Foreword:
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – UAV, also known as drone is an aircraft that has no human pilot on board. It flies piloted by a digital autopilot, remotely, guided by a control centre on ground, or is placed in a different piloted aircraft. Drones are used in both military and civil sectors.
Military drones are used in intelligence, surveillance, espionage, reconnaissance, or combat, in combat missions. Depending on their purpose they are equipped with different types of surveillance equipment and/or weapons.
In the context of the general and global evolutions Iran’s interest for enhancing its experience in the field of airspace engineering and drone/UAV manufacturing is increasing. It became a study subject with evaluations and prognosis, especially when there already is the international perception that Iran is once more interested in this kind of technologies (an interest it showed during the war with Iraq and more so now, when Russia invaded Ukraine).
The Beginning of the Development of Iranian Airspace Engineering and UAV Manufacturing
The Iranians have been working in the UAV sector for decades. They purchased military fighting jets from the USA in the ’60s and ‘70s, and a small number of Chinese and Soviet aircrafts. It became well known that Iran has old Phantom and F-14 squadrons, but the fact that they managed to maintain their functionality for as long as they could fly, says something about their proficiency as defence airspace engineers. To still have these aircrafts operational is an achievement that reflects the capability of Iranian engineering that is now found in the UAV sector.
Iran has tried for a long time to develop an industry to manufacture UAVs. Some of its drones were used in 1997 to monitor US operations in the Gulf. Some reports showed that the Iranians used drones to monitor events in Afghanistan in the ‘90s, during the civil war. The first generation of UAVs (Ababil) that was used during the Iranian-Iraqi war seems to have been compared to cheap assault ammunition, rather than an intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance platform. Iran’s technological development and experience led to Ababil-3 and Ababil-5 (a medium range reconnaissance and surveillance device), Ababil-T (a short/medium range attack UAV) and Ababil-B and Ababil-S.
For example, Ababil-3 was first introduced in 2010 during the “Great Prophet-5” military exercise, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Images with this type of drone flying over the Persian Gulf were made public. The drone was officially introduced to the public in 2014 and was handed over to the Iranian Armed Forces. What draws attention to it are its technical features – the aerodynamic fuselage, different from Ababil, an eight hours’ flight time and a 250 km range, and the ability to send real time pictures to its control stations on the ground or to a different platform. In 2019, during some demonstrations, images with Ababil-3 were published. It was armed with Qaem bombs that showed the endowment capabilities to execute intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. One of the most famous reconnaissance operations of this drone that became viral in May 2019, was when it flew over the USS Eisenhower carrier, while it sailed in the Persian Gulf.
Israeli military experts believe that Iranian drones are a real threat. They explained some actions they carried out, saying that Israeli troops took down drones used by Hezbollah, in an attempt to attack an Israeli gas exploration platform in Lebanon disputed waters. The Iranian drone industry extended to other countries as well. In May 2022 Iran opened a drone factory in Tajikistan that manufactures Ababil-2, capable of reconnaissance and combat.
Iran recently let know that it developed two new types of Ababil – one of them is called Ababil-S, and was created especially for ISR operations. The aerodynamic design of the two models enhanced the device’s stability and performance in the air – they fly at high speed and they have superior manoeuvrability.
The arguments that are behind Iran’s increased interest over the manufacturing and use of UAVs are many.
For example, during the war with Iraq, the Iranian Air Forces increased their visibility and impact force; however, the high attrition level of their fighter jets became well known, especially by their engineers. The jets required constant inspection, tuning and calibration, maintenance and repairs, and even replacement – the devices that could no longer fly.
The UAVs allowed Iran to carry out some of the missions and take over the roles of other fighting jets, being less expensive fuel-wise and easier to build. The costs and technologies (some of which are very important) needed to manufacture, repair or maintain, tune and calibrate manned aircrafts allowed Iran to progress in this field. The UAVs take on roles and missions that the Iranian Air Forces and their manned aircrafts could not carry out at an acceptable consumption rate or even with acceptable losses of aircrafts and even human lives.
Iran – Significant Progress in Manufacturing Its Own UAVs
In 2021 the UAVs systems of the Iranian Armed Forces changed significantly. They changed from small, light, short range UAVs to large ones, capable of gathering intelligence, surveil and reconnoitre. The portfolio was enhanced – larger capability and more extensive gear; Iranian UAVs were equipped with electro-optic sensors, as well as more weapons systems.
Many times – especially in the past few years – was this question raised: how did Iran manage to equip its Armed Forces with high performance UAVs? People are looking for an answer to this question because, on an international level, there is the general belief that there are only two main sources for acquiring high performance UAVs. They are the USA and Israel, which are famous for their advanced airspace research and development industry and their up-to-date technologies, both countries having proficient airspace industries that can develop latest generation unmanned aerial systems. Both countries have developed top capabilities rather early, and they evolved fast, reaching mid to top levels performance.
In Iran’s case was the other way around. It had low level capabilities and the UAVs they manufactured could have been purchased on a domestic level only. Hence, Iran proved it had a dual approach as to UAVs manufacturing, needed to equip its Armed Forces. Within a conventional army, the UAVs take on classical operational assignments – intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance – at different times. According to the type of drone and its on-board sensors some of them have different types of weapons. Many of Iran’s UAVs seem to be operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), even though its conventional army and navy also started using them (2021). It looks like the IRGC also supplies its regional proxies with drone design and production capabilities, which enables Iran to deny all connections with those that have and use these types of UAVs. In this context, the Houthis from Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and the Hezbollah in Lebanon are concrete examples that have used UAVs or direct attack ammunition (also known as suicide or kamikaze drones), which bear the mark of Iranian craftsmanship.
As a result of the evolutions and progress Iran made in UAVs manufacturing, we must mention that during the ’80s and the ‘90s, Tehran managed to cooperate with China on defence, when it also acquired anti-ship defence missiles. We can assume that Iran might have been or probably was influenced during this time by Chinese projects. Some of the Iranian drones had “a similar design with the Chinese ones”. As Iran went along with the development of UAVs-manufacturing capabilities, it became clearer that most of them were made inside the country. Nevertheless, we do not exclude the possibility that some components were acquired on the “grey market”, or covertly. There are some UN reports that show this was the case. However, these files are hard to “crack”, because at the present, the design, blueprints and production of Iranian UAVs are strictly domestic.
Iran’s UAV technological development and operation originates from the conviction that Israel’s air capabilities and power are far superior. During a TV show broadcast in May 2022, Iran showed pictures of an UAV base situated in its Zagros mountain range, that held “over 100 UAVs”. According to information published by Israel’s longest surviving newspaper, Haaretz, in July 2022, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin visited Iran to meet with the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and with the Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, and officially discuss their coordinating strategies regarding Syria. Putin’s visit was also meant to make sure that Iran provided Russia with as many UAVs and weapons as it needed, because Putin and his generals realised that they were behind on the UAV development and production process, a weapon that nowadays is considered to be valuable and cheap.
In July 2022, the US national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, revealed that Iran was working on delivering hundreds of Iranian drones to Russia, for support in its war in Ukraine. This information was backed up by satellite imagery and additional information that showed Russian officials visiting Kashan airfield at least twice during summer, to examine the Iranian drones that were to be purchased. Iran categorically denied providing Russia with drones. The Iranian minister for foreign affairs, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian highlighted that his country had not or would not provide Russia with any weapons to be used in the conflict in Ukraine. France, Germany and Great Britain asked the UN to look into the matter and on the 8th September 2022, the USA sanctioned several Iranian companies for sending drones to Moscow. Despite further relevant evidence, Iranian officials continued denying their involvement in the war in Ukraine. In the beginning of November 2022 they partly denied and claimed that Iran gave Russia drones several months before the invasion of Ukraine. The US intelligence services claim that Iran also sent members of the IRGC in Crimea to assist Russia in overcoming the technical difficulties related to the drones Iran distributed.
We believe that it is very important and enlightening to show that Iran developed many highly equipped, domestically produced types of drones. Furthermore, the fact that Iran used some of these drones in its missions in the Persian Gulf is important. It also gave some to its regional proxies in order to be used for military purposes.
Our following presentation refers to a few common types of Iranian drones that this country could give Russia to be used in various parts of the world:
1. Ababil-2
Role: multirole (ISR and fight capabilities)
Range: 120-200 km
Launch System: JATO, pneumatic truck launcher
Munition: n/a
2. Ababil-3
Role: multirole
Range: 100-250 km
Launch System: runway
Munition: Almas anti-tank guided missiles, Qaem guided glide bombs
3. Ababil-5
Role: multirole
Range: 480 km
Launch System: runway
Munition: Almas anti-tank guided missiles, Qaem guided glide bombs
4. Fotros
Role: multirole
Range: 1.700-4.000 km
Launch System: runway
Munition: Almas top-attack guided missiles, Qaem guided glide bombs, Heydar-1/2 cruise missiles
5. Hemaseh
Role: multirole
Range: 200 km
Launch System: runway
Munition: Qaem guided glide bombs
6. Karrar
Role: multirole
Range: 800-1.000 km
Launch System: pneumatic catapult
7. Mohajer Mohajer-2/2N
Role: ISR
Range: Mohajer-2: 31-50 km; Mohajer-2N: 150 km
Launch System: pneumatic catapult
Munitions: possible capability to launch RPG-7s
8. Mohajer-4
Role: ISR
Range: 150 km
Launch System: pneumatic catapult
Munitions: Hyrda-70 air-to-surface unguided rockets
9. Mohajer-6
Role: multirole
Range: 200-2.000 km
Launch System: runway
Munition: Almas anti-tank guided missiles, Qaem guided glide bombs
10. Sadegh
Role: multirole
Range: 200 km
Launch System: pneumatic catapult
Munitions: Adapted Misagh air-to-air missiles
11. Shahed-129
Role: multirole
Range: 1.700 km
Launch System: runway
Munitions: Sadid guided glide bombs
12. Toufan
Role: One-way kamikaze attack
Range: 100 km
Launch System: JATO
Munitions: n/a
As I previously said, according to information from the media, it looks like certain versions of Iranian drones were used by Russia in the war against Ukraine – Shahed and Mojaher.
The most common explanation for Russia’s interest to purchase Iranian drones could be the desire to replace its expensive cruise missiles with much cheaper weapons, which, in a way could have the same effect in case of a prolonging war.
In the same context, when it comes to the features and performances of Iranian drones – unlike Turkey’s UAVs, which have already been tested – they do not have a full proof combat history, which is why we can assume that they are currently testing the performances they can achieve.
As a Conclusion...
Even if the UAVs are not a replacement for manned fighter jets, they are currently enabling Iran to significantly engage in military actions. Taking into account the fact that Iran’s regional influence increased, making it an important regional actor, the UAVs allow it to scramble its image as a threat to its regional opponents.
To sum up this analysis, we must remember that we are currently traversing the drone age and a different type of modern warfare. The technology for designing, manufacturing and efficiently using drones will probably turn into a critical and comprehensive type of technology. The efficiency, effectiveness and increasing number of missions carried out using different types of high-end UAVs sent military strategists and weapons manufacturers a very clear message – that they have a huge potential and are capable of confronting armies and destroy targets that are miles away.