Foreword

It became obvious that the world must face many unpredictable actions orchestrated by various entities, using diverse tools, entities which take advantage of the vulnerabilities of some of the regions in the world. The current political, economic, social, military, security situation in the world is deeply affected by various interests, which cause insecurity and confusion, when it comes to the future world order.

Multipolarism and the occurrence of a variety of perceptions regarding all risks generate intense debates concerning the principles and modus operandi employed to ensure a stable environment in any part of the world. As a consequence, now more than ever, strategic analysis circles are making efforts to quantify the impact of the evolution of the challenges that the world today is facing. Such a circumstance makes it necessary to adopt a proactive stand when dealing with these challenges, because the speed of change sometimes surprises the international actors involved in the evolutions of the situations in various areas, as it is the case with the Black Sea basin.

Will Vladimir Putin Visit Turkey, a NATO Member?

On the 29^th March 2023, the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a surprise declaration, according to which, his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin could visit Turkey on the 27^th April 2023, to inaugurate the first nuclear reactor in the country, built by the Russian state company, Rosatom.

However, we cannot overlook the fact that the declaration of the Turkish president, made public on TV was that “maybe there is a possibility that Mr Putin will come on April 27, or we may connect to the inauguration ceremony online and we will take the first step in Akkuyu”.

In such a context, we must highlight that on the 27^th March, the authorities in the Kremlin refuted the information published by the Turkish media that said that Putin would plan to visit Turkey. Furthermore, the Russian state agency, RIA let know on the 27^th March that the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Iran and Syria could meet in Moscow for consultations in the beginning of April 2023.

In order to become more credible, the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, also refuted the information regarding V. Putin’s visit to Turkey. He also said that the Russian president did not intend to travel to Turkey.

Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that previously, the Turkish press informed that secret preparations for V. Putin’s visit were ongoing and that he was expected to discuss a series of important matters with the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

We must also highlight the fact that the Kremlin let the international public know that on the 25^th March 2023, Putin and Erdoğan discussed on the phone about successfully implementing common strategic projects in the energy field, including the construction of the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu[1]. It looks like, following this conversation, the Turkish press published reports that suggested that Putin would soon meet Erdoğan in Ankara. The reports said that the visit had been kept secret and that Erdoğan and Putin would visit southern Turkey, affected by the two strong earthquakes, which took place in February 2023.

Various analyses based on information, knowledge and the understanding of the possible evolutions in the region, labelled the possibility of Putin’s visit to Turkey as an event meant to strengthen Erdoğan’s position before the presidential and parliament elections that are to take place on the 14^th May 2023. However, we must not forget that the International Criminal Court recently issued an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes committed in Ukraine, which could have put Erdoğan on the spot, domestically, regionally and globally, especially when Turkey is not part of, and did not sign the agreement for the Rome Statute, which established the ICC.

The 20 billion dollars and 4,800 MW project to build and make operational four nuclear reactors in Akkuyu will allow Turkey to join the small club of nuclear nations and it is well known that Turkey has previously made public its intention to power its first reactor there in 2023. Turkey will load the nuclear fuel in its first nuclear reactor of the power plant and will officially be given the status of nuclear facility on the 27^th April 2023, as Erdoğan made public in a previous announcement.

It is important to emphasize that Erdoğan and Putin talked about Russian cereal exports and about their delivery to the countries that need it, Turkey proving itself active both in the negotiations regarding the distribution of cereals through the Black Sea, as well as those regarding the peace between Russia and Ukraine.

Unpredictible and Duplicitous Changes with Regard to Turkey’s Attitude, Reactions and Decisions in the Intense Relationship and Competitive Process with Russia

The complexity of interactions and relations between Russia and Turkey goes beyond conflict zones, all the way to the military and energy sectors. While Russia and Turkey were managing conflicts and occasionally clashed in the Middle East and the Caucasus, they also developed a military cooperation. It went to another level when in September 2017 Turkey announced that it purchased the Russian anti-aircraft missile system, S-400. It was activated during the launch trial, which took place on the 16^th October 2020. The US military fears that by operating the S-400 system, Turkey, a NATO member will allow the Russian military to access “the data base containing the fighting capacities of the US made F-35 fighter jet”. Hence, the USA stopped the delivery of 100 F-35A fighter jets, and the Russian leadership said it was ready to deliver Turkey advanced fighter jets, including its own fifth generation SU-57.

Analysts and international observers are more and more careful and puzzled by the apparent closeness between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and implicitly, by that between Russia and Turkey, that is real, despite the intense Russian-Turkish competition for the ever-expanding influence in North Africa, South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. A common goal is to advertise the idea that they are regional powers that wish to control those regions and build a regional order outside the framework of multilateral institutions based on hierarchy, limited sovereignty and the interference with the territorial integrity of smaller countries.

Furthermore, by getting more and more involved in their neighbour’s disputes, Russia and Turkey increased the number of issues that generate friction between them. In the areas where their ambitions clash, Ankara and Moscow try to approach the condominium differently, while attempting to diminish the influence of Western countries and institutions.

And in the context of the international sanctions, this month, Turkey suddenly stopped the transit of goods to Russia, because the EU and the USA are putting pressure on the allies to support the measures taken concerning Russia, following the Ukraine invasion. The government ordered stopping the transit of these goods through Turkey on the 1^st March 2023, according to the sanctions imposed, stated a high Turkish official, who wished to remain anonymous. “The customs system in Turkey just stopped working”, stated Ekaterina Lazutkina, the co-owner of Vendor Cargo, a maritime transport, customs and general goods company from Moscow, which accesses Turkey. The customs system is blocking the goods destined for Russia, she said.

We must not neglect the fact that all those decisions were taken after Turkey became one of Russia’s rich paradises and a goods-supply centre, benefitting for the past year from the personal relationship between the presidents Putin and Erdoğan. Taking into account the relationship between the two countries we must highlight that Turkey’s exports to Russia increased from 5.8 billion dollars to 9.3 billion dollars in 2022, pointing out the difficulties that the USA and the EU had to face to form a common front against Putin.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s current position is tied to the EU extending the sanctions against Russia, just as Mustafa Boyacioglu declared. He is the executive director of the custom agency Subasi in Istanbul. He said that there was no official announcement and no transition period, thus creating confusion among companies.

“We hear that a solution might be to send products in countries that have nothing to do with the sanctions, such as those in Central Asia”, said M. Boyacioglu. “There should not be an issue with the products that have been firstly imported from Turkey and then sent to Russia, but we are not even sure about that, as restrictions seem to be based on origin”. “Russian senders still hope that the situation will return to normal”, said Valeriya Savenkova during a phone conversation. She is the trade manager for Transasia Logistics in Moscow, which makes deliveries to Turkey.

And all these unclear, surprising and duplicitous evolutions of the relations between Turkey and Russia ever since the beginning of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine meant Russia giving Turkey a helping hand, which actually meant providing it with a multitude of people – tourists, visitors – and implicitly money and benefits, in exchange for the attitude the latter manifested. All through 2022, the Russians came to Turkey in numbers. Many have been buying properties, while others came to escape recruitment, place their financial resources outside the Russian president’s sanctioned economy, or open new businesses. In 2022 alone, the Russians established 1,363 new companies in Turkey, and the immigration offices in the largest Turkish cities are being “flooded” by Russians asking for stay permits. According to data provided by the Turkish government, over 155,000 permits have already been approved.

Most of Turkey and its economy welcomed the newcomers and their money with open arms. To a certain extent, they changed – at least for a while – the face of Turkish cities, such as Istanbul or Antalya. The rents went up, but the prices for natural gas remained low; even the occasional billboard has Cyrillic letter nowadays. For Turkey, one of the largest NATO Members, maintaining and strengthening its ties to Russia is a difficult balancing act, but proves to be highly valued by both countries. Turkey believes it should play double at this time, as it sits between Iran and the West, with its border with Syria, controlling the only way into the Black Sea basin, and having a maritime border with both Ukraine and Russia. More than that, ever since the war started, Turkey placed its strategic interests above all else and adopted decisions, which managed to support the Ukrainian military effort, as well as the Russian economy affected by the war.

Turkey provided Ukraine with drones – highly effective against Russian forces – and helped negotiate an agreement that would enable the transport of Ukrainian grains from Black Sea harbours. At the same time, Turkey started buying more Russian oil and gas and partially protected Moscow from sanctions. For the Turkish President, Erdoğan, the most important thing is his geopolitical, geostrategic, political and economic needs, domestically speaking.

To be able to understand properly Erdoğan’s ideas, plans and decisions, we must remember that he is probably facing the most difficult electoral process, which is to take place in May 2023, and his support, not Russia’s will be decided, if “the marriage between Turkey and Russia is of convenience”, just as Alper Coskun said. He is a senior member with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This definitely is not an easy marriage. Ever since 2015, the relations between the two countries have gotten worse, when Turkey took down a Russian aircraft that illegally entered Turkish airspace, at its border with Syria. In June 2016, Erdoğan apologised and expressed his availability for restoring bilateral relations. A month later, Russia offered Erdoğan its help, after a failed coup d’état that took place in Turkey.

For Turkey, Russia is full of opportunities, but is also a threat. An aggressive Russia that controls Ukrainian coastal cities is definitely not suitable for Turkey. Neither is the rise of a Kurdish state in northern Syria, especially when, ever since 2014, the USA have supported Kurdish fighters there, while Turkey claims that the Kurdish militias are strongly connected with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a formation that Turkey, the USA and the EU labelled as a terrorist organisation. In the same context, Russia was on the other side of the competition in Syria, supporting the Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad.

This mindset to maintain a close relationship with partner states is probably what made Moscow seriously and closely monitor the future Turkish elections, because it is trying to keep up with the many evolutions in the countries in the Middle East, where it plays a detrimental role to its opponents. The recent foreign policy actions taken by Russia in the Middle East and North Africa raise concerns with regard to Erdoğan’s electoral success, who, even though is a frequent tactical opponent to Russia, is more or less the same as Putin when it comes to the way he chooses to govern, or to the policies he employs. His recent political decisions paved the way so that Erdoğan could remain in power.

These converging contexts could make Moscow provide proper support for Erdoğan during the electoral cycle that would take place in Turkey. The Moscow leading elites seem anxious to see Erdoğan continue to profit and “shine” in Ankara, even if this survival does not guarantee that the Turkish leader, pragmatic and authoritarian will join the Russian flow. Nevertheless, from Russia’s point of view, Erdoğan’s survival when facing his opponents is an essential means to balance Russian interests for the next five years and a regional actor that is connected to NATO and has a common geography and close military bases in Africa, Asia and Europe. So far, the Russian media highlighted Russia’s efforts to support Turkey, refraining from criticising the way that Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party dealt with the earthquake, despite the ever-increasing anger in Turkey concerning the lack of responsibility in following the construction codes and standards, and the failures to coordinate post-earthquake controls. Furthermore, the Russian press agency Russia Today, focused on the successful efforts of the Turkish rescue teams, such as the rescue of a child who had stayed under the rubble for 260 hours, but less on other efforts and activities.

Conclusions

In the context of this duplicitous role played by Russia and Turkey, we can say that the relationship between the two countries is more than a tactical cooperation between two geopolitical competitors. The leaders of the two countries managed to create new opportunities, political areas and processes that set their priorities and maximised their interests and influence, at the expense of other regional and international actors. Not only did they marginalise Western influence in the regions where they enhanced their influence, but they even narrowed the political cooperation area, domestically, starting to resemble more and more to surrogates than partners. Furthermore, this cooperation between Russia and Turkey survived the shock of the Ukraine invasion and the extra polarisation that the conflict brought to international relations. While on a geopolitical level Russia and Turkey are rivals and have constantly been on opposite sides of conflicts. On a strategic level, we can see that they are opposing and cooperating and coordinating at the same time, however, on a short term.

Moscow’s political mindset is currently conceived to strengthen the tendency of the Turkish president to open to the Russian axis, while opposing NATO policies that do not align with his governing style. The risk in this regard is that this Turkish-Russian closeness and Putin’s gift to Erdoğan could make the latter counter Western policies, US in particular, as well as those of their local allies in the Middle East, especially Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Somalia. Furthermore, in the international environment there is a visible paradox that could be explained by the fact that Russian-Turkish relations can be seen only as a triangle, as both countries watch each other constantly, while they both watch over the West.

The fact that Putin takes advantage of the authoritarian and autocratic mindset of the Turkish leader can make the latter become even more authoritarian and duplicitous when it comes to the decision-making process, while destabilising its nations’ relations with the West. It is obvious that Moscow would be thrilled for Turkey to join the MENA and BRICS blocs, which tend to develop around the Chinese-Russian cooperation. Putin’s actions are easier to implement because of his prominence as an expert player in the Middle East, where he publicly names his colleagues, intervenes on their behalf to protect them from defeat, and gives them whatever they need to survive. This is an appealing perspective for more regional leaders, not just Erdoğan. If uncontrolled, Putin’s proposals will probably convince Middle East entities to get closer to Moscow.

For many in the Middle East, the USA seem to not be concerned with their main issues that occur in the region. The USA are not perceived as being significantly involved in the conflict ending process in Libya, Yemen and Syria. Neither are they seen as being involved in finding effective ways of opening problem-solving channels, problems that failed states such as Iraq or Lebanon have to face.

As such, the USA must understand this Russian operation and face it in ways that support its other partners and allies, strengthen their positions and even work on decisively making Turkey come back to the allied bloc it belongs to.

[1] The nuclear power plant in Akkuyu is the only large facility of its kind in Turkey abd is under construction in Akkuyu, in Büyükeceli, Mersin province. Upon completion, it will supposedly generate almost 10% of the country’s energy need. In May 2010, Russia and Turkey signed an agreement according to which one of Rosatom’s branches would build, own, and operate a power plant in Akkuyu. It would have four VVER1200 units, 1,200MW each. The construction of the first reactor began in April 2018. In February 2013, the Russian nuclear construction company, Atomstroyexport and the Turkish construction company Özdoğu signed the contract which marked the start of the building site of the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu.