Between the 14^th and 16^th of February, the capital of Bavaria hosted the 56^th edition of the Munich International Security Conference. The event was dedicated to the strategic dialogue regarding current matters related to international relations. It registered the presence of 35 heads of states and governments and over 100 foreign and defence ministers.

Valentin Naumescu, a professor at the Faculty of European Studies, Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca and President of the think tank Initiative for European Democratic Culture, made an account of this year’s Munich International Security Conference, the most prestigious international security forum, while being interviewed by Vladimir Adrian Costea, for the Geostrategic Pulse.

Vladimir Adrian Costea: Professor Valentin Naumescu, “De-Westernisation” and “Westlessness” were two of the major subjects discussed at this year’s Munich International Security Conference. What are the crises which have lessened the beliefs that the West represents a guideline in a democratic value system?

Valentin Naumescu: The “De-Westernisation” of the global order is not a new topic. As an expert on international relations, this year’s Munich International Security Conference (MSC) only confirmed some of my observations and older predictions. These past few years even Romanian analysts, including myself but also others, have written explicitly and somewhat concerned, on several occasions about matters regarding the “De-Westernisation” of the world and of the international system, both from an outside perspective, as a competitive threat enhanced by non-western great powers - especially China and Russia whose influence is expanding, most of all domestically speaking - as well as from an inside perspective, as a division of the Euro-Atlantic Club, which Romania joined in the middle of the 2000s. There is a strong connection between the two “De-Westernisation” perspectives, which fuel each other and form a “vicious circle” we cannot know how and when to escape from.

We are going through a deep and complex change of the international system, where the West gradually loses the quasi inspirational, restructuring, and even decision-making hegemony, which it has had for many decades. For now, we are referring to multipolarity. We don’t know what tomorrow brings. It is difficult to even say when and how the decline of this order started and if the West will ever lose global supremacy (we shouldn’t mistake the hegemony from 23-30 years ago with the political, economic, military and technological supremacy it still has), however, unfortunately there are tendencies in that respect. We can, perhaps identify a series of critical milestones and moments of the changes in the free Western order, without specifically naming what precisely triggered them.

What could we include in this sad list? The catastrophic terrorist attacks on the 11^th of September 2001, which delivered a blow to the USA and had long term global consequences, the harsh and long debates between the USA and Europe regarding the military intervention in Iraq, in 2003, the gradual development of an inborn anti-Americanism in a Western Europe which was free from the threat of the USSR and which steered between 2003 and 2008 towards a pronounced anti-Bush rhetoric, the scandal of US monitoring the calls (NSA) of European leaders in 2013, the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the weariness related to EU integration and the Eurosclerosis, the terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Berlin, Paris etc., the global financial crisis between 2008 and 2010, the Eurozone debt crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis (see Greece), and the increasing belief that there are uncompetitive states which are supported by the EU and which hinder its prosperity, the migrant crisis between 2015 and 2016, which Western and Central Europe took advantage from politically and electorally, the strong come-back of the nationalism and protectionism, the Brexit referendum in June 2016, and Donald Trump coming to the White House in November that year (which intensified Transatlantic mistrust), the yellow vests protest movement against the system between 2018 and 2019, a long series of misfortunate declarations regarding the “disappearance” of NATO in Washington and more recently in Paris, the West’s inability to find a solution to Russia’s defiant annexation of Crimea, in March 2014, the major difficulties in solving the crises in Ukraine/Donbas, Libya, Syria etc., left us with an overall sensation that the major actors of the Western order - the USA, NATO and the EU - lacked the authority, convergence, efficiency and ability to find real solutions. The rifts between the allies and the lack of trust in the ever present European internal institutions, policies and values made possible for China and Russia’s interests to sneak through, which clearly wish to destabilize the Western world and undermine the credibility of liberal democracies. This doesn’t mean the West has lost the battle and completely ran out of arguments, resources and leverages. It only means we have reached a chapter in history when we don’t understand each other any-more and alliances are more difficult to forge and preserve. All options are on the table. Anything can happen; the struggle for power may have any result.

© Munich Security Conference/Frank-Walter Steinmeier

From “NATO’s brain death” to the “language of power”, President Macron’s position highlights NATO and the EU’s need to be reshaped. How is the Conference in Munich a turning point in the relationship between NATO, the EU and Russia?

I wouldn’t rush into saying that the MSC is necessarily a turning point. Not with regard to the relationship between the West and Russia, nor with regard to other matters. Certainly Munich’s “winter speeches” are juicy and interesting every year, especially to analysts, however, the decision making process doesn’t take place at the MSC. There aren’t any new developments either, since significant international actors only explain or maybe rephrase their ideas for the media, or at least highlight the opinions they have already exposed the year before. “NATO’s brain death” was probably the worst, most uninspired and harmful comment the French president made, ever since his election in 2017. It may seem surprising to you, but this comment is in fact consistent with his foreign policy, through which the Paris leader is trying to draw attention on the autonomy of the EU in its strategic relationship with the USA, repeatedly referring to “European sovereignty” and the EU’s “strategic autonomy” (ESA).

© Munich Security Conference/Emmanuel Macron

Macron’s vision aims at restoring France’s former European and global glory, which in its turn is based on five main objectives: to reform the EU and the Euro Zone, to strengthen the political role of the French-German nucleus, to found the “European Defence” built on French military power and the interests of its defence industry, to diminish the influence of the USA in Europe, to become the EU’s main leading and politically influencing power (especially since the twilight years of Angela Merkel) and to improve the relationship between the EU and Russia, up to a “partnership” with Putin, which Central and Eastern Europe object to.

  What were the main topics of interest for the USA, Russia and China? Where did the members of the delegations stand regarding the situation in the Middle East?

Even though it took place in the heart of Europe, this year’s MSC was definitely “outshone” by the talks regarding the policies of the USA, China and Russia, three great powers led by highly mediated presidents, who, they say, have the attention of over 50% of the global news. The EU mattered less and was less interesting, perhaps because it goes through a painful divorce from the UK, which comes with a series of unknowns, including the Multi-annual Financial Framework 2021-2027, whose approval already foretells a long crisis. Neither the dull and predictable speeches of German dignitaries, nor Macron’s one hour speech, created the feeling that the European bloc is in control of the global order. The European bloc left the impression that it slightly blamed the fierce competition between the great powers (President Steinmeier) and that, in a somewhat worrisome and spoiled manner, felt the need for an ambitious European action, which hangs between a well-rehearsed criticism against the USA, a generous idealism, and a pragmatism, which promoted, by means of a well-crafted hypocritical discourse, the interests of a single country (President Macron’s, present for the first time to this prestigious forum).

© Munich Security Conference/Mike Pompeo

Finally, as we have grown accustomed to, the all-time Lavrov delivered, once again, new accusations against NATO and the EU, which stir and intentionally create tensions on the continent, appealing once again to the need for cooperation with Russia, and that it was “time to say no to promoting the “Russian threat” phantom or any other threat for that matter, and to go back to things that unite us”, a speech to which apparently Macron and other German leaders (especially social-democrats) are looking forward to having a positive come-back. Of course, the Russian foreign minister completely ignored President Zelensky’s serious appeal to the West helping Ukraine, who, referring to the conflict with Russia stated that “it is not correct to say war in Ukraine. This is a war in Europe”.

© Munich Security Conference / Sergey Lavrov

Speaking about the Greater Middle East, it deserves an entire separate discussion. The complexity of the themes and the specificity of the positions of the western countries almost don’t leave any room for a general interpretation or any principle for that matter, other than following their own interests. Circumstantial alliances appear and disappear overnight due to unpredictable factors. The Syrian tragedy is almost over, after nearly eight years, but the West is somewhat shaken after this terrible civil war, which it wasn’t able to stop or solve, neither for the inhabitants in the area nor in the spirit of the liberal values it officially promotes. Yes, we can agree that Russia’s all so interested intervention, in September 2015, changed the original dynamic of the conflict, and it is not too flattering for the West’s ability to promote solutions. Libya is still the best example of our time. Ever since the Arab Spring, Libya after the Gaddafi regime is one of the West’s terrible failures towards finding solutions. Nothing worked. Failure after failure. The most recent one, “the Berlin Process”. Let’s see how the most recent international initiative after the MSC will help with the stabilisation and democratic reconstruction of Libya.

© Munich Security Conference

In the end of this interview, please draw a conclusion regarding this year’s most prestigious international security forum. What was the main news and what were the latest challenges? Were there any definite solutions to diminishing current international conflicts?

The 56^th edition of the MSC didn’t bring any understandings between international actors, should anyone have expected that three days of discussions could have solved existing issues. Almost 500 high dignitaries have exposed various perspectives and attitudes, a high range of strategic options and interests, with different ideological contents and nuances. The current international system seems more torn apart than ever in this post-war age. Surely discussions are always useful; at least to better understand all sides if not for finding solutions.

There are certain cleavages which have deepened and are worth defining or redefining at this time. The Transatlantic bond is getting weaker; there is no doubt about it. The Transatlantic rift is no longer just political; it is becoming strategic, military economic and technological. Let’s see the effect and impact of the US presidential elections in November, even though the hope of a reboot of the Western alliance on a short and medium term is modest. The battlefield of the US-Chinese competition for global supremacy is huge, and compared to it Europe and Russia seem mere spectators, with not much influence. The cleavage between the East and the West within the EU re-emerges, intensified by the political and financial disagreements regarding the 2021-2027 budgets - mainly between the net contributors and beneficiaries - and by the re-shaping of the Union on the concentric model or the one of a multispeed Europe, just as President Macron wishes. The relationship with Russia seems to divide Europe, as does the relationship with the USA. Overall, the EU 27 will clash with the UK in a series of negotiations, which don’t appear to lead to a post-Brexit agreement by the end of this year. Turkey as a part of the West (NATO) becomes a controversy with pros and cons. As I have mentioned, no one understands anyone, neither in the West nor outside it.

So here are some of the major division factors that threaten the unity of the Euro-Atlantic area for the next few years, from Vancouver to Ankara, a political area which starts lacking coherence, is more and more divided and harder to comprise in a coherent concept and vision. The Romanian leaders and foreign policy decision makers should continuously work on flexible and alternate scenarios, identify solutions and make plans in order to face the fast and dynamic global political and diplomatic arena, so that we are not surprised by the positioning of the international players and by the structural changes of the world order.