A Preamble

         During its modern history - marked mostly by the Sykes-Picot agreements in 1916, where Great Britain and France shared the vilayets and Ottoman provinces in the Middle East, then in 1947 by the famous “Partition Plan”, when the UN separated historical Palestine in two entities (Jewish and Palestinian Arabic) followed a year later, in May 1948, by the birth, in the Middle East, of the state of Israel - this troubled piece of the global political geography has known just a few, and short-lived moments of peace. Manifold, complex and most of all violent, the conflicts that have marked the developments in the Middle East brought complex and complicated combinations of successions of the actors involved, without significantly altering the essence and the stakes of the conflicts themselves. However, they have generated a series of continuous and varied alliances, more or less enduring, either between regional actors, or between them and one or more of the post-World Wars or post-Cold War global powers or, less so, between the latter. Alliances keep on appearing and disappearing nowadays as well, as they are built on the same ephemeral, mercantile principles and on the circumstances, favouritism, indifference and abuse of the law and international justice system. Such a phenomenon of appearance and disappearance of these alliances, partnerships, axes and blocs has known and still knows a fast growth under the influence of three major factors. They are the end of the Cold War and the fall of the “Iron Curtain” between the East and the West, the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September and the wars that followed, as well as the outburst of the fundamentalist Islamic terrorism and the so called “Arab Spring” with its failures and disappointments.

        The fluctuating power shifts and other various rivalries and centrifugal geostrategic calculations, accompanied by a host of wars and hybrid or covert confrontations have brought on the military, economic, commercial, energy and/or political battle fronts new actors and strategies that shape the current configuration of the political and strategic landscape in the Middle East.

         Landscape 
         The following lines try to paint a small picture of the main polarisations of forces which, under various names contribute to defining the current geostrategic identity of the Middle East.

         1. The “alliance” or “axis” that brings together the Russian Federation, Turkey and Iran.
These countries aren’t necessarily part of the Middle East, as they each have their own priorities and interests, and even misunderstandings; however, they all share the objective of self-imposing as deciding powers on the complicated conflictual dossiers of this geopolitical area. One of their common interests is the Syrian civil war that, due to the current course of events has become the element that binds them together. Despite the fact that positive steps have been taken to find a solution to the Syrian conflict, this axis has been and still is problematic and ambiguous. Even if Russia and Iran can justify their interference in Syria as having been requested by the regime in Damascus, reality shows more and more that, as far as Russia is concerned, it isn’t willing to accept a future scenario where, once pacified Syria will still host foreign forces (Turkish, Iranian and Western). At the same time, president Putin is willing to maintain a functional relationship with Israel, a state that is deeply hostile to Turkey and Iran. However, the Kremlin leader keeps being pragmatic. It is worth mentioning the fact that he indicated to both Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump that Russia was willing to influence the Iranian withdrawal from Syria, as long as they turn a blind eye on the conflict in Ukraine and as long as the Israeli and US administrations agree to resume negotiations with the Palestinian National Authority. Under such circumstances, one may say that the “alliance” between the three former imperial powers still is, if not problematic and confusing, at least doubtful as far as its duration is concerned.
         2.  We are currently witnessing a discreet rapprochement between the Gulf Arab states (minus Qatar) and Israel, with the sole purpose of thwarting the regional ambitions of the Tehran theocratic regime. The Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already been on a state visit in Oman, and Israel maintains close and specific political, military and commercial contacts with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Even the Riyadh monarchy through its crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman has intensified statements in favour of a strategic, military and media rapprochement with Israel, and against Iran.
         3.  As we speak, analysts and media commentators are closely monitoring, even if they don’t have enough information, what they call the “Middle East Alliance” supposed to develop a dynamic relationship between two great powers - the Russian Federation and China for now - and influential countries in the Middle East. This virtual bloc - meant to bring a new regional order once the regional conflicts are over and envisaged in the context of the imbalance generated by the decision of the current Washington administration to “bring home” its military forces from the Middle East - originates in Doha, and the initiative belongs to the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hammad Al-Thani. According to the Emir, this new “bloc” is meant to be a dynamic alternative to the ossified Gulf Cooperation Council. The initiative was welcomed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, while China and the Russian Federation showed interest and availability to join this new “alliance”. The USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia criticized it. Just as with other “advertised alliances”, there are doubts regarding the materialization of the project, as well as whether this “alliance” isn’t just another lever used by Qatar in its conflict with Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
       4. We will finally mention another alliance project, this time initiated by the Donald Trump administration. The “Middle East Strategic Alliance” (MESA or “Arab NATO”) was conceived as a comprehensive agreement incorporating military and security elements, as well as economic, energy related and political projects. Ever since its inception, the US initiative had a negative welcome and was subject to criticism from US and Arab analysts and politicians, to whom this strategic alliance was but one of Donald Trump’s attempts to place the burden of economic security on the shoulders of the regional member states, all under American leadership and without Washington assuming responsibilities to defend the allies in this “strategic coalition of the new Middle East”. The alliance died before it was even born. The tensions between Qatar and the other Arab monarchies in the Gulf Cooperation Council and the differences between the security priorities and the gaps that separate the countries’ approach on regional matters, such as the conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the different evaluations regarding political Islam, including the Muslim Brotherhood were some of the main issues hindering the accomplishment of the US and Qatari initiative.
It was the same failed experiment and the same volatile alliances as it was the case with the military alliance “Baghdad Pact” (1955-1979) also known as CENTO, that was meant to stop the Communist USSR from reaching the Middle East and Western Asia. Thus, one may say that alliances in this part of the world have had and still have, nowadays, a miserable destiny either because they lacked substance, or because they were premature or because they died before they were even born.

          From Alliances to Partnerships
        The countries in the Eastern and central part of Europe, out of which ten are NATO members, advance partnerships with the USA - based mainly on Washington’s ultimate power of decision and on support of the administration regional policies. On the other hand, Western Europe and Canada are reserved with regard to the policy that Donald Trump promotes in relation to the conflicts in the Middle East. We are mostly referring to the dispute with the Tehran Islamic regime, the Syrian civil war and the Palestinian issue.
Moving on to the actual Middle East area, one may see that for a long time the USA have managed to build a large system of bilateral partnerships that, without being immune to shock, tensions and intermissions, all offer support and serve as bridgeheads for the political and military presence of the USA in this area. (See picture below.)
         The Russian Federation, thanks to their policy regarding the Syrian civil war and the relationships with the countries in the region, has almost reached a climax as far as its return and consolidation of the presence and influence in the Middle East is concerned. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran act with rigor in order to expand and strengthen their regional power status, while the USA remain, at least for now, the only omnipresent and omnipotent manager of the geopolitical and geostrategic issues in the Middle East.
         In these circumstances, Turkey has a particular place, since it is one of the founding NATO members and has the second largest army in the Alliance. Turkey is also a fundamental outpost for the US regional policies, despite fluctuations in the relationship between the two countries. These fluctuations occurred due to the ever-changing and variable decisions and approaches taken by both the White House leader and the Turkish president Recep Tayyp Erdogan. A strong advantage is the US air base in Incirlik (in southern Turkey) where a nuclear arsenal including the long-range strategic bomber force B-52 has been deployed, among other.

 Source: les Clés du Moyen Orient, www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com

          Without being a NATO member or part of a long-term regional alliance, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of USA’s most trusted allies in the Middle East. This country has the advantage of being the second Arab state (following Egypt) that concluded a peace treaty with Israel. Besides, it plays a dynamic part in the overall effort to finding a solution to the sensitive Palestinian issue. Military speaking, Jordan has hosted US air force capabilities as part of the international coalition against the Islamist terrorist phenomenon and the fundamentalist terrorist group Islamic State/Daesh.

         Equally, Egypt benefits from a substantial US financial assistance that serves a military and security purpose and holds a special place in the US regional equation.

        In the Arabian Peninsula and on its eastern coast, the Arab monarchies, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but also Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman may be considered USA’s main allies in the Arab speaking area of the Middle East. Speaking from a strategic perspective, but also as main actors on the global market of energy resources, as outlets for the US arms industry and as countries that along with Washington contest the Iranian regime and its policies, these states share an important place in the regional US foreign policy.

        Looking at the region from a “Greater Middle East” perspective, we will find Iraq in the eastern proximity. This state hasn’t forgotten the US invasion (2003-2011) which is why it has close, official and confidential relationships with Iran. On the other hand, it also has a relationship with the USA, which might be defined as a sort of catholic marriage that has known its ups and downs. Furthermore, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa are known as USA’s allied clients and are dependent on American financial aid and are exposed to the geostrategic, geopolitical and military developments in the region.

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          A long lasting tradition of the USA’s foreign policy makes the American diplomacy - no matter its political orientation - divide the international community in two. Using the same rhetoric, we are referring, on one hand, to the good guys. They are of course the countries or the communities that suit the USA’s national and geostrategic interests and provide the source of future friendships, partnerships and alliances. On the other hand, we are referring to those commonly known as the bad guys, which are the countries known as not friendly, even hostile to the interests and plans of the Administrations across the Atlantic. The historical problem in both cases is that, from a resilience point of view, we cannot definitely talk about the steadiness of this paradigm, since for one reason or another the good guys can no longer be considered good, once they have exhausted their potential of interest for the USA. The bad guys can also revise their hostility and end up on good terms with “America First”. We are after all referring to a natural course of events that is as old as the history of alliances between the USA and the rest of the “guys” that make up the international community. Thus, the practice of volatile alliances is but a mere tool, useful under circumstances as volatile as the alliances, to satisfy the temporary interests of the powerful, or of those who want to become powerful or more powerful for a certain amount of time. Nothing new under the sun.