known aspect of its World War I participation, I will only make a few points. My major observation on both the Dardanelles and Gallipoli is how tenuous these victories had been for the Turks. Its navy was clearly no match for the Allies and particularly for the British. In February 1915, a 42-ship fleet from the West attempted to take Constantinople using naval power alone. This assault had minimal impact on the Turks other than alerting them to the need for greatly improved defenses. Months later, Churchill had assembled a huge Armada to force the passage of the Dardanelles, including 18 battleships which were the most powerful naval vessels of their time. The West’s major mistake was sailing too close to the coastal artillery defending the straits, thus taking major losses including the sinking of three battleships and the crippling of three others. Yet, according to John McDonald, “unknown to the allies, the Turks had almost exhausted their ammunition and the fleet could have proceeded to Constantinople unmolested.”[6]

Similarly, it is very well documented the Australian-New Zealand (ANZAC) amphibious landings at Sulva Bay faced a hellacious Turkish defense led by Mustafa Kamal from the high ground of the Gallipoli Peninsula. For example, when the former coal collier, now troop transport, River Clyde, attempted to land its ANZAC troops, only 21 of the 200 men reach the beach unscathed by Turkish bullets.[7] They were quickly bottled up in an ANZAC Cove killing zone. French and British allied invasion forces were only 10 miles away but barely, if at all, engaged. Moreover, even without French or British help, the ANZACs had come within a short sprint of taking the final ridge and controlling Gallipoli. Of course, major credit must be given to the Turkish defense which exceeded all reasonable expectations. By the time the Allies withdrew eight months later, a half million men had perished, almost equally distributed on both sides. The Allies gain nothing. The Turks had defended their homeland and earned huge prestige, but at a terrible price.

The Eastern Campaigns

In December 1914, only months after entering the war, Pasha Enver took control of the 3rd Army for an assault on the Caucuses. Some might have thought winter was an odd time to be trekking through the mountains of eastern Anatolia, and they would have been correct. The result was eerily reminiscent of the Ottoman campaign to siege Vienna in 1529. Like Suleman, Enver was forced to leave his artillery behind in the deep snow. Both commanders’ troops were soon ravaged by disease and short on food. Both then ordered their depleted forces to attack. In 1914 the target was a Russian base called Sarikamish, but unlike Suleman (who was in fact Magnificent) Enver was an amateurish field general. The attacks were terribly coordinated, so the Russians were able to decimate the attackers one at a time. Of the perhaps 100,000 men who took part in the attack 86% were lost. A German officer said the 3rd Army “had suffered a disaster for which their rapidity and completeness is without parallel in military history.”[8]

Enver Pasha also had designs, no doubt encouraged by the Germans, on controlling technically neutral Persia, which at that time had arguably its weakest dynasty in its long history.

Several battles were fought with success in Western Iran between Russian and Ottoman forces. “These battles destroyed many villages, killed several hundred Iranian civilians, and caused near-famine conditions that probably resulted in the death of several thousand more.”[9] The campaign lost steam when promised units of reinforcements had to be rerouted after the defeat at Sarikamish. In May of 1916, Enver Pasha launched a second invasion of Persia. This did enjoy some initial success. The Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 eventually resulted in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty which at least temporarily resuscitated the Triple Alliance's (Germany, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman’s) war efforts. It also freed massive numbers of Turkish troops defending against Russia in the Caucasus. Britain feared these forces would be shifted to Mesopotamia to retake Baghdad, which they had only recently recap­tured.

The Mesopotamian Campaign

In early November 1914, a British Army consisting mostly of Indian troops was eager to protect British oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. After some initial resistance, they quickly took the al Fao Peninsula and Basra, a port on the Euphrates River just north of the Persian Gulf. Their combination of land and naval artillery proved to be too much for the Ottoman defenders. British casualties were about 350 men while the Turks lost more than 1000. The Ottoman commander was so distraught that he shot himself.[10]

At that point, the British had only two reinforced divisions at Basra. Nonetheless, a British force of 10,000 men preceded north in an effort to take Baghdad. They were met by a slightly larger Turkish force at the town of Kut. The Turkish defenders fought well but were forced to retreat in good order towards Baghdad. Although he had taken more than 1,200 casualties and received no reinforcements, the British commander was ordered to proceed north. Enroute, he encountered well-entrenched Turkish defenders with almost twice his force’s numbers. His only advantage was that, for the first time, 7 military aircraft had arrived in Mesopotamia and provided air support to him. The British managed to siege and initially hold additional ground against the superiorly sized force. However, after taking almost 40% casualties they retreated back to Kut. A British relief column for Kut was skillfully blocked by the Turkish 6th Army, commanded by the German General Colmar von der Goltz. After four months and near starvation, the British at Kut surrendered more than 8,000 troops, including 6,000 Indian soldiers. In addition, the relief column suffered more than 21,000 casualties. The British eventually mustered another attempt at Baghdad using 166,000, mostly Indian, troops. The Turks then fought a very professional retreat from Kut to Baghdad. They eventually fell to the British but might have held out if the reinforcements promised them under the Yilderim plan had arrived. Those troops had been diverted to the Levant theater of operations.[11] The Ottomans eventually lost Mesopotamia but made the British pay the horrific price of 92,501 casualties.

The Levant Campaign

The Turk’s Levant campaign was initially planned because logistical support for Gallipoli came from bases in Egypt, a former Ottoman client state which Britain had occupied in 1869. Moreover, if successful, it would deny the British access to the Suez Ca­nal. The canal was the lifeline to British possessions in the Persian Gulf, and to India, “the Jewel in the Crown” of the British Empire. In 2015, the Ottoman commander Dejemal Pasha enjoyed initial success when he led a force of 22,000 men from Beersheba (in modern day central Israel) across the Sinai Peninsula. This force did not cross the canal, but their mere presence created the danger that prevented the British from shifting more troops towards Gallipoli. The military situation turned into a hot and dusty stalemate until the Arab revolt broke out further south in the now Saudi Arabian region of Hejaz. Hussein, the Grand Sharif of Mecca, proclaimed Arab independence and began to receive British assistance via Captain T.E. Lawrence (aka Lawrence of Arabia).

Following the disastrous Gallipoli campaign, British attention also shifted to the Middle East. They knew the Russian declaration of peace by Vladimir Lenin would free up massive numbers of Turkish troops in the Caucuses and Persia. Britain feared these forces would be used in Mesopotamia to retake the recently captured city of Baghdad. Therefore, an offensive along the Levantine coast would divert Turkish forces to Palestine and relieve pressure on Baghdad. Most importantly, the war in Western Europe was not going well and civilian morale was flagging. Although two previous attempts to take Gaza had failed, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George told his new commanding general, Sir Edmund Allenby, that "he wanted Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the British nation." Allenby's first step in achieving that prize would be to dismantle the Turk's Gaza-to-Beersheba line of defense. Once this was achieved and Jerusalem captured, the Ottoman defenses in the Levant began to crumble.

A DIME Analysis

Now that we have established the baseline on Ottoman military capabilities in 1914 and also have reviewed their actual performance during the war, let us examine the wisdom of their decision to become a belligerent by assessing the following factors: diplomacy, intelligence, the military, and the economy.

Diplomacy

Why did the Sublime Porte[12] choose to align with the Germans? In “The Fall of the Ottomans”, Eugene Rogan argues “German and Ottoman friendship ran relatively deep.”[13] He cites the 1898 state visit by Kaiser Wilhelm II as a turning point. The Kaiser pledged perpetual friendship, perhaps because he calculated that the 300 million Muslims who venerated the Caliph might make for good allies. The Germans wanted to make Constantinople their base for a jihad (holy war) against the British. Moreover, the Ottoman territories could be a significant obstacle between Britain and its most critical colony, India, while also letting the Germans enter the great game in Central Asia. For both these and economic reasons, by 1911 the German ambassador to the Sublime Porte referred to the Ottoman as being a German, “political, military, and economic sphere of interest.”[14]

Germany’s main strategic objective was to draw Russian resources away from its east­ern front. The German-Ottoman relationship had been built over the course of decades as German engineers contributed to the development of railroads in southeastern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East. Of course, the Germans also would benefit from any difficulties the British experienced in their hold­ings in India, Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, and Egypt.

Within a week of the war’s declaration, a German archaeologist named Curt Prufer arrived in Istanbul. Although truly an accomplished archaeologist, he was also a German spy. He would later be named the German “Lawrence”. To his surprise, the German ambassador and military attaché told him there were great divisions within the Sublime Porte on whether to join the German war effort. Moreover, the attaché assessed the Turks to be militarily weak. He especially noted the lack of adequate defensive preparations in the Dardanelles. Nonetheless, both men wished to persuade the Ottomans to join the German war effort, even though they assessed that in the Sublime Porte only the Pro-German Turkish war minister, Enver Pasha, actually favored such a move. [15]

Germany said Turkey, “was expected not only to defend the Straits and to protect her quarters at great distances, but conquer Persia, make Egypt independent, prepare for the emergence of independent states in the Trans-Caucuses, threaten India from Afghanistan if possible, and in addition furnish active assistance in the European theater.”[16] In short, Germany thought it had much to gain. [17],[18]

These factors made the Ottomans an attractive ally for Germany. But why did the Sublime Porte decide on this risky alliance? Talat Pasha, the Minister of Interior, thus described the Ottoman diplomatic situation in 1914, “Turkey needed to join one of the country groups so that it could organize its domestic administration, strengthen and maintain its commerce and industry, expand its railroads, in short, to survive and to preserve its existence.”[19] Based on that reasoning, with its resources largely drained after years of fighting in the Balkans and in Libya, the Ottoman Empire would need an alliance with European powers, but which ones?

Certainly, the Ottoman leadership’s personal preference played a large part in siding with Germany. Enver Pasha had conducted his military studies in Germany and spoke German.[20] As noted above, they had also benefited significantly from German investments and infrastructure projects. The Ottoman Empire also entered the war with the hope of recovering some lost Balkan territories. Yet another factor must have weighed on the Sultan's mind. Germany was encouraging Romania and Bulgaria to join the Central Powers. Therefore, if the Ottomans were to side with the Triple Entente, they could immediately have both Russia and Balkan armies on their doorsteps. Its remaining toehold in Europe would have been threatened.

The Turk’s dream was that with powerful allies some of the lost territories of the Empire could be recovered and its status as one of the major actors of European politics could be restored. That said, they did not have many reasonable alternatives for allies. Almost up to the outbreak of war the Ottomans were cultivating a potential alliance with the British, French, and the Russians. Surprisingly, late in the Summer of 1914, Enver was still negotiating an alliance with the Russians, even after they had already signed a secret treaty with the Germans on August 2nd.[21] However, Russia was their historical enemy and France was a close ally of Russia. Their best hope of entering that alliance would have been with British sponsorship.

Since the Crimean War (1854-56) the United Kingdom had been a major proponent for sustaining the Ottoman Empire which was also known as the "Sick Man of Europe". In 1908 the secular "Young Turks" felt deep ideological ties to the West. However, more conservative Turkish nationalists were skeptical, pointing to a string of Muslim territorial losses to European nations in the Balkans and the Italian invasion of modern-day Libya. Moreover, the Sublime Porte was also concerned by the historical Russian desire for Turkish lands, especially the strategic access to the Mediterranean Sea which could be afforded by control of the Turkish Straits. In the end, the British assessed the Turks would not add much to the Allied war effort and might, in fact, be a drag (by that same reasoning, they underestimated the Turkish forces at Gallipoli, as well as in the Levant and Mesopotamia).

Intelligence

From a military intelligence (MI) perspective, neither side had been well prepared prior to the outbreak of war, although Turkish military intelligence capabilities are difficult to judge.  Very little has been written in English on this subject. Few of the relevant Turkish documents have ever been translated into English. The topic is, however, covered in a book entitled Yildirim, published in 1920. Written by a former member of the Turkish General Staff, it covers the involve­ment of the Turkish Yildirim (Thun­derbolt) Army Group in their Levant Campaign.[22]

Initially, the Turks were almost totally dependent on German techni­cal intelligence. Turkish assessments in Yilderim indicate they had weak MI analytical capa­bilities. In sharp contrast, deception and counterintel­ligence (CI) were Turkish strengths and an Ottoman tradition. They were particularly good at camouflaging military locations such as artillery batteries, although this became less useful as the allies increasingly relied on high fidelity aerial imagery rather than the visual observations of pilots. By 1915, the Ottomans had already put a clamp on outgoing communications. The Germans attempted to stir up Arab revolts against British authority. This in turn led to a robust British counterintelligence (CI) presence. Realizing the need to high­light issues of more local concern and to inject Anti-Western messaging. The German spy, Curt Prufer created seven Pro-Turkish, Arabic-language newspapers and set up propaganda rooms in major cities in which the locals could view this material. His goal was no less than a jihad.

As it deployed against the Ottomans, most of Britain’s intelligence capabilities and processes were modern, but its official knowledge of the Ottoman Empire was almost non-existent. In 1929, Sir Winston Churchill wrote in The Aftermath, "I can recall no great sector of policy about which the British government was less completely informed than the Turkish". The reasons for such ignorance by British politicians are unclear. For example, British admiral Arthur Limpus had been reorganizing the Turkish Navy right up to the outbreak of World War I.[i] In fact, he served as Commander in Chief of the Ottoman Navy. Clearly, there were at least some senior officials in Britain with a deep understanding of the Turkish military. Yet, Lord Kitchener had so little regard for the Empire's forces he made little effort to study its tactics or capabilities. Fortunately for the British, they did actively pursue British civilians who could offer deep insights into the Arab world. Unfortunately, the government also set up convoluted intelligence structures for Expeditionary Forces. This problem first raised its head at Gallipoli. Communications were haphazard and the Allied maps of the Peninsula were both out of date and inaccurate.

The British soon developed very active spy net­works, using Bedouin across the desert and Jewish settlers of Palestine along the coast. Captain Lawrence fed invalu­able HUMINT reports into this network and his Bedouin also benefited from it.^a

The Germans were initially more technically proficient in Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and clearly had communication secu­rity superior to that of the British, but that changed as the war progressed. British and French spy ships started collecting SIGINT while patrolling the Mediterranean coast and re­connaissance aircraft plucked it from the sky. A prized British possession was a high-tech device called a Wire­less Compass. Modified for military use by the famed scientist Guglielmo Marconi, the compass enabled intel­ligence officers to locate the source of enemy radio transmissions. It was particularly useful in identifying and targeting Ottoman military headquarters.¹⁵

Perhaps surprisingly, this war had an early version of communications intelligence (COMINT). Both sides tapped into newly erected telephone lines and listened to unsecured conversations.[23] In sum, British military intelligence was initially heavily flawed, but it improved over time and eventually gave the Allies a decisive edge. By 1918, German-Turkish intelligence could only be deemed as totally inadequate.

Military

During the 18^th and 19th centuries, the formerly dominant Ottoman military had deteriorated enough that the word “Ottoman” was not even mentioned in Carl von Clauswitz’s 1832 classic military treatise, On War. Perhaps their greatest weakness was a scotoma concerning the individual Ottoman soldier’s capability vis-a-vis the West. After close observation of the Turks, the great Prussian General von Moltke wrote, “A Turk will concede without hesitation that Europeans are superior to his nation in science, skill, wealth, daring and strength, without it ever or occurring to him that a Frank[24] might therefore put himself on par with a Muslim.” [25] As a direct result of such shortcomings, they lost most of their European territories. By allying with Germany, Enver Pasha’s grandious vision of enlarging the Empire seemed obtainable. Using this “carrot” the Germans pushed the Ottomans beyond their military capabilities, for example by encouraging reckless campaigns into Persia and against the Suez Canal. Thus, overextending the Turks and contributing to a weakend state by the end of the war.

Quality military leadership did sustain the Turks for much of the war and goes well beyond Mustafa Kamal’s famous order to have his men “die” at Gallipoli. Competent German advisors such as General von Sanders at Gallipoli stood in sharp contrast to Enver Pasha’s botching of the Eastern Campaigns. The talents and dedication of the broader Turkish officer corps should not be underestimated. Ottoman military training produced many fine officers. “The military system, despite the minimal attention of historians, pre-dated the civil system and was always better funded and more carefully organized.”[26] Who knows how many of Turkey’s best and brightest young officers died quite early in the war while defending the Turkish straits?[27] How many more sage veterans had been purged by Enver in 1914? Had Enver Pasha paid greater heed to his senior staff’s professional military advice, the outcomes in the Caucuses and the Levant could have been much more beneficial.

In many ways the Ottoman military performance exceeded expectations despite poor political leadership, weapon and manpower shortfalls, and logistical nightmares. One must not forget that they were greatly war weary even before the Archduke's assassination. Eugene Rogan noted, “In the aftermath of the wars in Libya and the Balkans, men of military age have been discreetly fleeing the Ottoman Empire to avoid the draft. In 1913 immigration to North America and South America increased by 70% over previous years. American Council officials claimed that most immigrants were young men evading military service.”[28]

The Ottoman leadership also had misplaced strategic military priorities such as protecting “railroads to nowhere”. Of note, T.E. Lawrence strongly supported keeping the rail line to Medina open. He correctly estimated the Turks would make the error of using 20,000 men to guard the line. Those soldiers would therefore not be able to be deployed against the British elsewhere.

Economic

In Arming the Sultan: German Arms Trade and Personal Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire Before World War I, Naci Yorulmaz assessed the Ottoman arms industry as largely self-sufficient for the first 3/4 of the 19th century, albeit producing inferior quality weapons. From that point up through World War I, Germany managed to dominate the production of Ottoman arms. Yorulmaz argues German sales successes resulted not from the quality of the German weapons (which was in fact quite good), but rather from personal bonds between senior German and Ottoman officials. Germany's industrial might at the beginning of World War I was further enhanced by the capture of the French industrial heartland. The Central Powers were generally quite efficient, squeezing as much as they could via “siege economies”. Germany also provided much more than just political support. It had been very active in trying to both modernize and organized the Ottoman army and had made major financial investments in the Ottoman economy and infrastructure. The most famous of which were the aforementioned rail line from Berlin to Baghdad and a lesser, though important, route down the Levant with an objective of reaching Mecca. Of note, the first train for Berlin left Baghdad on June 1st, 1914 just days before the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

A longer war definitely favored the Allies. Britain at that time controlled almost 20% of the earth’s surface and the Triple Entente powers had three times the resources and five times the population of their enemies.[29] Moreover, “Britain radicalized the war, for it fought differently from the continental belligerents as the world's premier naval power with control of sea lanes, coaling station, and underwater telegraph cables, it used economic warfare proactively as a means to strangle its enemies.”[30] That was all before the rising industrial powerhouse, America, even entered the war.

Economically, by 1914 the Ottoman Empire was a mere shadow of its former greatness. Its control over major trade routes had long ago dried up as had the taxes and booty derived from its voracious territorial expansion. Prior to the war, a third of all Ottoman tax revenues was already being used to repay crushing foreign debts.[31] Tax revenues dropped by 20% and most European banks started recalling their loans within months of mobilization.[32] Moreover, mobilizing a major slice of the male labor force had predictably devastating impacts on the Ottoman’s agricultural productivity, as well as its already unimpressive industrial capacity. These factors, compounded by Allied maritime and land-based control of trade routes, increasingly starved the Ottoman of the resources needed to support both the military and the civilian populations.

Conclusions

The Ottoman’s loss in World War I was not necessarily a foregone conclusion. Yet, it seems to be the logical progression in a decline which had begun with the unsuccessful second siege of Vienna in 1683. At that point, the Empire had achieved its greatest territorial gains in Europe. It would subsequently spend centuries dealing with the technological, economic, and military ascendance of the West.

Diplomatically and culturally the Ottomans misplayed their two “key cards,” its Sultanate and Caliphate. Early in the war, the Ottomans rounded up and executed Arab intellectuals and Muslim leaders in Beirut and Damascus. With their German allies, they terrorized and alienated Muslim, Jewish, and Christian villagers. In sharp contrast, a more culturally attuned Lawrence successfully argued against a massive allied invasion force which would be seen as another crusade. He then rallied Muslim Bedouins to his side and made them a significant unconventional force. Similarly, as his Levant campaign closed in on Jerusalem in 1917, General Allenby ordered no artillery be fired at the city. The leader of the first Christian army to enter Jerusalem since 1087, did so humbly and on foot. He guaranteed access to the holy sites to all religions and the only flag he let fly over the city was that of the Red Cross.[33]

There were certainly pockets of outstanding Turkish military performances such as the Gallipoli and Mesopotamia campaigns, however, any objective assessment of the Ottoman military in 1914 should have led to a decision to remain neutral during the war. Even with an infusion of experienced German senior officers, the military was neither equipped, nor trained, nor possessed of sufficient military intelligence to be successful in an early 20^th Century military conflict. It is certainly true that several of the Western allies also had severe military weaknesses, but this is where the economic aspect of the DIME analysis is so critical. The Ottomans, and even the Germans, did not have a sufficient resource base to win a protracted war. In sum, they were not well prepared for a true Yilderim (lightning) war which they would need to win before the West could fully mobilize and attract the Americans onto their side. They also did not have the manpower, industrial base, nor the political leadership to be successful over the longer term. The Ottoman decision to go to war led to the greatest loss of civilian life of any of the participants in World War I (20%) and the creation of twenty-seven successor states at last count.[34] I have to wonder if an early defeat in the Dardanelles might have actually been beneficial for the Ottomans. Clearly, given the Western avarice chronicled in Sykes-Picot another documents, the Ottoman Empire would not have survived intact. Yet, it could have been spared almost four more years of devastating personnel and economic losses. It would have also severed German supply lines and taken tremendous pressure off of British possessions in Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. An early withdrawal could have shortened the overall length of the war and dampened Allied thirst for vengeance in the dismembering of the Anatolian heartland. A rising Russia could have also given the war weary French and British incentive to prop up the non-threatening “sick man” for at least a bit longer. Such a scenario would have almost certainly precluded the rise of Attaturk and taken the Turks on a significantly different path than they experienced in the 20th and early 21st century.

What might have happened if the Ottomans had allied with the West? Certainly, no one could have forseen a “Black Swan” event such as the Bolshevik revolution. Could anyone have reasonably predicted America’s eventual entry into the war? Regardles, a Western alliance certainly would have avoided the devastating Turkish campaigns at Gallipoli, with the Russians, and in the Middle East. True, the Ottomans would still have had a Balkan front, especially after Bulgaria aligned with Germany, but consider how much pressure even a fraction of the eventual 2.8 million men in the Ottoman army could have put on Germany. Combine this with the effect of Russia and Britain not having to commit troops to a Turkish front. This would have almost certainly have led to a quicker allied victory. Perhaps the Bolshevik Revolution, which was partially caused by Russia’s huge military manpower losses, never takes place. But this is all speculation on possible alternate histories.

What does seem clear is that three basic paths were open to the Ottomans in the summer of 1914: a) ally with the West, b) ally with the Central Powers, or c) remain neutral. The first was problematic given a lack of enthusiasm by Britain and France. But only one of the three paths was likely to lead to disastrous consequences for the Empire. Unfortunately for the Turks, that was the path the Ottomans chose.

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Dean, Louise. Rail that Survived Demolition by "Lawrence of Arabia": An Analysis. The Journal of Metallurgy, http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/jom/0307/dean-0307.html, 2003

PBS, Arab Warfare, http://www.pbs.org/lawrenceofarabia/revolt/warfare3.html

Nabataea.net, The Hejaz Railway, http://nabataea.net/hejazhistory.html

http://alh-research.tripod.com/Light_Horse/index.blog/1825345/turkish-understanding-of-projected-allied-attacks-august-1917/ (Australian Light Horse Studies Centre)

Weapons of the Ottoman Army - The Ottoman Empire | NZHistory, New Zealand history online 

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[1] Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, p. 57

[2] Salt, The Last Ottoman Wars, p. 5

[3] For example, the massive cannons used against the walls of Constantinople in 1453 were designed and built by a Hungarian named Urban.

[4] Weapons of the Ottoman Army - The Ottoman Empire | NZHistory, New Zealand history online

[5] Ernest and Trevor Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 942

[6] John McDonald, Great Battlefields of the World, p. 138.

[7] Michael E. Haskew, Great Military Disasters, p.75

[8] David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p.121

[9] Iran and the First World War, www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-and-the-First-World-War.htm

[10] Salt, p. 186

[11] Dupuy, p. 952-975

[12] The Sublime Porte was basically the most senior level of the Ottoman government.

[13] Eugene Rogan, the Fall of the Ottomans, p.34.

[14] Christopher Clark, the sleepwalkers, p.335

[15] McKale, Curt Profer: German Diplomat from the Kaiser to Hitler, p.26

[16] Ahmad, The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities, p.127

[17] In The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Paul Kennedy argues that the German decision to seek an alliance may have actually backfired on the Kaiser. Although controlling the straits stop Russia from exporting grain and importing munitions, Kennedy notes that Russia did not have very much excess grain nor were there munitions to spare in the West[17].

[18] The Turkish Straits are probably the least important of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s strategic naval chokepoints. The narrowness of the Straits makes them relatively easy to mine and the power of the British Navy could have stopped any power projection from the Turkish Navy into the Mediterranean. Granted, possession of the Straits did maintain communication and logistical links between Berlin, Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and the Levant.

[19] Alan Woods, The First World War: A Marxist Analysis of the Great Slaughter (2019) ch. 8.

[20] Henry P. Williams III, East and West: Where the Twain Meet (2019) New Degree Press p.215

[21] Salt, p. 172

[22] The author, Husayn Husnu Emir, said he was inspired to write the book because he previously could only learn about Turkish military history by reading the works of foreigners.

[23] The encryption used to counter this threat mainly consisted of time-hon­ored letter substitution codes, but the addition of a second layer of mathematical encryption guaranteed much higher security.

¹⁷ The resulting improvement in COMSEC led to a requirement for increasingly sophisti­cated code breakers.

[24] “Frank” was a generic Turkish reference to Europeans dating from the time of the Crusades.

[25] Keegan p.39

[26] Michael Provence, The Last Ottoman Generation, p.18

[27] The Ottomans held no monopoly on senior military incompetence. Prior to the war, a Turkish general had major concerns about confronting British soldiers, who they assessed to “fight like tigers”. In reply, a German general reportedly said, “True, but they are led by donkeys”. The unquestioned low point of British leadership took place at Gallipoli. British mismanagement of the amphibious landings and subsequent battles goes down as one of the greatest military disasters of all time. Winston Churchill was hardly an unbiased observer of this campaign, but he was able to aptly characterize the decision of General Sir Charles Monroe to evacuate the Peninsula, “he came, he saw, he capitulated.”[27]

[28] Rogan, p. 54

[29] Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel, (Basic Books, 2014), P. 208

[30] Ibid

[31] Salt, p. 190

[32] Rogan, p. 57

[33] John Thom Spach, Allenby in the Last Crusade, Military History Magazine. March 1996, pages 27-28.

[34] Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire in the First World War https://www.insightturkey.com/book-reviews/the-Ottoman-road-to-war-in-1914-the-Ottoman-empire-and-the-first-world-war