Professor Selçuk Colakoğlu, with the Department of International Relations at Yıldırım Beyazıt University (YBU) in Ankara, specialized in International Relations and Director of the Turkish Center for Asia Pacific Studies (APAC), has offered his views on Security of Turkey in the interview offered to Geostrategic Pulse Magazine.

Professor Selçuk Colakoğlu / (C) The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research

Geostrategic Pulse: The unfolding great power competition, currently accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, is set to change the nature of international relations in the coming period. In your opinion, what are the main challenges that Turkey will face in the light of the above? To what extent did the pandemic cause a paradigm shift in Turkey’s geostrategic approach, with regard to strengthening its domestic resilience?

Selçuk Colakoğlu: The literature of international relations has had new terms like “corona diplomacy” and “vaccine diplomacy”. Achieving personal protective equipment (PPE) was extremely critical for countries in the beginning of the pandemic. Now achieving vaccines first has caused a competition among states. Furthermore, the pandemic has accelerated the global competition between the West and China. The debate on the source of the COVID-19 has still caused friction between Beijing and Western capitals. The United States, Russia, China, and the European Union have tried to expand their influence via vaccine and aid diplomacy across the World. Turkey is also in the middle of vaccine diplomacy. In the initial stage of the pandemic, Ankara used its corona aid to other countries to increase its diplomatic influence. Ankara has also had diverse vaccine contracts with the Chinese Sinovac, Russian Sputnik, and American-German Pfizer-BioNTech. Turkey has so far succeeded in not being part of great powers’ competition during the pandemic.

Taking into account Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies, how do you see the balance ensured by the national security strategy between the internal and external resilience of the country?

Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies have become more interactive recently. The rise of populism and nationalism in domestic politics in recent years has paved the way using foreign policy issues as a leverage to get more popular support for Turkish politicians. On the other hand, using foreign policy issues in domestic politics may have a fire-back to Turkey’s economic relations with other countries. Furthermore, the de-institutionalization process in recent years has created a challenge to fix a resilient and full-fledged national security strategy for Turkey.

Turkey’s foreign policy was very clearly defined by president Recep Tayyip Erdogan during the AK Party’s 7^th Ordinary Congress: “We will continue to shape our relations with all the countries, from the U.S. to Russia and from the European Union to the countries in the Arab geography, in line with Turkey’s interests and our nation’s expectations. As a country that is located in the heart of Africa, Asia and Europe, we cannot afford to turn our back on either the East or the West. We are well aware of the fact that it is not easy to develop balanced, coherent and long-term cooperation with countries which are in competition or even in conflict with one another at the same time. However, Turkey, with its geographical position, economic interests and inclusive foreign policy vision, has the power and sagacity to achieve this.” How will Turkey’s agenda and priorities be influenced by the strategic rivalry between the three major powers – USA, China and Russia?

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) changed its ideology from center right “Muslim Democracy” to pro-Muslim Brotherhood “Political Islam” in 2011. Turkey’s deterioration of relations with Israel, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is related to ruling AKP’s pro-Brotherhood policy in the Middle East. The ruling AKP has also formed an anti-West coalition with the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and a marginal pro-Eurasian association Vatan Party since 2016. This does not mean that Turkey has become an ally of Russia and China. Ankara has used Moscow and Beijing as a leverage for its bargaining with NATO allies. On the other hand, Turkey has bitter differences on some policies with Russia and China too. Ankara’s active balancing policy between rival great powers has got some tactical and short-term benefits. But there is a risk that the United States, Russia, and China may consider Turkey as untrustworthy because of its unpredictable and fast changing balancing tactics in Turkish foreign policy.

Ankara has lately committed itself to sustained efforts to restore Turkey’s relations with important countries in its regional vicinity, mainly Egypt. What are the motivations behind this shift in Turkey’s foreign policy and to what extent do you think a normalization of the relations between Ankara and Cairo is achievable, taking into account the complexity of a regional environment that includes Greece, Cyprus, Libya and others?

Turkey’s deepening isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean against the bloc consisting of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus has increased diplomatic and economic costs for Ankara in recent years. Losing large Turkish export markets in Egypt and Saudi Arabia is another special reason for Ankara to seek normalization with Cairo and Riyadh in recent months. On the other hand, excluding Turkey from regional initiatives like the East Mediterranean Gas Forum is not logical step for their sustainability. Any energy project in the Eastern Mediterranean without Turkey’s involvement will be insufficient and less feasible. 

The May 5-6 talks in Cairo, chaired by the deputy foreign ministers of the two countries, took place relatively soon after Turkey began to publicly voice its overtures with Egypt in March 2021. The talks focused on the conflict in Libya where Egypt and Turkey have backed opposing sides, the energy rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean and Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which Cairo has designated a terrorist organization. The earlier talks between Ankara and Cairo indicate that fully normalized Turkish-Egyptian relations is not an easy target which can be achieved soon.

In the context of the Syrian war, and with regard to the tensions that keep on occurring at the Greek-Turkish border, how do you assess President Erdogan’s policy on migration? To what extent is the government in Ankara able to manage the migration flows?

The AKP-MHP government has successfully used the refugee card as a leverage to bargain with the EU. The 2016 EU-Turkey deal has been on track without a big blow. The refugee flow from Turkey to Greece following the Idlib war in March 2020 has been under control by Ankara and Brussels in the end.

The other fact is that people from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa are not covered by the 2016 migration deal. The Syrians in Turkey have settled in Turkish cities with some protection rights, built their own communities and integrated into the Turkish society to a certain level. However, the others have nothing to lose for trying to cross the Turkish-Greek border.

Turkey is now testing its limits to host refugees. Around five million refugees (four million Syrians and one million of different nationalities) have caused a demographic change in many Turkish cities, particularly in those bordering Syria. The Turkish public has become less tolerant to the refugees because of the economic hardships and increasing number of newcomers.

Turkey’s geopolitical position has represented, for the past few years, a major advantage in its relationship with the European Union. However, the dynamic of the migration flows can also represent a vulnerability to its domestic policy. How do you see this on a medium and long term?

Turkey’s economy has been in decline for the last seven years in a row. Turkey’s GDP was around $958 billion in 2013, then it declined to $650 billion in 2020 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Turkish lira depreciation against foreign currencies since 2018 and the pandemic has hit Turkish financial stability hard. The economic downturn and growing unemployment have been diminishing Turkey's absorption capacity for refugees. Around five million refugees will have more economic and social difficulties in Turkey. As the democratic backsliding of Turkey seems the main reason for the economic downturn, it is difficult to find easy solutions for the depressed Turkish economy.

In the current context, do you see as opportune a new association agreement with the European Union? To what extent could establishing a common, gradual agenda contribute to Turkey’s integration in the European Union?

Turkey’s membership process to the EU has technically continued, but no one from either side believes that Turkey will join the union in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, Turkey has been part of the EU customs union except for agricultural products since 1996, and has a deep-rooted economic integration into the EU. Even the membership process itself is particularly important for Turkey, for its economic stability and credibility. Recent surveys show that around 60% of Turkish people are still in favor of EU membership. This indicates that interdependence between the EU and Turkey forces them to keep their relationship vibrant.

The revision of the 1996 Customs Union is a long-time demand of Ankara after Brussels has signed many FTAs with third countries. Some EU countries were dragging the Turkish demands in recent years. If there is another deal between the EU and Turkey, it will be a balanced approach between the refugee issue and the revision of the Customs Union. However, as long as Turkey’s democratic backsliding continues, the Turkey-EU relations will have remained problematic rather than cooperative.

Selçuk Çolakoğlu, Turkey and China: Political, Economic,and Strategic Aspects of the Relationship, (London: World Scientific, 2021).