The significance of the transatlantic link in the architecture of the European security[1] has been, over the years, a subject for debate for both the member states and the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. As in most cases, when important aspects regarding European defence and security are debated at the level of the European Union, opinions differ - from completely supporting the transatlantic link, to ensuring European security by its member states alone, by means of the Common Security and Defence Policy. These debates are the more relevant nowadays, when the European Union is more determined than ever in its evolution to build a security and defence profile that depicts the institution as guarantor of European security.

          While many EU member states leaders have expressed the necessity to develop European defence capabilities so that Europe can ensure its own security, the reality is totally different, as proven by the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy[2]: “The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two. In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to, and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States. … On the broader security agenda, the US will continue to be our core partner. The EU will deepen cooperation with the US and Canada on crisis management, counter-terrorism, cyber, migration, energy and climate action.”

          So, the most important document adopted in the past years by the European on security and defence undoubtedly states the current and future significance of the transatlantic link not only as far as defending Europe, but also ensuring its security. As the Global Strategy stipulates, and even though EU-NATO’s main fields of cooperation are crises management, counter-terrorism, hybrid threats and cyber defence, the other aspects of security are not excluded. Based on these clear stipulations of the Global Strategy, it is obvious that Brussels is aware of the fact that both the European defence and security are highly dependent on the cooperation between the EU and NATO, thus on the transatlantic link.

         The issue of transatlantic cooperation (the relationships between the EU and NATO, and between the EU and North America) from the perspective of European defence was extensively examined by the author in the first two articles. This article focuses on the significance of the transatlantic link from the perspective of European security, in the context of the dynamics and complexity of the international security environment and of the evolutions registered at the level of the European Union - from the same perspective. (Picture no. 1)

Picture no. 1, The Euro-Atlantic Area[3]

          The European Union is aware of the fact that its internal security cannot be ensured without NATO’s defence capabilities, and NATO’s military potential depends on the USA and Canada. So, in Brussels, it is hard to imagine the possibility of developing military and security capabilities that will lead to EU becoming totally independent from NATO and, by extent, the USA. This is neither realistic nor acceptable for the 22 common member states that would face the risk of duplicating their capabilities necessary to fulfil the responsibilities as EU and NATO members. This is why both the 2016 Global Strategy and the documents adopted afterwards at the level of the European Council and the Council of European Union highlight the necessity of cooperation with NATO and the USA on European defence and security, in complementarity and full respect of the decisional autonomy of the parties.

          Practically, by adopting a broad and inclusive approach, the European Union manages to satisfy, in an acceptable manner, the interests of all its member states, whether large or small. Large EU states (France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands etc.) that are NATO member states as well enjoy the EU decisional autonomy on security and defence. The other states that are part of both organizations benefit from not having to duplicate their defence capabilities and from preserving their decision-making autonomy over matters of security and defence that are of interest to the Union, but in which NATO doesn’t want to get involved. These states are lobbying permanently for cooperation between the EU and NATO on defence planning and development of military capabilities.

          Just out of the need to preserve decisional autonomy and promote its security and defence interests in areas and fields where NATO doesn’t show any interest, the EU has launched – through its Global Strategy implementation plans - a complex process of building military capabilities complementary to those of the Alliance. Looking at the way the funds destined for European defence and security are spent by comparison to the USA, the EU estimates that, depending on the intensity of European cooperation, it can save 25-100 billion Euro by eliminating fragmentation and inefficiency. (Picture no. 2)

Picture no. 2, the Cost of Current Fragmentation and Inefficiencies at the Level of the EU[4]

          The adoption of the Global Strategy has set up a complex process of analysis at the level of the EU and its member states that led to strengthening the mechanisms of the Treaty of Lisbon and to the creation of new ones through the various Council’s Conclusions. Thus, the European Union has embarked on a road to better coordination the planning of development of military capabilities destined to the defence and security of Europe. Among these mechanisms, the most important are:

        - Permanent Structured Cooperation - PESCO which, although included in the Treaty of Lisbon, is implemented for the first time. It lays out the necessary framework for the 25 member states that signed the PESCO arrangements to cooperate on 34 specific projects in fields such as military training and exercising, European Medical Command, joint capabilities, cyber-defence, hybrid threats etc.

        - Coordinated Annual Review on Defence – CARD, which: allows the member states to inform each other, in a formal setup, on national plans regarding defence expenditures; enables them to identify gaps and duplications, as well as savings by means of cooperation. Moreover, the common military research and development will be financed by the EU, from the European Defence Fund - EDF which will amount to 13 billion Euro in the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027.

          The recent evolutions at the level of the European Union, as far as the defence industry is concerned, are considered a serious challenge to the transatlantic link, the Europeans having to assume a greater responsibility in matters of European defence and security. If such initiatives existed in the past at the level of the EU, but were never materialized in cooperation programs, today things are different. Starting with 2014, the security situation at EU borders and even domestically has changed dramatically. The rules of international law were severely violated when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea. Russia’s actions in Eastern Ukraine led to increased instability at the eastern border of the EU, and many European countries see Russia as a destabilising factor and a threat to their sovereignty. The unity of NATO and the EU is exposed to Moscow’s attempts to undermine it using means and techniques specific to hybrid warfare. Just like terrorism, cyber warfare represents a more and more powerful threat from both state and non-state actors. Consequently, Europe feels the urgent need to develop military capabilities to defend its interests, should the USA and implicitly NATO choose not to get involved.

          One should also consider the fact that Brussels is undergoing radical changes regarding the way European institutions get involved in security and defence matters. If these fields have traditionally been considered to fall under the responsibility of the European Council and of the Council of European Union, starting with 2017 the European Commission is involved by allocating funds for military research and technology. Taking into account that the Commission has significant authority on allocating funds and spending the EU budget, it is expected the EDF to be implemented according to the decisions taken by the member states.

         Moreover, the Europeans have become relatively sceptical about the USA involvement in European defence and security after the declarations of President Donald Trump regarding Washington’s transatlantic commitment, as emphasized on the occasion of the NATO Summit in 2018. Surely, economic concerns are being voiced on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, especially by the USA, Great Britain, and the EU states with small defence industries that fear that larger EU countries will further consolidate their defence industries, with a negative effect on free and fair competition.

          Economic considerations are elements to be taken into consideration, without a doubt. However, the author believes that Europe must increase its defence investments just like the USA demanded on many occasions, starting with the NATO Summit in 2014. This is practically the role of the EDF managed by the Commission. By investing in common military research and development, the EU member states will develop modern military capabilities at lower costs than when investing only at national level. This will reduce the dependency of some states from Russian military equipment and will increase European interoperability.

         One might believe that the US interests are severely affected by the EU’s new initiatives on research, development and acquisition of European military capabilities. The author believes this will only happen on a short term. More important to Washington should be reaching its strategic objectives on long term, as far as European contribution to the defence and security of Europe. Taking into account that at this moment the US military exports to EU states represent 11% of all exports, out of which one third goes to the UK, the impact on the US military industry is not as high as one might expect. This impact can be reduced by setting certain conditions for the subsidiaries of US companies in EU to participate in EDF financed projects, while European companies will have access to US technology. (Picture no. 3)

Picture no. 3, the meeting between the US President, Donald Trump, President of the European Commission, Jean Claude-Junker and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, May 2017[5]

         Intensifying the cooperation between NATO and the EU as far as the development of complementary and interoperable military capabilities is concerned should be a priority for all involved parties. To this end, both the EU member states and the USA must cooperate to develop military capabilities. To most European states that are members to both NATO and EU, is in their interest to see that the development of military capabilities within EU contribute to NATO’s capability requirements, and the other way around. In order to achieve this, complementarity and interoperability are mandatory, and a guarantee for the development of a single set of forces at national level. This generates a conflict of interests between the largest European producers of military equipment and the other EU member states that need to be settled at the level of the European Council. Smaller states want to have access to the European military research and development while preserving their decisional freedom as far as the military equipment suppliers, whether European or North American.

          Practically, when implementing projects financed through the EDF one should also take into account the capability gaps identified by the NATO Defence Planning Process - NDPP. This is why the European Defence Agency - EDA should be more connected to the NDPP and encourage the EU member states to lobby within PESCO primarily for the development of capabilities that lack within both organizations. Basically the NATO-EU cooperation on the development of military capabilities should be broadened from a military level to a political strategic one. In such a situation, the EDF could contribute to finding solutions to the security interests of both Europe and the US and would give more substance to the relationship between NATO and the EU, as well as to the transatlantic link.

         The US and European security and defence strategic objectives are not in contradiction with each other, and their complementarity can also be improved through a closer cooperation in the development of military capabilities. This is obvious for everyone. It remains to be seen how the national interests of the larger EU countries and those of the US - as far as the defence industry is concerned – can be harmonized with those of the smaller EU states and even with the Union’s general interest to ensuring European peace and security.

         The author believes that an increase in the European military cooperation will have as main consequence more efficiency in the military expenditures of the EU member states, especially with regard to modernising combat capabilities and reducing duplication in the fields of research, development, acquisition and operation of combat equipment. Full transparency towards the member states and inclusiveness will allow the UE to increase the European contribution to the distribution of the trans-Atlantic effort to ensure the security and defence of Europe. Europe will become more capable to act within the Allied framework or autonomously in areas of common strategic interests, both at an operational and strategic level.

          By adhering to the principle of a single set of forces assumed by all the states that belong to both NATO and the EU, and by ensuring a fruitful NATO-EU cooperation in the field of defence planning, the 22 NATO and EU member states can deploy their forces in both NATO and EU operations. Thus, the EU’s strategic autonomy can develop in complementarity with that of NATO and contribute to a more balanced distribution of the security and defence responsibilities of the countries on both sides of the Atlantic. This can only lead to the strengthening of the transatlantic link.