The Versailles system of treaties between 1919 and 1920, following World War I, replaces imperialism with nationalism and practically ends the process – which lasted for the whole 19^th century – of the formation of the modern European states. The first country to separate from the Ottoman Empire was Greece, after a long Russian-Ottoman war which ended with the Adrianopolis Peace Treaty in 1829 and recognised the autonomy of the newly emerged state.[1] It took 30 years for a new country to gain its independence from this “sick” empire – Romania. It emerged following an intra-European war, the War of Crimea, which ended with the Peace Treaty of Paris, in 1856. Based on this treaty, the European powers involved in the conflict – England, France, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, Prussia and Sardinia, on one hand, and the Russian Empire, the losing side, on the other hand, agreed to the idea of a union between the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Thus, on the 24^th of January 1859, with the election in Iași and Bucharest of one ruler, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, the United Principalities become one country, modern Romania, established due to European interests in the Danube and Black Sea areas.[2] During the Oriental crisis between 1877 and 1878, Romania, led by Karl, Prince of Hohenzolern-Sigmaringen, joins Russia and declares war against the Ottoman Empire to obtain its independence on the battlefields of Bulgaria. According to the Berlin Treaty, in 1878, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro became independent states, and Bulgaria became an autonomous principality under Ottoman sovereignty.[3].

Following international recognition, Romania will establish diplomatic relations with the countries which recognised its independence, including the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This multi-ethnic state, where two communities – the Austrians and the Hungarians – were the dominant nationalities, was a dual monarchy, led by a monarch, Franz Joseph, “Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary”, but which had two parliaments and two governments, in Vienna and Budapest. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 changes Hungary’s status in relation with the monarchy, becoming an autonomous kingdom, which however didn’t have its own armed forces, diplomatic service or budget. The three executive domains are considered common affairs; however, they remain in Vienna, the official capital of the empire state. The Romanians in the monarchy won’t recognise the duality and will proceed to organise their own national movement and set clear political objectives. To them Romania as a country was very important, as they will now have a mother country capable of defending their interests.

Consequently, on the 11^th/23^rd of September 1879, the Romanian diplomatic agency in Vienna was raised to the rank of Legation, and on the 2^nd/14^th of October the same year, Ion Bălăceanu presents to Emperor Franz Joseph his letter of credence as the Romanian envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.[4] This certifies that Romania’s status is a distinctive issue of international law and the Austro-Hungarian Empire must treat it accordingly. In its turn, the Empire sends to Bucharest its own envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Ladislas Count of Hoyos, who, on the 21^st of October/2^nd of November 1879, presents his letter of credence to Prince Karl.[5] So, at that time, Romania established diplomatic relations with the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a matter of international law, as neither Austria nor Hungary were independent countries. These relations functioned from 1879 until August 1916, while between 1883 and 1916 they were allies in what was known as the Triple Alliance. One of the main objectives of the Kingdom of Romania in its relationship with the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the situation of the Romanians in the Empire, believed to be, in 1910, over 3 million citizens, living in Transylvania, Banat, Hungary, but also Bukovina.[6] In the middle of World War I, Romania reaches the conclusion that its 37 year old hopes of improving the situation of the Romanians in the Empire do not stand a chance; on the contrary, in the area administered by the “Autonomous Kingdom of Hungary”, the people have been treated as inferiors and oppressed by the dominant Hungarians. In that moment, the Romanian government, led by Ion I.C. Brătianu, took action, joined the Entente, and declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

On the 14^th/27^th of August 1916, the Romanian minister in Vienna, Edgar Mavrocordat, went to the Palace of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Ballhausplatz, where the Kingdom of Romania declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is the only declaration of war that Romania issued. It didn’t declare war on the allies of the empire (Germany, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire) because it only sought the freedom of the Romanian provinces under the rule of the dual monarchy. The document contained the claims of the Romanian people, in full determination and dignity required by international protocol, stating that “the war which has taken almost all Europe brings to our attention the serious troubles which hinder our national development and the very existence of the countries; Romania, wishing to make a contribution to the end of the conflict and acknowledging the need to safeguard its race, finds itself in a position where it is forced to join those who are more able to ensure the accomplishment of its national unity. This is why it now sees itself at war with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.”[7] The consequence of this declaration was the end of the diplomatic relations between Romania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Legation in Vienna and the Romanian General Consulate in Budapest were closed. Romania’s interests in Vienna were represented by the US Embassy and, starting with 1917, by the Swiss Legation.[8]

The state of war between Romania and the Empire had direct repercussions on the military and political evolutions in Central Europe and, even more, on the final crisis of the dual monarchy. First of all, the treaties signed by the countries in the Entente – England, France and Russia – with Italy (26^th of April 1915) and Romania (17^th of August 1916) and the promises made to Serbia (August 1915) to get Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia and Fiume (Rijeka), question the strength of Austro-Hungary as an Empire, and even foresee its fall.[9]

Secondly, the migrant political leaders, representatives of the nations in the dual monarchy, get for their secessionist claims the support of the public opinion and the authorities from the member countries of the Entente. The Slovenians, the Serbians and the Croatians jumpstart a programme for the formation of a Southern Slavic country, and the Czechs and the Slovaks take action to establish a country of their own. In Paris, London, Rome and Bucharest, the Italians and the Romanians are acknowledged their demands to unite the countries they inhabit – Italy and Romania.[10]

The death of emperor Franz Joseph on the 21^st of November 1916 and the attempts of his successor, Charles I as Emperor of Austria/Charles IV as King of Hungary to meet the desires of peace of the peoples in the monarchy, won’t be able to stop the fall of the empire. The events in 1917 in the USA – Woodrow Wilson’s propagation of the principle “there is peace without victory” – and in Russia – the removal from power of the Russian tsar, Nicholas II, and the victory of the Bolshevik revolution – will encourage the new emperor.[11] His intention was to rebuild ”the empire and the kingdom” state as a confederation; however, the government in Budapest fervently opposed him. Nevertheless, Charles I’s public manifesto addressed to his “faithful peoples” on the 16^th of October 1918 (published on the 17^th of October 1918)[12] will start the devolution of the Empire. The imperial manifesto was positively received by the nations in the monarchy, except for Hungary. The political leaders of nations correctly interpreted the document signed by the emperor as indicating a path toward devolution. All ethnic communities in the empire proceed to forming “national committees”, which will take power from the central government and move it to the territories where they live. The “national committees” will take actions in order to establish their own state governments and won’t take to the federal association model any more. The Czechs and the Slovaks, the Southern Slavs, the Polish and the Ruthenians, the Italians and the Romanians will reject the imperial forecast reformation and will state loudly and clearly their intentions to fight for all their national, political and territorial claims.[13] Even in Vienna, a hasty parliamentary session, which became known as the Provisional National Assembly, proclaims, on the 21^st of October 1918, the Republic of German-Austria.[14] This action means that Austria separates from its empire, even before the other peoples are ready to do it.

These events determine the authorities in Budapest to operate towards secession from Vienna, but through keeping and defending the Habsburg crown, a symbol for the unity of all the lands under the rule of the “holy Hungarian crown”. On the 25^th of October 1918, Budapest forms a new government, under the leadership of Mihály Károlyi, which will be called the “National Hungarian Council” (NHC). Its name and objectives originate from the same imperial manifesto, meant to reform Austro-Hungary, and will work in the interest of the Hungarian nation by taking over all the prerogatives of the central establishment. Given the devolution of the central political and administrative structures in Vienna, the NHC did not have and could not claim its authority over the territories inhabited by Romanians, Croatians, Serbians, Slovenians, or Slovakians.[15]

In Transylvania, the Romanian National Party (RNP), led by Iuliu Maniu, adopts in Oradea, on the 12^th of October 1918, a Declaration which challenges the right of the two houses in the Hungarian government to represent the interests of the Romanians in Transylvania and Hungary. On the 18^th of October 1918, the declaration is read and supported in the Parliament in Budapest by Prince Alexandru Vaida. Still in Budapest, on the 31^st of October 1918, the National Romanian Council (NRC) was formed, and it had six members from the RNP – Vasile Goldiș, Aurel Lazăr, Teodor Mihali, Ștefan Cicio-Pop, Prince Alexandru Vaida, Aurel Vlad, and six social-democrats – Tiron Albani, Ioan Fluieraș, Enea Grapini, Iosif Jumanca, Iosif Renoiu, and Basiliu Surdu. The NRC is led by Ștefan Cicio-Pop, who will move the headquarters of this political body to Arad. The decisions taken by the NRC will be made known to the church and given the approval and support of the bishops Miron Cristea (orthodox, the future Patriarch of Romania) and Iuliu Hossu (Greek-catholic, future cardinal).

After the Romanian protest followed the Slovakian protest, bearing the same message, challenging the right of the Hungarian institutions to represent their national interests. As such, Mihály Károlyi presents in front of the members of the parliament the programme of the Independence Party regarding the matter of the nationalities. It recognises the Croatian right to separate, under the condition that it ensures Hungary’s access to the sea and its keeping the port city of Fiume. Subject to attention is Oszkár Jászi’s federalist programme to establish five states – Austria, Hungary, Poland, Bohemia and Illyria (the Southern Slavs) – which would form the Danube Confederation.[16] Consequently, Mihály Károlyi tells Oszkár Jászi, who was responsible for the issue of the nationalities within the NHC, to start negotiating with their representatives.

Budapest’s project ignored the Romanian population, destined to remain within the borders of a Hungarian state. To persuade them, Mihály Károlyi summons at his residence a delegation made of Romanian representatives, while the Hungarian representatives were Ernö Gárámi and Oszkár Jászi. The Romanian delegation composed of Ștefan Cicio Pop, Aurel Lazăr, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, Vasile Goldiș, Ioan Erdely, and Aurel Vlad raised the issue of an autonomous Transylvania, to which the Hungarians never agreed.[17] As the NRC had trouble taking over the “governing” responsibilities of the territories inhabited by Romanians, on the 9^th of November 1918 the Hungarian government is notified to allow the transfer of “all institutions and political, administrative, judicial, educational, religious, financial and military bodies” from the 23 districts and regions inhabited by Romanians to three other districts. The notification signed by Ștefan Cicio Pop, the president of the NRC, says that the NRC will be waiting for an answer by the 12^th of November 1918, 18.00 hrs.[18] The document is looked into during the Hungarian parliamentary session on the 10^th of November 1918, who see it as an ultimatum. To avoid a Romanian uprising, which could lead to the Entente or the Romanian forces occupying the country, Oszkár Jászi proposes starting negotiations with the Romanians. The talks take place in Arad, on the 13^th and 14^th of November 1918, following the diplomatic rules of equality, as the NRS and the NHC were established by the same criteria as the “national councils” of all the nationalities in the fallen empire.[19] After two days of negotiations, the Hungarian minister concludes that the Romanian delegation wants “the sovereignty of the Romanian nation” and sees this issue as “very serious”. Oszkár Jászi says that only the peace conference has the ability to decide over matters regarding state law and proposes a transition deal until the conference.[20] At the end of the reunion, the Hungarian dignitary understands that his actions are unsuccessful, and asks Iuliu Maniu to state clearly what the Romanians want, while the latter gave him a straight answer: “total separation”.[21]

After the failure of the Romanian-Hungarian talks in Arad, on the 20^th of November 1918, the NRC called on the Great National Assembly in Alba Iulia, which would take place on the 1^st of December 1918. The delegations were chosen during popular meetings. 1228 people were elected as delegates from all social and professional strata – teachers, priests, peasants, lawyers, soldiers, students etc. Vasile Goldiș read the resolution regarding the union of Transylvania, Banat, Crișana and Maramureș, which was voted unanimously; all 100,000 Romanians, present in the Field of Horea, in Alba Iulia, received it with enthusiasm.[22] So, on the 1^st of December 1918, the Romanians from what used to be the Austro-Hungarian Empire democratically exercised their right to self-determination, conferring legitimacy and durability to the union with Romania of the territories they inhabited.[23]

The shock of the decisions taken in Alba Iulia made the government in Budapest decide, on the 8^th and 18^th of December 1918, to approach the issue of establishing and defending an ethnically pure Hungary, in an area where Hungarians represented a majority.[24] Proclaiming a Hungarian independent state, separated from Austria, implicitly meant denouncing the Austro-Hungarian Compromise from 1867, and all the consequences of this act, including those concerning Transylvania. The affiliation and the future of this territory was decided by the Romanian majority. The new Hungarian state, established in an ethnically pure area, was not perceived as a Hungarian endeavour. The Hungarian political and intellectual elites set as their national objective the reestablishment of the former feudal Hungarian kingdom, or what they called “historical Hungary”. The perspective and later the certainty of losing the territories which used to belong to the “holy crown” made then “Provisional President of the Hungarian Democratic Republic”, count Mihály Károlyi, play a last card, the red Bolshevik card. On the 21^st of March 1919 he peacefully transferred the power “to the people”, to the Hungarian communists and socialists. On the 21^st/22^nd of March 1919, Béla Kun, the leader of the communists, who favours an “ideological and military alliance with the Russian soviets” and opposes the imperialist Entente, takes over the newly founded “National Governing Council” in Budapest.[25] The decisive Romanian military intervention that took Budapest on the 4^th of August 1919 was the only one able to overthrow Béla Kun’s regime and protect Central Europe from communist danger. After the communist revolutionary regime who brought the “red terror”, Budapest establishes a counterrevolutionary government led by Miklós Horthy, who, in his turn brought the “white terror” as a right radical response to oppose left radicalism.[26] He dissolves the republic proclaiming the Kingdom of Hungary, with himself as regent.

Historically speaking, in the fall of 1918, democracy won against the dual monarchy of Austria and Hungary. The treaties in Versailles won’t do anything but recognise de jure a de facto situation – the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This is the “imperial state” that fell in 1918. The peace treaty between the allies and Austria, signed on the 10^th of September 1919 in Germain-en-Laye and by Romania, the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia three months later, on the 10^th of December 1919, confirmed the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This treaty recognises Austria as a republic and an independent and sovereign state. The allied and associated powers announce that they will resume their diplomatic relations with the Republic of Austria. The treaty also modified the name of the country – from the Republic of German Austria to the Republic of Austria – to avoid any association with Germany, but also to highlight the continuity of Austria with regard to the Western half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, thus making it responsible for the world war.[27]

On that note, on the 4^th of June 1920, in Trianon, a peace treaty is signed with Hungary, which is recognised as an independent and sovereign state, however, in continuity with the Western half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it is made responsible for the world war. The Treaty of Trianon was signed by 23 countries – Hungary on one hand and 11 European countries on the other, and the allied and associated powers, among which Romania and three newly established states – Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia – and other 12 non-European countries – the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zeeland, the South-African Union, India, Japan, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama and Siam.[28] Romania was represented by Nicolae Titulescu, a former minister, and by Dr. Ion Cantacuzino, minister of state, Hungary by Ágoston Bernárd, welfare and labour minister, and Alfred Drasche-Lázár de Thorda, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.[29]

The Treaty of Trianon was not a treaty between Hungary and Romania, but a treaty between Hungary and the rest of the world. The settlement of the dispute between Romania and Hungary is important to both states; however, it represents only a small part of the treaty.[30] Its preamble focuses on the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, through Article 73, recognises Hungary’s independence. So, the Treaty of Trianon represents the birth of Hungary as a modern, independent and sovereign state, a distinctive subject to international law. The Treaty also states that once it is implemented, the state of war ends and the allies and associates can establish official relations with Hungary. Article 27 establishes the borders between Hungary and Austria, the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, Czechoslovakia and Romania. This article established the legality of the separation from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, not Hungary, of the territories mostly inhabited by Romanians - Transylvania, Banat, Crișana and Maramureș. Article 29 specifies that the borders were to be established in the field, by delimitation commissions, fully empowered to determine the most exact lines, according to the existing districts and local economic interests.[31]

The fact that the Hungarian borders have been well traced is proven by their resistance in time. Anyway, out of all central European countries, Hungary is unique as the two greatest geopolitical powers in this area, Germany and the USSR had no territorial claims over it, nor did its neighbours, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Therefore, Hungary did not register any imminent military threat or danger to its territory or sovereignty.[32]

The Romanian Parliament on the 17th (by the senate) and the 26th of August (the Chamber of Deputies) ratified the Treaty of Trianon. The Hungarian Parliament ratified the treaty on the 14^th of November 1920 and the Hungarian Government, on the 23^rd of March 1921. The peace treaty with Hungary was implemented on the 26^th of July 1921, after it had been previously ratified by the other signatory countries.[33]

In the period following the implementation of the Treaty of Trianon, Romania and Hungary negotiated for the establishment of diplomatic and good neighbourly relations. Two days after its signing, on the 6^th of June 1920, so before the ratification and implementation, count Pál Teleki, the foreign minister of the Hungarian government led by Simonyi-Semadan, and starting with the 19^th of July 1920 Hungarian prime minister, devised the ground lines of the relation with Romania: 1) Hungary will return the territories around the borders inhabited by Hungarians and Swabians; 2) autonomy for the Hungarians, Szekelys and German-speaking Saxons in Transylvania; 3) a liberal agreement regarding the rights of the minorities; 4) Hungary will have mining rights over the mines in Maramureș. In exchange for these concessions, Pál Teleki would have been willing to give up Romania’s 9 billion Crowns debt, which it had to pay as compensation.[34] Of course, these territorial claims and demands for autonomy for Transylvania were dismissed in Bucharest, in exchange for friendship with Hungary. The necessity of establishing diplomatic relations with Hungary was acknowledged both in Bucharest as well as in Budapest. French diplomats had to intervene in both capitals so real steps could be taken.[35]

So, on the 7^th of August 1920, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest proposes the establishment, in Budapest, of a Romanian “diplomatic commissioner”, who could later be accredited as a minister plenipotentiary. This mission is entrusted to colonel Traian Stircea, royal adjutant. At the same time, Romania proposes sending to Budapest a delegate in charge with the issues related to the implementation of the amendments of the peace treaty. The person assigned for this is Ion Lapedatu, general secretary of the finance department in the “Directory Council of Transylvania“, led by Iuliu Maniu.[36] Hungary responds and accepts, on the 26^th of August 1920, the appointment of the two persons and makes its intentions known that it wishes to assign a qualified diplomat to represent Hungary in Bucharest.[37] A royal decree appointed Traian Stircea “envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary” and sent him, on the 21^st of February 1921, to Budapest to take over the Romanian Legation there.[38]

At the same time, Budapest took similar action to establish a Hungarian legation in Romania. The communication process goes through Vienna where there were a Romanian and a Hungarian legation. The first nominated diplomat accepted by the Romanians, in October 1920, was Szilárd Masirevici, a former Austro-Hungarian diplomat who would instead take over the Hungarian legation in Vienna.[39] Under these circumstances, the Hungarians requested the nomination in Bucharest of a chargé d’affaires, in the person of András Hory, who would also serve as a counsellor within the legation.[40] He would start his mission in Bucharest on the 15^th of February 1921 and would lead a team made of Béla Szentirmay, general consul, Emil Szilas, vice-consul, and Jozséf Takács-Tolvay, military observer, but who would be in a counsellor’s position, as Hungary, according to the Treaty of Trianon, was not allowed to send military missions abroad.[41] As the head of the Hungarian legation in Bucharest, the government in Budapest would assign Baron Iván Rubido-Zichy, who would come later.[42]

Both diplomatic missions, the Romanian one in Budapest and the Hungarian one in Bucharest, had to first normalise the bilateral relations and the implementation of the amendments foreseen in the Treaty of Trianon. The diplomatic relations between Romania and Hungary were the result of peace, which made itself known in the bilateral relations, and an institutional adaptation to Hungary’s new status as a distinctive subject to international law. The foreign policies of the two countries were in opposition ever since the beginning – the Kingdom of Hungary, ruled by its regent Miklós Horthyi, adopted a revision policy of the treaties signed in Paris, between 1919 and 1920, while the Kingdom of Romania, ruled by King Ferdinand, acted to the defence of the status quo established in Paris, and was willing to build a system of alliances which would serve that purpose.

For almost 100 years, the main subject of the relations between Romania and Hungary isn’t good neighbourliness, but the Treaty of Trianon. If in Romania this treaty is seen due to its positive effects – first of all recognising the union in Alba Iulia, on the 1^st of December 1918, in Hungary the political and intellectual elites see the influence of the articles regarding the borders of the newly emerged states within the ruined, former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The constant opinion that the Treaty of Trianon was a great injustice to Hungary, expressed by all parties and civic and professional organisations, no matter their political beliefs, hindered the country’s relationship with its neighbours and others as well. At the level of the elites as well as at the level of the Hungarian public opinion, there are two themes regarding national interest – condemning the Treaty of Trianon and defending Hungarians outside the country.[43] These two objectives were very visible throughout the whole interwar period (1920-1940), a little bit less during the communist regime (1945-1989), and they peaked in the post-communist period. On the 4^th of June 1990, the Parliament of the Republic of Hungary commemorated the Trianon episode with a moment of silence, and on the 19^th of June 2001, the Parliament in Budapest motivated the law on the status of the Hungarians outside the borders as a reparation for the losses caused by the Treaty of Trianon.[44] Even more, the 4^th of June is considered the Day of National Unity.[45] All political events in Hungary, which are accompanied by protests, make a show of a whole range of “Trianon” claims. Even after 100 years, Budapest is still looking for a party or an alliance which could be made responsible for Trianon. It is justified to say that a “Trianon syndrome” manifests itself throughout all Hungarian social spheres.[46]

The promoter of this syndrome was the regent admiral Miklós Horthyi, who instated in Hungary a parliamentary, autocratic regime, permanently asking from the Parliament in Budapest increased prerogatives for the institution of the regent. During the whole interwar period, from 1920 up to 1941, Horthy ruled Hungary with an almost royal authority. Practically, the Treaty of Trianon was signed under his mandate as the head of the Hungarian state. The Hungarians from the Austro-Hungarian Empire lost two thirds of the territories from the former autonomous kingdom, which had 13 million inhabitants, coming from various ethnic groups (Romanians, Slovakians, Serbians, Croatians, Ruthenians, Germans, Gypsies and Jews, including 3 million Hungarians), all of whom would become citizens of Austria (Burgenland), Czechoslovakia (Highlands/ Felvidek), Romania (Transylvania, the Romanian Banat, Crișana/Partium, Maramureș) and Yugoslavia (the Serbian Banat, and Vojvodina/Bacska in Hungarian). This loss caused a lot of discontent, which resulted in the beginning of an increase of revisionist beliefs, only to later turn into a national obsession.[47]

Thus, the revision of the peace treaties in Versailles became a constant objective of the Hungarian foreign policy. The young diplomatic apparatus in Budapest saw revisionism as a priority, recurrent in the relations with the countries which had territories which had once belonged to the feudal Hungarian kingdom – Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. A document drafted by Miklós Horthyi in October 1919 said “Hungary’s number one enemy is Romania because we have the highest claims over its territories and because it is our most powerful neighbour. This is why the main objective of our foreign policy is settling our issues with Romania by going to arms.” He believed that “until the right moment to strike arrives, peaceful relations with Romania must be maintained; however, we must use all opportunities to isolate it diplomatically, and Transylvania must have at all times an active irredentist organisation”. With regard to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the same document stated, “The way to satisfy our territorial revisionist objectives is to encourage the secessionist tendencies of the Croatians and people from the Sudeten region and to take direct military actions against those countries”.[48] Only a carrier officer could have set these kind of foreign policy objectives for unexperienced diplomats.

In order to achieve its objective, Hungary needed a powerful ally, a supporter of the revision of the treaties from Paris, and it could only be Germany. At the same time, Hungary needed the League of Nations to consolidate its status and to provide foreign financial support. On one side, the conflictual demands of the alignment with a German revisionist group, anti-League and on the other, with an anti-revisionist League of Nations, were among the first Hungarian parallel foreign policies. Miklós Horthyi was secretly working on an alliance with Germany in order to achieve his revisionist goals, cooperating with the military segment and using his personal relations with Erich Ludendorff and Hans von Seeckt. Furthermore, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he contacted London and Washington to persuade Great Britain and the USA to agree to the fact that returning old territories is necessary to ensure stability in the region.[49] Both endeavours meant to achieve the same revisionist goal, which is why Miklós Horthyi will adopt an authoritarian and fascist regime, similar to Benito Mussolini’s in Italy, way before Adolf Hitler and Nazism became famous in Germany, leaders to whom he will become very close. As part of Miklós Horthyi’s inner circle, we must also mention the communist leader, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. The consolidation of united Romania, which now possessed Transylvania and Bessarabia, pushed Hungary towards forming a de facto alliance with the USSR, against it. Admiral Horthy and his regime managed to establish a gentlemen’s agreement regarding Romania. Ever since 1919 Miklós Horthyi intended to ask for Moscow’s military support against Romania, taking steps towards it by naming, in 1938 as Chief of Defence Staff, a former commander of Béla Kun’s Red Army, and Moscow declared in 1941 that it was willing to ignore Hungary’s war declaration if its involvement wasn’t “active”. Moreover, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars for Foreign Relations, informed the Hungarian government that “in the future, Hungary could count on Soviet support regarding Transylvania, so long as it maintains its neutrality in the German-Soviet war”.[50]

Romania’s position and status after World War I changed considerably. Following the Union in 1918, Romania became a medium sized country in Europe, with a surface of 295.049 km² and a population of 14.7 million people in 1919, which in 1930 reached 18,057,028 inhabitants. The Romanians were 71.9% of the population, and among the 20 minorities the Hungarians represented 7.9% (1,425,507 inhabitants in 1930).[51] At the same time Romania changed its neighbours. Three of them, Hungary, Soviet Russia and Bulgaria, had territorial claims and acted as enemies. The Bolshevik government notified Bucharest, on the 13^th/26^th of January 1918 that it ended all diplomatic ties with Romania, and on the 5^th/18^th of April 1918, Soviet Russia declared that it did not recognise Bessarabia’s union to Romania.[52] A few years later, what was to become the future USSR will adopt a revisionist view over the Paris treaties, because it had not been invited to join their signing. Situated in the area of extended Central Europe – from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea – between the states which formed the cordon sanitaire between Germany and the USSR, the Romanian diplomacy chooses to form an alliance with five of them: Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia (which would later become Yugoslavia) and Greece. This diplomatic initiative of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Take Ionescu, is agreed with and supported by France and Great Britain, powers which were involved in the signing of the treaties in Versailles.

Consequently, the relationship between Romania and Hungary is marked by a period of divergences, which linger even when they are part of the same alliances – between 1941 and 1944, during World War II, between 1945 and 1989, during the communist regime and even in the post-communist era, until today, when they are both members of the EU and NATO. Taking into account the post-Versailles international context and Hungary’s double play, Romania must overcome bilateral relations and build a multilateral diplomatic network of relations. The first steps towards this objective head for Poland, with which Romania signs a political and a military, defensive convention (between 1920 and 1921), both countries feeling the need to protect themselves from the USSR.[53] The agreements between Romania and Poland remain bilateral as Poland had a problem with Czechoslovakia and did not wish to enter a multiple alliance with the latter in it.

The first regional alliance in Central Europe is between Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia and the Kingdom of Romania, in the spirit of the agreement of the “Society of Nations”, which will be called the Little Alliance, or the Little Entente. All three states envisaged their defence in case of an unprovoked attack from Hungary, which was slowly fulfilling the obligations from the treaty of Trianon. Moreover, as states formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, all three of them were interested in preventing the eventual rise of the Empire under Habsburg rule. The Little Entente (1920-1921) was rushed due to Charles of Habsburg’s attempt to take over the Hungarian throne (March 1921). The Little Entente sent Hungary an ultimatum, which warned it that if the former king does not leave the country by the 6^th of April 1921, it would use military means to ensure the country upholds the Treaty of Trianon.[54] A second attempt coming from Charles IV of Habsburg to take over the Hungarian throne (21^st of October/1^st of November 1921) is thwarted by the energetic attitude of this tripartite alliance. Romania envisaged that this alliance should enable the creation of a system which could coordinate foreign policy actions and level the organisation of the military. The Little Entente was meant to be a peace effort, a defence instrument of the status quo established by the treaties in Versailles.

The Little Entente and its actions against Hungary, which proved effective, pushed this country towards Germany. Hungary practically becomes a compatible ally with Germany, both having as their main objective in their foreign policies the revision of the treaties from Versailles. Germany’s trust in Hungary began to fade in the summer of 1938, when Budapest accused Germany of having lacked preparedness in its attempt to break Czechoslovakia apart. Only after the minister of foreign affairs, Kalmán Darányi, sent Hitler a personal message from Horthy, which showed his desire to leave the League of Nations, to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and to sign a new long-term deal, did the German chancellor intervene and gave Hungary southern Slovakia, during the first Vienna Arbitration (3^rd of November 1938).[55] On the 23^rd of February 1939, the Hungarian Government signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, and two weeks later Horthy was ordered by Hitler to occupy Ruthenia, a territorial acquisition which increased Hungary’s debt towards Germany. Budapest answered this with its decision to withdraw from the League of Nations.[56]

In Bucharest, the Romanian diplomats saw the communist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as the greatest threats to Europe. In the meantime, Hungary managed to establish an early alliance with Nazi Germany and reached an understanding with the USSR for the partition of Romania. Taking this into account, the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, signed on the 23^rd of August 1939 – The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and its secret additional protocol – intensified the extremely complex political environment in which Romania was forced to operate. Thus, in the summer of 1940, Romania was under extreme pressure from two of the powers which were at the peak of their political and military might – Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union. They were both against the system of treaties signed in Versailles and saw Romania as the result of those treaties. Consequently, Romania wasn’t well perceived – neither by Berlin nor by Moscow. Both capitals encouraged Hungary’s revisionist policy against Romania. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was very effective in Poland’s case, which was attacked by Germany on the 1^st of September 1939, and by USSR’ Red Army, on the 17^th of September 1939. The direct consequence of this double aggression was Poland’s dissolution and its division between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Polish precedent threatened Romania. Under the circumstances in which Germany proved its loyalty towards its cooperation with the USSR, on the 27^th of June 1940, Moscow delivers Romania an ultimatum, summoning it to give back Bessarabia and North Bukovina.[57] Politically and militarily isolated, and upon Germany’s advice to “unconditionally agree to Russian terms”, Romania accepts the terms of evacuation disposed by Moscow.[58] Giving up Bessarabia, North Bukovina and the Hertza region surprised Budapest, but also encouraged it to start an offensive to take back Transylvania. At that time both Hungary and Romania turn to Germany; the first to win, the second to save itself. So, on the 1^st of June 1940, Romania gives up French guarantees and withdraws from the League of Nations. Hitler’s response to these actions repeats the solution of the Bessarabian crisis: King Carol II is advised to start negotiating with Hungary and Bulgaria on matters regarding territorial claims and proceed to give up certain territories.[59]

In the following period, high officials from Budapest and Bucharest travel from Berlin to Rome to support their interests. The way they were received, and the results of those visits are significant for what was to come. The fact that on the 9^th of July 1940 Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano received the Hungarian Prime Minister, Pál Teleki, and the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, István Csáky, and the fact that Carol II was denied his visit to the Reich Chancellor, was a warning to Romania.[60] There follow the visits to Germany and Italy of the Prime Minister Ioan Gigurtu and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mihail Manoilescu. The Romanian dignitaries were received in Salzburg by Joachim von Ribbentrop and in Berchtesgaden by Adolf Hitler (26^th of July 1940), where they had to face the hostility of the Nazi leaders, who supported the necessity to amend the injustices from Trianon and Saint-Germain, and declared themselves in favour of changing the borders. The only satisfaction came with Hitler’s disagreement with Hungary’s claims over having back all of Transylvania.[61] The meetings in Rome (27^th of July 1940) of the Romanian Prime Minister and his minister of foreign affairs, with the Duke Benito Mussolini and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Galeazzo Ciano, were totally unconvincing. The Italian dignitaries could not afford to take any kind of initiative, other than those agreed with the Germans. The conclusion drawn from these visits is just one, for both Budapest and Bucharest: the obligation to start negotiating for Transylvania.[62]

Three rounds of Romanian-Hungarian negotiations took place in Turnu-Severin – on the 16^th, 19^th and 24^th of August 1940.[63] The two governments assigned one delegate each – the Romanians appointed Valer Pop, and the Hungarians appointed András Hory. They both had full power of decision. Each delegation had four experts. According to the Hungarians, Romania had to cede 2/3 of the territory it took during the union on the 1^st of December 1018 (68,000 km², 3,900,000 inhabitants, out of whom 2,200,000 were Romanians and 1,200,000 were Hungarians). Hungary would leave Romania Banat and South Transylvania. These exaggerated claims ensured the failure of the negotiations, which is why Germany and Italy intervened as mediators. The solution of the arbitration and the new Romanian-Hungarian border were provided by Hitler, and the scenario was conceived by Ribbentrop for the 29^th and 30^th of August 1940. Summoned in Vienna, the Hungarian and Romanian representatives faced an already taken decision. The only ones who were consulted were the heads of the German and Italian diplomatic missions in Budapest and Bucharest. On the 29^th of August 1940 Hungary answers affirmatively to the question whether is willing or not to accept the arbitration. Romania, through its Crown Council convened in Bucharest, communicates its agreement on the morning of the 30^th of August 1940, at 4.20 a.m. On the same day, at 13.00, Romania receives a series of notes from Germany and Italy, which guarantee its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its state territory, and the Romanian Government agreed with these guarantees. At 13.30-14.00 the arbitration decision is signed in Belvedere Palace, without allowing the presentation of the two parties involved. Joachim von Ribbentrop and Galeazzo Ciano signed as arbitrators, for Romania signed Mihail Manoilescu and for Hungary, István Csáky. Valer Pop and Pál Teleki acted as witnesses.[64]

Following the second arbitration in Vienna (30^th of August 1940), Romania lost and Hungary won what will be known as North Transylvania, 43,492 km² out of the complete or partial territory where t here was a total of 14 districts – Bihor, Ciuc, Cluj, Maramureș, Someș, Mureș, Năsăud, Odorhei, Sălaj, Satu Mare, Trei Scaune, Târnava Mare, Târnava Mică, and Câmpulung Moldovenesc – with a population of over 2.600.000 inhabitants, out of whom most were Romanians.[65] (According to the map attached to the Decision of Arbitration [66]).

The opinions in Budapest and Bucharest were almost unanimous: the border was artificial, and economically, geographically, strategically and from the point of view of the communication lines, was considered illogical.[67] To the Hungarian public opinion, the second arbitration in Vienna was a partial reparation of the unjust Treaty of Trianon. The reason for this was that two thirds of the Hungarian population in Romania (1.1 million) returned to Hungary, however, a larger number of Romanian ethnics (1.2 million) ended up under Hungarian rule. A presentation of Hungary, which was published in Budapest, in German, said that “the partition of Transylvania was practically a solution to the issue of the Hungarian minorities, but, at the same time, it gave birth to another even more serious issue, that of the Romanian minorities in Hungary”.[68] This is why the Romanian government at that time believed this solution was temporary. Moreover, the decisions taken in Vienna on the 30^th of August 1940 haven’t been promulgated in Bucharest neither by Ion Antonescu, who assumed the leadership of the Romanian government (starting with the 5^th of September 1940), neither by King Michael I, so they can be further considered legally null and void. Hitler’s statement when he met with Ion Antonescu on the 22^nd of November 1940, in Berlin that “history won’t stop in 1940” encouraged the Romanian dignitary to act in order to take back the lost part of Transylvania.[69] General Antonescu could not have known that Hitler said the same thing to the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, but with a different meaning.[70] Such an ambiguous statement for both the Romanian and Hungarian dignitaries fully confirms that divided Transylvania became an essential tool for Hitler, to use both against Romania, as well as against Hungary, in order to tie the two countries more to Third Reich.

One of the most serious consequences of the Vienna Award, from the summer of 1940, was expediting the competition between Romania and Hungary to win over Nazi Germany.[71] In 1940 and in the first part of 1941, Germany managed to significantly influence Romania’s actions by manipulating its competition with Hungary. The interest regarding the Eastern Campaign (against the USSR), the difference between the armed forces and the resource (mostly oil) and agricultural contribution favoured Romania over Hungary.[72] While Romania had good reasons to take part in the war against the USSR – to free Bessarabia, North Bukovina and the Hertza region – Hungary entered the war only to prove its loyalty towards Germany, to keep North Transylvania and to eventually get South Transylvania. It was highly unlikely because in Vienna, Romania’s borders had been guaranteed by both Germany and Italy, and the Romanian government agreed to those guarantees. However, Hungary’s borders had not been guaranteed, which made Hungary turn to Moscow once more, the great absentee from the arbitration in Vienna. The guarantees granted to Romania bothered the USSR deeply, because they limited its way towards the west and south, at the border with the Prut and the Danube.[73] The USSR’s distress because it was not invited to Vienna was expressed by V.M. Molotov, on the 6^th of September 1940, to the head of the German diplomatic mission in Moscow, F. W. Von Der Schulenburg. The Soviet dignitary criticised his partner over the fact that Germany showed lack of loyalty towards the commitment it took in 1939, and he referred to the two neighbours of the Soviet Union (Hungary and Romania) and to the fact that giving guarantees to Romania was against the wishes and the interests of the Soviet government, clearly mentioning South Bukovina, which the USSR had wanted from Romania. Perhaps the distress of the Soviet leadership regarding the arbitration in Vienna with concern to Transylvania is why Stalin and Molotov decided to end World War II or simply cancel it.[74]

The competition between Romania and Hungary, both allies within the Axis, caused different actions coming from the two countries in connection to the short and medium term development of their bilateral relations. During the next four years the relations between Hungary and Romania will witness considerable estrangement, which determined László Nagy, the Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest, to declare in May 1941 that they “rather resemble the relations between Greenland and Antarctica”.[75] The statement is not far from the truth. Practically, after the withdrawal of the Romanian troops and administration from North Transylvania, ant the immediate occupation of the territory by the Hungarian army, which establish in the region military leadership, economic and cultural cooperation is completely blocked. There still were formal diplomatic relations, but both governments – the one in Budapest and the one in Bucharest – were waiting for the opportune moment to start a fight – either peaceful, with the help of Germany and Italy, or a possible armed conflict. [76]

Both countries hoped to be able to settle their scores following the peace after World War II. So, in the beginning of 1944, Romania and Hungary are looking for a way to come out of the war. They are both trying to receive guarantees from the Allies – Great Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union – regarding their sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, both countries were trying to leave the Axis honourably while still maintaining a “friendly” attitude towards Germany so as not to be labelled as traitors.

Romania takes the first step on the 23^rd of August 1944, when King Michael I removes field marshal Ion Antonescu from power and joins the allies. Romania told Germany it would get out of the war and gave the German troops 15 days to leave the country. After they initially agreed to it, the German army bombed Bucharest. As a response, the entire Romanian army, including its high ranking officers, launched a counteroffensive which lead to driving the German forces out of the capital and out of the south-eastern part of the country, before the Soviet troops entered Bucharest. The Romanians kept on fighting for the Allies against the Axis, contributing with 25 divisions, all the way to the end of the war in May 1945.[77] On the 30^th of August 1944, Romania breaks all diplomatic ties with Hungary.[78]

Hungary told Germany that it wanted to get out of the war on the 15^th of October 1944, and gave the German forces 15 days to leave their country. An overwhelming number of Hungarian superior officers stood for the Germans, and Miklós Horthy, as head of state, was persuaded to entrust Hungary’s leadership to a pro-German government.[79] After this, the Hungarian army crossed the border into Vienna Award Transylvania, attacking the Romanian army. From that moment on, Romania and Hungary were at war. The Hungarian army will fight alongside the German forces until the winter of 1944/1945, when Soviet and Romanian troops enter Budapest and liberated Hungary from the Horthy-Fascist regime.

Starting with 1944, while still at war, but with a Red Army in full offensive, Moscow takes over the issue of Transylvania, because it wanted control over both Romania and Hungary, and wanted to take them out of the war against it. The part which Adolf Hitler played in using Transylvania as leverage against Bucharest and Budapest, will be taken over by “comrade” Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, the communist leader of the Soviet Union. He would prove even more efficient than the Nazi leader – he would manage turn both Romania and Hungary into communist countries and have them under the sphere of influence of the USSR, both taking part for almost half a century in what would later be called the “Eastern Bloc”.

While setting the grounds for peace after the war, the Soviet leaders assign the “Litvinov Commission” (the Peace Office within the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow) with answering the following question: what is Transylvania, and to whom should it belong? In 1944 this Commission took into account three solutions:

1.     North Transylvania, taken from Romania through the second Vienna Award on the 30^th of August 1940, is returned to Romania.

2.     North Transylvania stays with Hungary.

3.     Transylvania becomes independent, under the patronage of the USSR.[80]

The most supported option was that of an independent Transylvania, outside any union or federation, however proposed by the “Litvinov Commission” as temporary, until clearing all the possibilities of sincere cooperation with Romania, or Hungary. This option was advantageous, as it strengthened neither Romania nor Hungary, the USSR’s neighbours. Only the action taken by Romania on the 23^rd of August 1944 when it decided to join the allies and fight against Nazi Germany and Horthy Hungary will determine Stalin to ignore the option of an independent Transylvania. He goes back to an older idea of his, expressed in December 1944, during the meeting with the British delegation led by Anthony Eden – Romania’s expansion at the expense of Hungary and “Transylvania’s restitution (or at least part of it) to Romania”.[81] This formula enables Stalin to keep Bucharest under control and give Budapest hope until the conclusion of the peace treaties. The “Litvinov Commission” will provide a point for Stalin’s option – Transylvania can be returned to Romania “in exchange for solid guarantees that it would cooperate closely and on a long term with the USSR and permanently give up its claims over Bessarabia and Bukovina”.[82]

During the peace negotiations following World War II, both Romania and Hungary are dealt with together as former German satellites, considered a defeated state, under the influence of the USSR, agreed upon by Great Britain, the USA and France. Even if after the meeting in Moscow between Joseph V. Stalin and Winston Churchill (9-18 October 1945), when they agree on the percentage of the spheres of influence, and Romania will have the worst fate of all (the USSR would have 90%, while the Allies 10% – compared to Hungary 50%/50%), both countries would benefit from the same treatment. Furthermore, the issue of Transylvania is attributed to Romania, without being dealt with during the Peace Conference in Paris in 1947. The USSR manages to impose during the Peace Treaty with Romania, signed on the 10^th of February 1947, that the Soviet-Romanian border would be the same as it was on the 1^st of January 1941 (Art.1), following the takeover of Bessarabia, North Bukovina and the Hertza region, and the border between Romania and Hungary remains as it was on the 1^st of January 1938, before the Award in Vienna on the 30^th of August 1940, declared “null and void” (Art.2). The text of the treaty mentions the cessation of all hostilities between Romania and Hungary (Art.8).[83] On the same day, the 10^th of February 1947, the Peace Treaty with Hungary was signed, having similar provisions regarding the borders and the cessation of hostilities.

After, on the 20^th of July 1945, Romania signs an economic convention with Hungary, and on the 13^th of April 1946 signs the first Romanian-Hungarian economic agreement, and only after the signing of the peace treaties, on the 5^th of November 1947, did the governments in Bucharest and Budapest decide to restart their diplomatic relations by turning their political missions into legations.[84] Furthermore, after a series of visits from the heads of the governments – Petru Groza in Budapest (3^rd-5^th of May 1947), Lajos Dinnyés in Bucharest (23^rd-25^th of November 1947), and again Petru Groza in Budapest (22^nd-24^th of January 1947) – they come to sign a friendship cooperation and mutual assistance agreement between Romania and Hungary. In this document, the parties agreed on a common friendship policy, as well as on taking joint international actions in the spirit of the UN Charter.[85]

As a consequence of the decisions taken by the winning powers, following World War II (1^st of September 1939-9^th of May 1945), Romania and Hungary enter again the same system of alliances, this time under the patronage of the USSR, which imposed in both Bucharest and Budapest communist regimes. Under the security umbrella of the USSR, Romania and Hungary become two “sister countries”, with “brotherly” political regimes. They will both join the same military alliance – the Treaty of Warsaw (starting with the 11^th-14^th of May 1955) and will cooperate within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (5^th-8^th January 1949) following the rules set by Moscow. Practically both countries will be under Soviet military occupation – Romania from 1944 until 1958, and Hungary from 1945 until 1991.

Contrary to appearances, Romania and Hungary will continue their competition for the same region of Transylvania. Even if it was given to Romania, the Soviet leader J.V. Stalin still plays his part as an arbitrator by encouraging Hungary to demand territorial concessions at the borders, and an autonomous regime for the Hungarians outside its borders. Moreover, in May 1952, when the communist leadership in Bucharest sent to Moscow, for approval, the project for the new constitution, it was changed by Stalin and Molotov imposing the creation of a “Hungarian Autonomous Region” (HAR). Therefore, Article 19 of the new Romanian communist constitution mentions, “the HAR was a region entirely inhabited by Hungarian population, which had an independent administration, elected by the inhabitants of the HAR”.[86] This autonomous region was established after a Soviet model, taking into account Stalin’s idea of finding a solution to the serious issues concerning the ethnics in the former USSR. Since Moscow didn’t recognise Romania as a unified state, the HAR became a precedent for different other compact ethnical blocs, which would have led to the federalisation of the country. Since the USSR Red Army had headquarters in Târgu Mureș, Sfântu Gheorghe and Miercurea Ciuc, the Romanian authorities were requested to leave their posts and their place was taken by Hungarian ethnics, named by the deputy minister of internal affairs in Bucharest, the Hungarian János Vincze (Ion Vințe). Stalin created “Little Hungary” which appointed Lajos Csupor as its leader. The latter kept in contact with the Soviet military representatives and with Russian and Hungarian diplomats.[87] The establishment of the HAR did not please Budapest, but stopped for a time the territorial claims over Romania, at least until Stalin’s death on the 5^th of March 1953.

In the period immediately after Stalin’s death, the “Eastern bloc” witnessed a more relaxed transition, when both Romania and Hungary tried to change their relations with Moscow. In Hungary’s case, the communist leadership shows interest in domestic cooperation, and in winning over the public opinion, traumatized again after the war by the loss of the territories recovered during the collaboration between Horthy and Hitler, and especially by the reconfirmation of the Treaty of Trianon from 1920 and by the peace treaty signed in Paris, on the 10^th of February 1947, with the new winner Allies – the USSR, the USA, England and France. Again, Hungary seeks a strong ally and it cannot be but the Soviet Union in whose sphere of influence it was. The action is at an advantage since the Hungarians were under a second communist wave, following the Soviet Hungarian Republic (1919) established by Bela Kun’s first wave. The new leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) – Mátyás Rákosi, Ernö Gerö and Imre Nagy (the latter having collaborated with Bela Kun) get Moscow’s support to showing concerns over the situation of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and especially Romania. Thus, in September 1954, the couple Mátyás Rákosi, the leader of the party, and Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, send a letter to the communist leadership in Romania, where they describe the Hungarian- Romanian bilateral relations as cold and unsatisfactory. Mátyás Rákosi appeals to Valter Roman, his good friend and colleague from the Moscow Communist International (Comintern) with whom he is more direct, and raises the issue of Transylvania.[88]

In the post-Stalin age, however, Romania has other concerns. The fight for power within the Romanian Workers’ Party is fierce and favours Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who between 1952 and 1955 becomes the head of the government. Since the international context became more favourable, even though he was subordinated to Moscow, he spoke of the “Romanian way towards establishing a socialist age”.[89] When Walter Roman informs him about the Hungarian debates concerning Transylvania, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej chooses a national line of defence of Romania’s territorial integrity.

A documentary study drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the leaders of the party in Bucharest, in 1959, showed the nationalist policy between 1954 and 1955 when, at the head of the government in Budapest was Imre Nagy. The ministry analysed press articles and speeches from the electoral campaign in 1954, when Transylvania is being referred to as “Hungary’s forever stronghold”.[90] The study mentions the debate which took place in Hungary due to the brochure signed by Dezsö Nemes, editor in chief of the ”Népszabadság” party newspaper, which was titled “Patriotism and the Right-Wing Phenomena”, published in 1955 and issued in 15,000 numbers. The author, party journalist, brings up the issue of the border between Hungary and Romania, highlighting the fact that the Treaty of Trianon was unjust and that it hadn’t been recognised by the Soviet Union. The study argues the proliferation of revisionism in Hungary surrounding the revolutionary events from the “Hungarian Fall” in 1956 and highlights the fact that in their relations with Romania, and later Czechoslovakia, every Hungarian official delegation had claims over the “issue of the borders”.[91] The most disturbing matter was a request coming from the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest that a map of the HRA should be attached to the map of the Republic of Popular Hungary, and included in an atlas which would be issued in Budapest. This diplomatic action determined the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simion Bughici, to ask his colleague whether Hungary saw the HRA as a part of Romania or Hungary.[92]

These attitudes put on guard the communist leadership in Bucharest, who will manage the Hungarian crisis according to Romania’s national interests. During the events in Hungary, when, on the 23^rd of October 1965, Imre Nagy, the national representative of Hungarian communism, is reinstated at the head of the revolutionary government, the Romanian communist leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, goes to Moscow to support the endeavours of the Soviet Union regarding the events in Budapest. Manifesting even an excess of loyalty towards the new leader, Nikita Khrushchev, the Romanian leader manages to get close to him and even ask for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romanian territory.[93] Relevant to how loyal Romania was to the USSR is shown by the fact that the latter “hosted”, from the 23^rd of November 1956, until April 1957, in Snagov, under Soviet control, “Imre Nagy’s group”.[94] Basically, the Romanian government gave a so-called political asylum to the members of the Hungarian government led by Imre Nagy, arrested in Budapest by the Soviet army and “billeted” in Snagov, Romania, where they have been investigated by specialised institutions from the USSR. The “Imre Nagy group” was sent back to Hungary upon the express request of the Hungarians, where, on the 16^th of June 1960, the former prime minister and three of his collaborators were executed, while five others were convicted for various periods of time. The whole operation took place under the careful supervision of János Kádár, who became Prime Minister with the help of the USSR, after the massive intervention of the Red Army.[95]

After the events in Hungary, a special relationship between János Kádár and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej will be born, which will be reflected in the bilateral relations. It is worth mentioning that, on the 16^th of June 1958, when Imre Nagy was convicted and executed, the Hungarian authorities informed only three embassies – “those belonging to the countries which have been the closest to Hungary during the days of the counterrevolution”, Romania being one of them, along with China and the USSR.[96] Between 1958 and 1965 (until the death of the Romanian leader), there will no longer be major friction between Romania and Hungary, even if there were several books and articles in the press which referred to Transylvania. It is a time when the Hungarians agree and contribute with logistics, and sometimes financially through their local authorities, in order to help build graves and monuments for the Romanian soldiers fallen in the fights along the Soviet army to free Hungary from the occupation of Nazi Germany during the last months of World War II (October 1944-May 1945). The visits of both Hungarian and Romanian party and state leaders were mainly successful, however highly sensitive when referring to the issue of Transylvania and to the Hungarian community in Romania, which were not included in the declarations post-visits, and which came up during negotiations every time, according to the good offices of the two “brotherly” countries. All these sensitive issues were carefully monitored by the diplomatic missions – the Romanian one in Budapest and the Hungarian one in Bucharest. A significant moment was in 1959, when the universities “Victor Babeș”, and “János Bolyai” in Cluj merged, an action perceived by the Hungarians as the closure of a university with Hungarian teaching, even if the new university had bilingual teaching. Again in 1960 there is an administrative restructuring which affects the HAR, as two regions – Sfântu Gheorghe and Târgu Secuiesc – were transferred to the district of Brașov. It is the first change of a structure imposed by Stalin in Romania to satisfy Hungary. The HAR will be called “The Mureș Hungarian Autonomous Region”. The leaders in Budapest didn’t have any reaction to this change, as they were too busy dealing with domestic nationalism and with consolidating their regime following the events in 1956.

After intense negotiations, the Soviet-Romanian relations lead to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romanian territory, and the leaders of the Party in Bucharest show the first signs of distancing from Moscow. Right after the end of the withdrawal, in August 1958, the USSR realised it had lost the main leverage over this satellite state. Moscow acts quickly to discredit Romania and its foreign relations. For these actions, the USSR cooperates with its other satellite states – Hungary, Bulgaria, the Democratic Republic of Germany and even Czechoslovakia.[97]

The good relations between Romania and Hungary and even between Romania and Tito’s Yugoslavia bother Moscow, which intervenes, how else but though propaganda – on the 31^st of December 1963, the leader in Kremlin, Nikita Khrushchev, leaks to the press the peaceful alteration of the borders. It advertised the matter of the separation of the two Germanies, as well as the possibility of changing the border between Romania and Hungary.[98] The action is not singular. The Romanian embassy in Moscow informed in January 1964 of the interest Soviet professors and researchers had regarding the issue of Transylvania, “a region temporarily under Romanian control”, which “isn’t really part of Romania”.[99] Even if Khrushchev later changed his mind saying that “the issue of border change should not be raised among socialist countries”[100], the spark had already been lit in Bucharest and most of all, in Budapest. Moscow felt the need to draw attention to the fact that it remained an arbitrator in the relationship between Hungary and Romania and relaunched the competition between the two countries. It is worth mentioning the fact that at the level of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Hungary and Romania Direction within the Department of Foreign Relations was colloquially called by the employees “the Transylvania sector”.[101] This is a reflection of how important the USSR believed the Transylvania issue to be in maintaining its influence over both Hungary and Romania.

Freeing Romania from the Soviet military occupation in 1958 enables the Romanian Communist Party to issue, in April 1964, a statement independent from Moscow. The debate on the document is, domestically speaking, favourable for the popularity of the communist party, and externally, people even started mentioning a “Bucharest spring”.[102] One year later only, a change in leadership takes place – after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party is assumed by Nicolae Ceaușescu (23^rd of March 1965). The relations between Ceaușescu and Kádár will be totally different, in a negative way. In Hungary, Ceaușescu is seen as a nationalist, being blamed of closing the Hungarian university “János Bolyai”, and, not long from then, in 1968, through a domestic administrative reform, which made the transition from regions and districts, to counties, he would also be blamed for the dissolution of the “Mureș Hungarian Autonomous Region”. During all these years, Romania and Hungary’s relations reposition themselves with regard to Moscow. Both countries keep their communist regimes, remaining members of the Treaty of Warsaw and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but will go different ways until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Ceaușescu’s Romania will distance itself from Moscow’s policy, showing openness with regard to foreign relations and having a domestic authoritarian regime. By comparison, Kádár’s Hungary, and the Soviet military occupation, supplemented after the Soviet intervention in Moscow in the fall of 1956, will tag along Moscow as far as its foreign policy is concerned, and domestically speaking, will practice a “human communism” or a Hungarian national “goulash communism”.

If Hungary quickly adapts to the changes of the “global socialist system” started by Moscow itself through its transparent reformation policy and gives János Kádár (1988) up, bringing to the leadership of the communist party the second in command, Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Romania behaves as a country at an impasse and becomes completely isolated in its foreign policy. Romania acts defensively to the domestic changes of the Hungarian policy. During the last years of communism Hungary challenges Romania on the same issue of Transylvania and Budapest finds support in Moscow, which does not officially want to get involved as an arbitrator, but encourages Hungary.[103]

During these years we witness the start of interethnic events with a potential for conflicts, in the Yugoslavian and Soviet areas: Kosovo, where the Albanian population, representing the majority, initiates an anti-Serbian secessionist movement; Nagorno-Karabah, where a conflict breaks out between the Azeris and the Armenians from the two Soviet republics at that time - Azerbaijan and Armenia; the political and national emancipation movement of the Baltic republics – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, joined by the Romanians in the republic of Moldova. All these conflict areas are highly visible in the press, and come in support of the wishes of some Hungarian institutions interested in introducing Transylvania in this equation so as to make it an international matter. In 1988, when Moscow seemed willing to consider the Baltic republics somewhat autonomous, in Budapest the idea spread that it should ask Romania for an autonomous Transylvanian regime, which should be granted internationally.[104]

The Hungarian offensive against Romania lasted between 1985 and 1989 on three sides – on the cultural and historical side, in order to prove that Transylvania belonged to Hungary; secondly there was the “phenomenon of the refugees”, which attacked the Romanian establishment and Ceaușescu’s dictatorship; and the third aspect was the support of the Hungarian community in Romania claiming that it had been deprived of its rights and freedoms.

Culturally and historically speaking, the highlight was reached when, in 1986, the publishing house of the Hungarian Academy of Science published “The History of Transylvania” in three volumes, a series coordinated by Bela Köpeczi, the Hungarian Minister of Culture at that time. The work was issued three times, amounting to 130,000 copies. They later published a one volume synthesis in English, French, German and Hungarian, sufficient numbers to send to all the greatest libraries in the world. In a communist state such as Hungary at that time, such a work with such a circulation, which referred to a region belonging to another communist country under political patronage, could not have been published without the approval of the leadership of the party and of the country. Romania’s reaction at the highest level – the head of the state, ensured the book’s international promotion.[105]

The issue of the refugees, and the migration of Romanian citizens – Hungarian ethnics, but Romanian ethnics too – from Romania to Hungary, mostly illegal, significantly affected the bilateral relation. Between 1988 and 1989, the process became a phenomenon, amplified and encouraged by the Hungarian authorities, who obtained support and financing from the UNHCR. Propaganda stimulated donations from individuals and humanitarian organisations. The phenomenon received support due to an action taken by the Hungarian authorities – free access to a passport and travel abroad, by lifting domestic visas to get out of the country, starting with the 1^st of January 1988. Therefore, many Hungarian citizens, mainly experts, left the country and never came back. The free spots in schools, universities, hospitals, factories and research centres were filled with specialists from Romania, Hungarian ethnics, who integrated perfectly in the Hungarian society. In this case, we are referring more to an economic migration, instead of a political one. Romania will take this step – free access to a passport – two years later, on the 31^st of December 1989.

The issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania was permanently on the agenda of the bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary. Constantly bringing up this unilateral and aggressive matter, which worsened Romanian-Hungarian relations considerably, was part of an ample and professionally orchestrated joint Hungarian-Soviet propaganda against Romania. During this propaganda, Hungary advertised among the domestic and foreign public opinion, the transfer of Transylvania’s sovereignty (or at least some part of it) from Romanian authority. The Hungarian manager of this propaganda all through the ‘80s was Mátyás Szürös, the head of the Department of Foreign Relations within the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, trained in the USSR, János Kádár’s faithful collaborator and the former Hungarian ambassador in Moscow (1978-1982).[107]

For the matter of the minorities, Budapest adopted the principle of the collective rights of the national minorities, which becomes a tool of its revisionist policy. Bucharest maintained its principle of the individual rights of the persons categorised as national minorities. Under those circumstances, Romania never interfered to try to protect the Romanians in Hungary, precisely not to fuel or justify the demands of the Hungarians. However, institutions, politicians and people of culture, organizations and professional associations in Hungary demanded rights and freedoms for the Hungarian community in Romania, as if it had been threatened with extinction. It is worth mentioning the fact that the Hungarian intellectual elites in Romania were similar to those in Hungary, they had writers and artists perfectly integrated in Hungarian culture, they spoke literary Hungarian and many simple folks did not even know Romanian. Not only did the doctors, engineers, teachers and other highly qualified people from the Hungarian community in Romania, educated and trained in this communist country, who left their native country to replace those who migrated to the West, adjust quickly to their work places, but they made sure Hungary didn’t feel the brain-drain in the years that followed communism. The huge anti-Romanian propaganda in Hungary took full advantage of the Romanian systematization of the villages. The Hungarians displayed it as a destruction policy of the Hungarian and German villages in Transylvania. This issue caused in Hungary and in the Western countries a massive psychosis against the regime in Bucharest given that none of the Hungarian and German inhabited villages were touched.[108]

The tense Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations made the Romanian authorities close the General Consulate of the Socialist Republic of Romania in Cluj-Napoca (July 1988), and the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party even took into account the usefulness of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest. These circumstances required a meeting at the highest level. The initiative belonged to the Romanian head of state at that time, Nicolae Ceaușescu. The Hungarians, represented by Károly Grosz, the Secretary General of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, and Prime Minister of the Hungarian government,t came with a positive answer. The meeting took place in Arad, on the 28^th of August 1988, and managed to ease for the moment the tensions in the bilateral relations.

Only a year after, in 1989, the great geopolitical changes caused by the fall of communism, the European hinterland of the USSR, followed in 1991 by the break-up and the disappearance of the Soviet conglomerate, directly affected Romania and Hungary. Even if in Bucharest and in Budapest they are still wondering if a revolution did indeed take place in December 1989, the changes which took place in the relation between the two countries justify the term. The totalitarian, ideologically polarised political system, which was based on a closed, centralised and state controlled economy, was overturned and replaced with a democracy, which included various political parties, and economically speaking, it changed into a free market economy, open to international trade. At the same time, both states became democracies and returned to the national and nationalistic policy from before World War II.

Between 1988 and 1989, Hungary managed to peacefully break away from communism. The experience of the violent events in 1956, after 32/33 years, determined the reformist-communists to sit down at the same table with the democratic opposition and together find a new institutional formula. Going West and the Euro-Atlantic integration process was filled with debates concerning Hungary’s new status in Europe, as well how to preserve its national identity. The fact that Hungary changed its neighbours – except for Austria in the west and Romania in the east, its neighbours in the north, Slovakia and Ukraine, and those in the south, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia are new countries – made Budapest go one way, “for a better past”, politically speaking. In order to make yourself noticed among the political elites, no matter the orientation, left or right, you must fulfil two demanded conditions considered national interests – denounce the Treaty in Trianon and support the Hungarians outside the borders.[109] The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party turns into the Hungarian Socialist Party and adopts the two new national conditions. The omnipresent Mátyás Szürös will lead the Parliament and ensure alternance in power. In 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum forms a government led by József Antall. The Prime Minister dies during his mandate and, following the end of this mandate, the Forum disappears from Hungarian political life. In 1994, the socialists, led by Gyula Horn, a member of Matias Szürös’ team, take the leadership of the government.

In Romania, breaking away from communism was violent, but well directed and broadcast live on national television. Even if the political change strongly opposed communism and lead to the disappearance of the communist party, the leadership was assumed by its former members. In Bucharest, the construction and consolidation of the democratic institutions took a long time, six years, having the same president, Ion Iliescu. The change would come only in 1996, when historical parties such as the National Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic National Peasants’ Party formed the Democratic Convention.[110]

Romanian nationalism slowly faded after 1990. The interethnic episode between the Romanians and the Hungarians, which started on the 19^th of March 1990 in Târgu Mureș, and which could have caused a general conflict in Transylvania, was quickly overcome by the Romanian majority. However, it lingered in the political discourses of the Hungarian minority in Romania, but also in the political discourses of the centre-right Hungarian politicians. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania entered the parliament, joining the Romanian government, and toned down the power of the Romanian nationalist discourse and set astray the fears regarding Hungarian secessionism.

Turning to NATO and joining the EU were the main objectives both in Bucharest and in Budapest. For this, the two capitals needed to prove to Europe that Romania and Hungary ended their disputes and mutually recognised their borders and that they had normal diplomatic relations. After rushed negotiations between the Romanian government, led by the Social Democratic Party and its Prime Minister Nicolae Văcăroiu, and the socialist Hungarian government, led by Gyula Horn (the former minister of foreign affairs in the communist government, led by Miklos Nemeth), the two parties signed in Timișoara, on the 16^th of September 1996, the Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness between Romania and Hungary.[111]

The Romanian-Hungarian Treaty was signed in peacetime, in a relaxed atmosphere of cooperation. However, it has several shortcomings regarding the way to approach the evolution of the relationship between the two countries. Thus, the treaty treats the matter of the borders superficially, mentioning only the fact that the “inviolability of the borders” is necessary, but it does not mention what those are or how they were settled. The document goes around referring to the basic document, the most important in this case, the Treaty in Trianon, signed on the 4^th of June 1920.[112] Instead, the document puts more emphasis on the matter of the status of national minorities; true that there are only two articles, but one of them is two pages long and has multiple attachments. In the list of attachments, it mentions that Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe does not refer to “collective right”. Even if this is evidenced, the error is that Recommendation 1201, which is a political document, is given legal force due to the mere fact that it is included in a legal document.[113] Practically when it comes down to minorities, the Hungarian community in Romania  is granted an advantage, which is not comparable to that granted to the Romanian ethnics in Hungary. Perhaps the Romanian and Hungarian negotiators alike took into account the fact that in Romania live 1,434,377 Hungarian ethnics, while in Hungary only live 7,995 Romanian ethnics (data at the level of 2002, 6 years after the signing). They did not consider that even then, back in 1996, as well as today, in 2018, all European minorities must enjoy the same rights, no matter their number. This is while the Hungarians in Romania are members of the parliament in Bucharest, and they take part of the governing process, while in Hungary not only the Romanians, but also the other 13 national and ethnic minorities are far from being represented in the Parliament in Budapest.[114] Since 1918 until today, in 2018, for 100 years, Hungary does not wish to have minorities in the parliament in Budapest. The explanation comes from the fact that the small number of minorities – Romanian, Slovakian, Serbian, Croatian etc. – who were present in October-November 1918 in the Hungarian Parliament are still blamed for the disappearance of what was once the “Autonomous Kingdom of Hungary” in the late Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Consequently, the Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness between Romania and Hungary was and is a formal agreement, which enabled Hungary and Romania to join the Euro-Atlantic structures. Hungary joined NATO on the 12^th of March 1999, and on the 1^st of May 2004 became a member of the European Union.[115] Romania became a full member of NATO on the 29^th of March 2004, and on the 1^st of January 2007 it joined the European Union.[116]

Now, in the beginning of the 21^st century, Romania and Hungary are again in the same system of alliances. The sensitivities related to Transylvania and the minorities are still there in the bilateral relation, however not as evident as in the 20^th century. So long as no country becomes an arbitrator in the relations between Romania and Hungary, tranquillity in the Carpathians and in the Danube basin is ensured.

NOTE: The study was published in Ion M. Anghel (coord.) “Romania’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy over a Century since the Establishment of Greater Romania” – Romanian Academy Publishing, 2018, volume II, pag. 303-334.

[1] Horia C. Matei, Silviu Neguț Ion Nicolae, Enciclopedia statelor Lumii, Meronia Publishing, Bucharest, 2008, p. 268.

[2] Alexandru Ghișa, ”Chestiunea Dunării” and Europenitatea României, Sorin Liviu Damean, Marusia Cristea, Mihaela Damean, Lucian Dindirică (coord.), Permanențele Istoriei. Profesorului Corneliu-Mihail Lungu la 70 de ani, Cetatea de Scaun Publishing , Târgoviște, 2013, p. 168.

[3] Daniela Bușă, Modificări politico-teritoriale în sud-estul Europei între Congresul de la Berlin and primul război mondial (1878-1914), Paideia Publishing, Bucharest, 2003, p. 27-30.

[4] Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), Istoria politicii externe românești în date, Enciclopedic Publishing, Bucharest, 2003, p. 182.

[5] Ibidem.

[6] Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Paula Bolovan, Ispititoarea Transilvanie. Multiperspectivitate and adevăr în istoria unei provincii, Școala Ardeleană Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2017, p. 61.

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Fond 71/1914 E2, 2^nd part, vol. 45, f. 2-3 (Translation from French original).

[8] Ibidem, vol. 46, f. 503-506.

[9] Gyula Juhász, Magyarország Külpolitikàja 1919-1945, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1988, p. 10.

[10] Alexandru Ghișa, România and Ungaria la început de secol XX. Stabilirea relațiilor diplomatice (1918-1921), Cluj University Press, Cluj-Napoca, 2002, p. 69-70.

[11] Ibidem, p. 71

[12] Erich Zöllner, Istoria Austriei, Enciclopedic Publishing, Bucharest, 1997, vol. II, p. 605.

[13] Alexandru Ghișa, op. cit., p. 77-78.

[14] Maria Ormos, From Padua to the Trianon, 1918-1920, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1990, p. 44.

[15] Alexandru Ghișa, op. cit., p. 83.

[16] Jozsef Galántai, Hungary in the First World War, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1989, p. 316-317.

[17] Alexandru Ghișa, op. cit., p. 105-105.

[18] 1918 la Români – Documentele unirii, Bucharest, 1989, vol. VII, p. 200, doc. 162 – The mentioned districts are: Torontal, Timiș, Caraș-Severin, Arad, Bihor, Satu-Mare, Maramureș, Bistrița-Năsăud, Solnoc-Dobâca, Sălaj, Cluj, Mureș-Turda, Turda-Arieș,Alba de Jos, Târnava Mică, Târnava Mare, Hunedoara, Sibiu, Brașov, Făgăraș, Trei-Scaune, Odorhei and Ciuc, and regions from the Districts of Bichiș, Cenad and Ugocea.

[19] Alexandru Ghișa, op. cit.,p. 109-110.

[20] Ibidem, 116.

[21] Ibidem, 118.

[22]  Ibidem, p. 106-107 and 133-138.

[23] Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Paula Bolovan, op. cit., p. 77.

[24] Alexandru Ghișa, op. cit., p. 120-121.

[25] Ibidem, p. 157.

[26] Larry L. Watts, Aliați incompatibili. România, Finlanda, Ungaria and al Treilea Reich, RAO Publishing, 2014, p. 68.

[27] Erich Zöllner, op. cit., vol. II, p. 618.

[28] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Tratate and Convenții, Tratat de Pace între Puterile Aliate and Asociate and Ungaria, Protocol and Declarațiuni, din 4 iunie 1920 (Trianon), Bucharest, Imprimeria Statului, 1920.

[29] Ibidem.

[30] Camil Mureșanu, În templul lui Janus, Cartimpex, Cluj-Napoca, 2002, p. 123

[31] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Tratate and Convenții … Tratatul de la Trianon… .

[32] Larry L. Watts, op. cit., p. 69.

[33] Alexandru Ghișa, op. cit., p. 220.

[34] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Conferința Păcii. Paris 1946, vol. 96, f. 109-110.

[35] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond 71/1914, E-2, dosar 45/1916, vol. 65 Austro-Hungary, f. 15.

[36] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Issue 77, Dosare personale, dosar 77/S-63/1920, tg. no. 18089 of 07.08.1920.

[37] Ibidem, tg. no. 19825/26.08.1920.

[38] Reprezentanțele diplomatice ale României (în continuare RDR), Politica Publishing, Bucharest, 1971, p. 163-164.

[39] Ibidem.

[40] Ibidem, p. 165.

[41] András Hory, Bukaresttöl Varsóig, Gondolat, Budapest, 1987, p. 47, nota 23 subsol.

[42] Ibidem, p. 41-42.

[43] Alexandru Ghișa, Post-accession identity mutations. A case study: Austria, Hungary, Romania, în Vasile Pușcaș, Marcela Sălăgean, (coord.), România and Uniunea Europeană post-Tratatul de la Lisabona, Eikon Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 227.

[44] Ibidem, p. 229-230.

[45] Statemen of the state secretary Zsolt Nemeth, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4^th of June 2012, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/hirek/trianon-sebet-a-nemzet-kozjogi-egyesitese-gyogyithatja-be

[46] Peter Kende, A ”Trianon-szindroma” és a magyar külpolitika” Külpolitika Magazine, no. 3-4, 1995.

[47] Larry L. Watts, op. cit., p. 68.

[48] Mihai Retegan, În balanța forțelor. Alianțe militare românești interbelice, Editura Semne, Bucharest, 1997, p.23-24 and Larry L. Watts, Ferește-mă, doamne, de prieteni. Războiul clandestin al blocului sovietic cu România, Editura RAO, Bucharest, 2011, p. 98.

[49] Larry L. Watts, Aliați incompatibili …, p. 77-78.

[50]  Ibidem, p. 123.

[51] Romanian Academy (ed.), Istoria Românilor, vol. VIII, România Întregită 1918-1940 (coord. Ioan Scurtu), Enciclopedic Publishing, Bucharest, 2003, p. 31-33. 

[52] Ibidem, p. 431.

[53] Ibidem, 432-436.

[54] Ibidem, 436-437.

[55] Larry L. Watts, Aliați incompatibili …, p. 170.

[56] Ibidem.

[57] Relațiile româno-sovietice. Documente, vol. II (1935-1941), Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing, 2003, Bucharest, 2003, doc. 163 p. 324-331.

[58] Ibidem, doc. 164, p. 331-332 and doc. 173, p. 348-349.

[59] Cornel Grad, Al doilea Arbitraj de la Viena, Institutul European, Iasi, 1998, p. 27.

[60] Ibidem, p. 30.

[61] Mihail Manoilescu, Dictatul de la Viena. Memorii, iulie-august 1940, Enciclopedic Publishing, Bucharest, 1991, p. 105-120.

[62] Alexandru Ghișa, România între Germania and URSS în anul 1940 – Cedarea Transilvaniei de Nord, în  L. Balogh Béni, Cornel Grad, Sárándi Tamas, Ottmar Trașcă, Al II-lea Arbitraj de la Viena din 30 august 1940. Antecedente and Consecințe, Satu Mare Studii and Comunicări XXVII/II Supplimentum, Satu Mare 2011, p. 105-106.

[63] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond 71/1939, E.9.XII (Conferința româno-maghiară de la Turnu Severin pentru stabilirea noii frontiere între cele două țări), vol. 218, p. 247-253 (Declaration of the meeting on the 16^th of August 1940), p. 271-276 (Declaration of the meeting on the 19^th of August 1940) and p. 302-315 (Protocol of the meeting on the 24 of August 1940).

[64] Cornel Grad, op. cit., p. 52-53.

[65] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond 71/1920-1944. Transilvania, vol. 12, f. 42-43.

[66] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Acorduri and Tratate. Tratate multilaterale. Page 82 – Arbitrajul de la Viena.

[67] Zoltán Szász, Demersuri internaționale pentru slăbirea cortinei de fier în Transilvania (1940-1943). Intențiile de mediere germano-italiene, în L. Balogh Béni, Cornel Grad, Sárándi Tamas, Ottmar Trașcă, Al II-lea Arbitraj de la Viena …,  p. 157

[68] Ibidem.

[69] Cornel Grad, op. cit., p. 137 and nota 55 subsol.

[70] Zoltán Szász, op. cit., p. 159.

[71]  L. Balogh Béni, Erdély kérdése a román és a magyar külpolitikában 1940-1944 között, în L. Balogh Béni, Cornel Grad, Sárándi Tamas, Ottmar Trașcă, Al II-lea Arbitraj de la Viena …,  p. 170.

[72]  Larry L. Watts, Aliați incompatibili …, p. 200.

[73]  Alexandru Ghișa, La Transylvanie sous lʹArbitrage : De Hitler à Staline (1940-1947),  Transylvanian Review, vol. XXVI, no. 2, Summer 2017, p. 66.

[74] Ibidem, p. 67.

[75]  L. Balogh Béni, op. cit., p. 167.

[76] Ibidem.

[77] Larry L. Watts, Aliați incompatibili …, p. 290.

[78] Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), op. cit., p. 340

[79] Larry L. Watts, Aliați incompatibili …, p. 291.

[80] Tofic M. Islamov, Po povodu reakții v Rumînii na kniga ”Transilvanskii vopros bengero-rumînskii teritorialnîi spor i SSSR, 1940-1946. Dokumentî” (În legătură cu reacția din România la cartea ”Chestiunea Transilvaniei: Litigiul teritorial ungaro-român and URSS, 1940-1946. Documente”), în revista Novaia i Noveișaia Istoria (Istoria Modernă and Contemporană), no. 6/2000, p. 166-173 (translation Vasile Oroian)

[81] Florin Constantiniu, PCR, Pătrășcanu and Transilvania (1945-1946), Enciclopedic Publishing, Bucharest, 2001, p. 55-58.

[82] Ibidem, p. 54.

[83] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Tratate and Convenții, Tratat de Pace cu România, 1947, p. 2.

[84] Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), op. cit., p. 345,348 and 359.

[85] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Tratate and Convenții, Tratat de prietenie, colaborare and asistență mutuală între R.P. Română and R.P. Ungară, 1948.  

[86] Larry L. Watts, Ferește-mă, doamne, de prieteni …, p. 180. The communist constitution was adopted on the 27^th of September 1952 and published in the Official Bulletin of the Grand National Assembly, no. 1/September 1952. 

[87] Ibidem.

[88] Ibidem, p. 185.

[89] Stelian Neagoe, Oameni politici români. Enciclopedie, Editura Machiavelli, Bucharest, 2007, p. 308-312.

[90] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Ungaria – Unele aspecte ale politicii revizioniste ale Ungariei față de România”, 1959, f. 98-106.

[91] Ibidem.

[92]Larry L. Watts, Ferește-mă, doamne, de prieteni …, p. 187.

[93] Alexandru Ghișa, Zece ani de criză est europeană: 1955-1965. De la colapsul ungar la Declarația de independență a României față de Moscova, Nicolae Ecobescu (coord.), România. Supraviețuire and afirmare prin diplomație în anii Războiului Rece, Titulescu European Foundation, Bucharest, 2013, vol. 2, p. 327.

[94] Ileana Ioanid, Nagy Imre. Însemnări de la Snagov – Corespondență, rapoarte, convorbiri, Polirom Publishing, Iasi, 2004.

[95] Alexandru Ghișa, Zece ani de criză est europeană …, p. 329.

[96] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Ungaria 1956, Telegrama Ambasadei RPR la Budapesta nr. 127/16 iunie 1958.

[97] Ibidem, p. 331.

[98] Mircea Chirițoiu, Hrușciov umblă la Cutia Pandorei: Granițele, Magazin Istoric, no. 8/august 1999, p. 54-58.

[99] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond 220 URSS, 1964, Letter no 18/10 January 1964 – Manifestări negative despre RPR în URSS, p. 2; Larry L. Watts, Ferește-mă, doamne, de prieteni …,p. 242-243.

[100] Larry L. Watts, Ferește-mă, doamne, de prieteni …, p. 243.

[101] Valeri L. Musatov, was the head of the Department Hungary-Romania from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Deputy within the International Section from the CC of the CPSU (1984-1991) and the Russian ambassador to Budapest (2000-2005), Jurnalul Național,10.01.2009, Scînteia Supplement, p. 1.

[102] Alexandru Ghișa, Zece ani de criză est europeană …, p. 332-333.

[103] Alexandru Ghișa, Relațiile româno-ungare în ultimii ani ai Războiului Rece, în Laurențiu Constantiniu (ed.), In Memoriam. Acad. Florin Constantiniu – Smerenie. Pasiune. Credință, Enciclopedic Publishing, Bucharest, 2013, p. 275.

[104] Ibidem, p. 276.

[105] Ibidem, p. 276-277.

[106] Ibidem, p. 277-278.

[107] Larry L. Watts, Cei dintâi vor fi cei din urmă. România and sfârandtul Războiului Rece, RAO Publishing, Bucharest, 2013, p. 394, 424 and 674.

[108] Alexandru Ghișa, Relațiile româno-ungare în ultimii ani ai Războiului Rece…, p. 278-279.

[109] Alexandru Ghișa, Post-accession identity mutations. A case study: Austria, Hungary, Romania, Vasile Pușcaș, Marcela Sălăgean (coord.) România and Uniunea Europeană post-Tratatul de la Lisabona, Eikon Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 226-227.

[110] Ibidem, p. 230.

[111] As it is a treaty in effect, it is being kept in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the Department of General Legal Affairs and Treaties, but it can be read in the Official Monitor no. 250/1996.

[112] Ion M. Anghel, Tratatul de înțelegere, colaborare and bună vecinătate dintre România and Republica Ungară (neajunsuri and învățăminte), Ion M. Anghel, Lucian Petrescu, Valeriu Tudor (coord.), Pagini din Diplomația României – ”semper fidelis patriae”, vol. III, Junimea Publishing, Iaand, 2011, p.135.

[113] Ibidem, p. 134 and 139.

[114] Alexandru Ghișa, Maghiarii din România – Românii din Ungaria în secolul XX. O analiză comparativă, Vasile Ciobanu, Sorin Radu (coord.), Partide politice and minorități naționale din România în secolul XX, vol. IV, Techno Media, Sibiu, 2009, p. 66-67 and 78.

[115] Horia C. Matei, Silviu Neguț Ion Nicolae, Enciclopedia statelor Lumii …, p. 681.

[116] Ibidem, p. 536.