Abstract

Brexit signifies more than the technical complexities of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union: it is an ideological phenomenon, constructed both from within and outside the UK. The present article sets out to map some of the main evolutions possible for Britain and the EU in the context of the Brexit crisis that seems to enter its final stage as the 31stdeadline looms ahead. The analysis focuses also on the morphology of the British political landscape, which experienced some turbulence that propelled observers to question its stability. By anchoring the Brexit crisis into a national intellectual history, and exposing the different strands of British Euro-scepticism, we also set out to shed some light on the forces that drive this race forward. The review of potential developments highlights the chasm between the expectations of the many groups and political sensibilities that Brexit momentarily federated, albeit without offering any substantial formula for a real, long-term political cooperation.

Key words: euroscepticism, Brexit, European Union, populism

Brexit was, for doubters, the end of the integration enthusiasm and of the desire to have an ”ever closer Union”[1] that, for the past six decades, has been both the engine and the emotional horizon of the European construction process.

We intend to propose a few ways of understanding the post-Brexit scenarios in a European and British political landscape that will change considerably following the crisis generated by the vote on June 23, 2016. The first part of the present paper will focus on a series of international opinions regarding the way in which the Brexit aftermath will affect the pillars of the European Union that have been subjected to pressures from both populism and the readjustment of the balance of global powers in favour of other emerging actors, such as China and India. The local failure – in a highly visible member state that is a model of democracy – of the European project has generated an undeniable crisis of continental conscience that goes way beyond the Brussels technical debates regarding the restructuring of European institutions, the rewriting of European treaties, and the reform of Brussel’s bureaucracy. The basis of the European identity narrative enshrined by European treaties as “an ever closer Union” was called back into question, thus marking the end of a cycle of the European construction.

In the second part of the paper we intend to analyse more thoroughly Great Britain’s political landscape, where Brexit has sparked an apparent partisan realignment without precedent in the post war history of Westminster’s parties, which casts uncertainty not only over the international role of the United Kingdom but also over the structure of its domestic political landscape.

How Can We Understand Brexit? A Sample of Specialized Literature

It is difficult to cover all the literature that has been dedicated to Brexit. Social sciences must carefully find a way through the minefield of the present political situation. However, understanding the complexity of Brexit requires a few essential readings that may be either primary sources – product of political and intellectual rivalries that have defined the campaign and the negotiation process for a new Great Britain – or theoretical sources that aim for a global understanding of the causes of the separation. Whether the effort is academic or partisan, these works offer a multidimensional perspective on events but also on the clash of ideas. And the list goes on.

The first work, previously referred to, is interesting as it offers a continental perspective, French to be precise. Jaques Julliard’s book, titled Allons-nous sortir de l'Histoire[2] dedicates to Europe tens of pages of harsh, razor-sharp lines. Although the subject of the book isn’t Brexit, but the inner demons of Macron’s France, the spectre of the geopolitical aftermath of Great Britain leaving the EU haunts its pages. Julliard sees Brexit as a great opportunity and, looking back at Great Britain’s road packed with “opt-outs” within the European community, he sees the country as a toxic presence and an obstacle to any ambitious advancement of the Union’s project. The author’s suggested solution (with an obvious Crypto-Gaullist influence) is to rebuild a strong European bloc revolving around France and Germany that can be later joined by countries historically faithful to the European project, such as the Benelux countries. With an eye on the Czech Republic, Poland, or Hungary, Julliard is very tough on the Eastern European bloc as well, considering that the expansion of the EU in the ‘90’s and the 2000’s has been a mistake that is to blame for the current fragility of the European structures. Brexit was the threshold of the so called “post Maastricht blues” syndrome – a civic demobilization that translated into disbelief and loss of affection in the EU, accompanied by a moral breakdown and a search for the sense of purpose, in order to revive the European narrative. Julliard appears as one of the thinkers of the post-Maastricht Europe, including in some of the more sombre aspects regarding the redefinition of a European identity that threatens to revive obsolete dichotomies.

Brexit has been approached too many times from a strictly geopolitical or geo-economic perspective. Denis McShane’s book called Brexit: How Britain Left Europe[3] examines its ideological causes by thoroughly restoring the intellectual genealogy of the Euro-scepticism in both the Labour Party and in the Conservative Party. It is a complex work that highlights the maturity of the anti-European movement that has led to the vote on the 23rd June 2016 and explores the way great political figures of the 20th century have approached the delicate issue of European integration and British exceptionalism. From Winston Churchill to Margret Thatcher, from Edward Heath to Tony Blair or James Cameron, McShane offers a vast perspective on the pro or anti-European discourses that have infused the British post-war political culture. The author insists on the conservative revival in the ‘80’s, convinced that this moment holds the key to understanding the present. The evolutions of the European agenda are systematically connected to the domestic transformations of the British society: thus, the structural reforms conducted by Jaques Delors’ Commissionare weighed against the liberalization initiated by Margaret Thatcher and the violent conflict that opposed the British Government to syndicates. The originality of McShane’s undertaking resides not only in the restoration of political and strategic treats, but also in the contrasting ideologies that have drawn the defining lines of the Leave campaign. We can allow ourselves, though, to regret the absence of a more consistent chapter on the populist nature of some parties, such as UKIP, that have taken advantage of the Euro-scepticism to migrate from the periphery of the political system to its very core, as far as to challenging the Conservative Party on matters such as migration, security, and the multiculturalism of the British society. Despite this shortcoming, the book is still an essential read and an excellent starting point to understanding Brexit in its complexity.

To the reader interested in UKIP’s discourse, an undisputable player of the Leave campaign, we recommend the article written by Andrea Pareschi and Alessandro Albertini, entitled Immigration, Elites and the European Union. The Framing of Populism in the Discourse of Farage's UKIP.[4] Amassing significant critical narratives dedicated to the contemporary populist phenomenon, the authors draw up, based on a general theoretical pattern, a scheme that clarifies the various dimensions of UKIP’s populist discourse. The anti-European dimension and the anti-establishment rhetoric are the basis of UKIP’s populist actions; however, the article prides itself on emphasizing the complexity of the contrast between the two notions – centre versus periphery – that are the reason for Farage’s European phobia. UKIP doesn’t hesitate to take advantage of the resentment against the “centre”, but this discourse stops at the borders of the United Kingdom.

The literature on UKIP and its anti-European populism can be seconded by two more articles that, while preceding the 2016 referendum, provide some relevant insights that have been validated by the post referendum course of events.

Strategic Euro-sceptics and polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections[5] is a study on the mechanisms of European elections. The three authors – Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin, and David Cutts highlight the resources needed to aggregate a populist vote by combining a far right nucleus (regularly deserters from radical parties such as the British National Party) and a wider area of voters less political, who had either been politically inactive, or supporters of traditional parties. The conclusions validate the theory regarding the fragility of the foundation of protest votes, a theory that has been recently demonstrated by the changing makeup of the UKIP and Brexit Party votes depending on type of elections (European or parliamentary).

To better understand the characteristics of British populism, as opposed to the neo-fascist nationalism of the traditional far right, Anders Widfeldt’s article called The Populist Beauty and the Fascist Beast. Comparing the Support Bases of UKIP and the BNP[6] is an excellent starting point.

A more international perspective on Brexit and its potential outcomes can be found in the collective work Brexit Beckons: Thinking Ahead by Leading Economists[7]. Concise yet dense, the authors, 19 British and European economists, cover multiple aspects of the phenomenon, including the deep causes of the Leave vote, and the social and economic implications of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. The authors are somewhat predictable focusing on the economic and commercial dimensions of the matter; however, the book is infused with an acute sense of interaction between ideologies – how the population sees the economic realities that are governed by a sense of logic that has very often nothing to do with economy – and economy. The book has other strong points such as the two contributions dedicated to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Even if not ready yet to offer clear answers, the Scottish economist Ian Wooton knows how to ask pertinent questions and how to restore the balance between the main arguments of the debate on Scottish independence that will probably dominate the country’s domestic agenda, should there be a no-deal. John Fitzgerald and Patrick Honohan focus on the future of Irish economy, currently one of the most globalised economies on the planet (according to the KOF Globalization Index, Ireland is in second place following the Netherlands), as opposed to the economic turbulences registered in the region. The authors highlight both the possible opportunities (the relocation of large companies that wish to keep their privileged access to the European market) and the potentially destabilising effects (the logistic problems caused by the transit of goods through English ports or the energy vulnerability), insisting on the symbolic risks of a physical border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Published by Jamie Morgan and Heikki Potomaki, Brexit and the Political Economy of Fragmentation[8] is a very thorough analysis of Brexit; it is also the most daring multidisciplinary endeavour. The book’s 15 chapters have a political (foreign and domestic), geopolitical, economic, and sociological approach that make a very valuable compendium. To the “neophyte” looking for a deep immersion into the matter, Brexit and the Political Economy of Fragmentation is perfectly completed by another Routlege publication – The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit[9] whose publishers are Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard, and Ben Rosamond.

The last book on the list is the one written by the conservative MP Daniel Hannan, a fervent supporter of Brexit. Therefore, one should not see What Next: How to Get the Best from Brexit[10] as an impartial scientific research; on the contrary, it as the credo of a fervent Euro-sceptic. Hanna’s writing, where he argues in favour of a Singapore model, is an effective digest on conservative Euro-scepticism and a necessary incursion in the minds of those who contributed to the success of the Leave campaign.

Brexit and the European Community

For the optimistic, Brexit is rather a clarification, a return to the continental origins of a political phenomenon that is not based on an economic doctrine, but on a sense of moral belonging to a whole. In his book Allons-nous sortir de l’Histoire (Will We Fall Out of History?), Jaques Julliard suggests a reorientation of the European project around France and Germany, amulti-speed Europethat won’t be afraid to move on with the risk of leaving behind partners who cannot be, politically and culturally, enrolled[11]. Great Britain joining the EU in 1973 became the symbol of the rupture in the name of a European Realpolitik that has been guided by economic interests and by the concept of “Europe First” as ratified by the Treaty of Rome. Great Britain leaving (the EU) is, of course, to supporters of this community project, a radical challenge to the concept of a united Europe as shaped by the Maastricht Treaty. The pre-Maastricht Europe was based on a precise European philosophy, symbolically built as a cultural and ideological area different from both the popular democracies in the East and the Anglo-Saxon “Far West”. The veto of the French president Charles de Gaulle on the adhesion of the United Kingdom, allegedly an USA agent, or Trojan horse, reflects this approach of rejecting the Atlantic orientation as it would damage the European nature of the project.[12] While strongly challenged, this paradigm dominated the process of European construction in the 60’s: the first enlargement took place in 1973, after almost two decades of geographical freeze of the European Economic Community. Guilty of not being European enough, Great Britain could not embrace the project from the start. George Pompidou’s mandate, following the resignation of De Gaulle in 1969 meant the change of the ideological core of the European project, change that made possible the integration of Great Britain and the states in the Eastern bloc in the redesigned ensemble.[13] The European Union was, as a political construction, an innovation built on the abandonment of the post war utopia of a homogenous Mittleurope in favour of the adoption of a more inclusive legal and economic consensus. A growing legislative production has put the new European identity into a legal framework. Otherness has been given a legal meaning – democratic deficit and an economic one – structural frailty, but it hasn’t been given the symbolic meaning of a deficit of Europeanism. A fundamental change had occurred. Great Britain’s EU integration showed the start of a new crucial step in European development and was both the sign and cause of the reconfiguration of the collective project. Brexit can mean the end of the Maastricht ideology (that was actually launched in the 1970’s, and was institutionalised progressively through the Single European Act, as well as the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties) and the impact it can have on the future of the EU is, of course, huge. The evolution of the European Union after Brexit must be monitored carefully especially in the Eastern European states, that have the specific feature of being historically part of the EU but not part of the West – the source of the original European project. Indeed, the EU’s Eastern expansion is essentially the product of the Maastricht cycle and of the “ever-changing” European concept it has promoted.

Brexit – Product of a British National History? Great Britain’s Euro-sceptic Traditions

From the perspective of the European Union, Brexit is the paroxysm of a long and complex crisis. With the global economy under recession and uncertainty, the Euro-zone crisis highlighted many of the institutional and policy shortcomings of the European project.[14] The Greek and the migration crises have been the ideological fuel for the Euro-sceptic wave that swept our continent. A superficial analysis of the situation in Great Britain seems to firmly place Brexit in this line. However, even though the discourse of the Leave campaign is impossible to separate from the symbolic and rhetorical matrix of the populist movement on the continent, too little importance has been given to external factors. We believe Brexit isn’t a mere geopolitical event, but the product of an intellectual British history that produced a unique Euro-sceptic combination. The fact that the referendum took place in Great Britain and not Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic isn’t accidental; nor can the absence of a general domino effect be explained by the strategic caution and economic pragmatism of the governments (populist or not) on the continent alone.

What makes the British Euro-sceptic tradition particular is its fragmentation. We can refer to three different anti-European feelings that have grown separately, while feeding from antagonistic political philosophies.

Left Labour against the European Community

Chronologically speaking, the first is placed to the left of the post war Labourism. In the 1970’s, following domestic disputes and economic difficulties that have forced Great Britain to ask the help of the International Monetary Fund, the Labourites activated a revival of nationalism and protectionism, strongly denouncing the effects of globalization on workers.[15] Washington and Brussels became the compass points of the symbolic geography of capitalism and international ultra-liberalism. In this context, the EEC joining is presented as a serious threat to a British social model characterized by the power of the syndicates and the welfare state. The economic argument is seconded by a political one: joining the EEC would subordinate the British Parliament to the Court of Justice of the European Union, thus threatening the British democracy built on parliamentary sovereignty. The Labour MP, Michael Foot didn’t hesitate to declare that recognising a superior court of justice was the same as setting the Palace of Westminster on fire, a comparison to the Nazi Reichstag fire in 1933.[16] Eventually, Great Britain joined the EEC in 1973, under a conservative government. Over the next decade, and benefitting from the support of the vast majority of syndicates – in 1975 only 7 of 46 voted for the integration in the EEC[17] – the Labour Party kept on promoting the idea of a referendum for leaving the European structures, considering them the toxic product of the neo-liberal utopia of a free-trade world, fundamentally incompatible with their aspirations to a more egalitarian society. The Labour Party turned its back on Euro-scepticism along with Blair and Brown’s ideologically driven aggiornamento.[18] However, the election of Jeremy Corbyn in 2015 (one of the Labour MPs that firmly opposes Great Britain’s membership to the EU) proves the way the old guard, hostile to Blair’s policy, is still a dynamic ideological power; the surprisingly weak mobilization of the Labour Party in the Remain campaign can be associated with the underground reactivation – through Jeremy Corbyn – of the British left Euro-scepticism.[19]

The Conservatives Learn to Detest Europe

In the meantime, the consensus reached by the Conservative Party on the necessity to integrate Great Britain in the European market had worn out. As the European structures were producing a more and more consistent and compelling communitarian acquis in various domains, the Conservatives rose against the new regulations in the name of laissez-faire. Up until the ‘80’s, the British conservatism was ideologically close to the French and German right; economy to them meant a moderate liberalism that still recognised a paternal role for the state.The years of the Thatcher government meant a departure of the Conservative Party from this pattern that ensured a strategic and intellectual synergy with the other right-wing parties on the continent; at the same time, the socialist Jaques Delors, President of the European Commission (1985-1995), changed the Commission into a perfect instrument of market regulation in key areas such as: environment protection, consumer protection, health, and competitiveness.[20] Delors’ social and democratic agenda estranged the British conservatives for a long time. The neo-liberal matrix of the Euro-sceptic narrative, based on Brussels’ image as a Leviathan suffocating the economic freedom was a very original undertaking that can hardly be found in other anti-European continental traditions; in time it became associated with a sort of British “exceptionalism” that frequently used to express the idea of a deep political and ideological incompatibility between Great Britain and continental Europe. The fact is that, following the 1990’s, the Conservative Party became the most Euro-sceptic political party in Europe.

The Europhobic Populism

The British Euro-scepticism cannot be reduced to a mere confrontation between left-wing anti-capitalism and right-wing neo-liberalism, monopolised by the two largest parties in Westminster. The Euro-scepticism has become a key component of a third heterodox tradition, strongly anti-system and built to stand against the Labour-Conservative alternation. The populist sensitivity of some parties such as the UKIP (founded by Nigel Farage in 1993), or the latest Brexit Party (whose leader is also Farage, who left the UKIP following the success of the Leave campaign) has been shaped by disparate intellectual ideas. The nationalist far-right (promoted by the National Front and the British National Party, active between the 1990’s and the 2000’s) was, of course, one of the sources of inspiration, especially as far as the discourse against migration is concerned. However, even though key figures in the UKIP have stood out due to their racist and anti-Semite comments, these do not make a central component of the anti-European populism. Its main incubator seems to actually be the post-Thatcher conservatism itself. The biographies of the promoters of this political trend confirm their affiliation: Nigel Farage, Paul Nuttal, Douglas Carswell or Mark Reckless were all members of the Conservative Party. On an economic and financial level, the UKIP seems to follow the same liberal-conservative doctrine: the leitmotifs of the anti-European populist discourse are reducing the fiscal burden and freeing from the over-protective European leash. Populism is, by nature, an ideological “patchwork”, and the UKIP and Brexit Party are mirror images of the revival of this populist protectionism after the year 2000[21]; the focus on social services that receive a strong nationalist symbolic and affective meaning (e.g. the National Health Service), seconded by a strong anti-elitist rhetoric define the new narrative paradigm of the populist Euroscepticism. So, the third tradition is a heterodox synthesis of the left and right-wing tropes (sometimes far-right) that work independently though given the amazing political fuel made up by the anti-establishment resentment directed against both Brussels “experts” and Westminster elites guilty of the compromise negotiated with the EU.[22] What binds this synthesis is the myth of the British exceptionalism. More than the populist movements on the continent (Euro-sceptical, but with stronger narratives), the British populism basis was made of a centre-periphery discourse (the centre being Brussels, of course) overlapping the anti-establishment rhetoric typical to populism.

The Resilience of the Westminster Model under Scrutiny

Brexit was the product of a fortuitous confluence of composite electorate from rural areas and from the disadvantaged industrialized areas (the electoral geography of the Leave option being largely reflected by the dichotomy observed on the continent between the urban areas connected to the flows of globalization and the industrialised “hinterland”[23]). However, the structural frailty of the Euro-sceptic ideological formula in Great Britain is obvious: what the uncontainable impetus of the Leave vote produced, namely the synergy of the three sensitivities based on a minimalistic agenda and on a short term strategic objective, was the key to the current blockage. This alliance took place only at the level of the voters, never at the level of the politicians or that of the Westminster elites. At the present moment, once the effect of the universal suffrage was gone, we witness the recurrence of those fractures that the dichotomy for/against the EU has only artificially concealed. A post-Brexit agreement seems impossible since Brexit is an incoherent political project that lacks ideological coherence or substance.

On a domestic level, this ideological configuration supports the current two-party system. The debates around Brexit have polarised the society to the extreme, and the European elections in May 2019 have established a vaguely “four-sided” system: the dichotomy between Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party and the Liberal Democratic Party – highly in favour of the EU (two parties that have gathered 50% of the votes) overlapped the traditional confrontation between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party – the two largest ruling parties that have gathered only 20% of the votes, by far the worst score in their entire existence.[24] The earthquake of the European elections seemed to show the dissolution of the secular two-party system in Britain and, on a higher note, the disintegration of the left/right original axis. A scenario similar to the French one seemed justified and isn’t completely out of the picture. However, Boris Johnson becoming prime minister changed the scene completely, mobilising again a large part of the pro-Brexit conservative voters, who during the European elections had voted against Theresa May’s moderate policy. The last polls confirm this trend: as early elections seem more and more plausible, Johnson’s hard policy is supported by those who wish to leave the EU right away (with or without a deal). Farage’s formidable electoral pedestal, which made possible the resounding victory in May, seems more fragile than ever. As of June, the Conservatives led by a politically exhausted Theresa May could only hope – in case of early Parliamentary elections– for a score of 21%, as the Brexit Party was credited with 22%; at this time, polls show that they can get over 30% (32%), while the Brexit Party is down to 12%.[25] This data is, after all explicable: Johnson’s party favours populist anti-European political narratives, one of which is the elite’s plot against Brexit, so he promises a firm and swift resolution to the Brexit crisis. Johnson’s political creed is a strong and effective mixture between populism (Johnson’s charisma, far superior to Farage’s enables him to play effortlessly the part of a “Trump/Maverick”), a clear anti-European ideology, as well as the promise of an institutional stability and continuity that the Brexit Party cannot ensure and that cannot be overlooked by a part of the conservative electorate.

Even more surprising is the fact that on the eve of a possible early election the Labour Party too seems revived, although Jeremy Corbyn is far less credible as leader of the Remain campaign. The dynamic Liberal Democratic Party positioned itself, during the European elections in May, as the moving power behind the demand of the pro-European voters for a second referendum. With 19.6% of the votes, it had a considerable head start on the Labour Party (13.6%). The pro-European political offer was very divided – the Greens getting the fourth place with 11.8% of the votes.[26] An average of the polls conducted in September shows, in exchange, a very different picture: the Labour Party takes back the second place, following the Conservative Party with 25% of the votes. Their lead over the Liberal Democrats (19%) is over 6%.[27]

So, if the European elections in May were a quake that questioned the very survival of Britain’s traditional two-party system and its two historical parties, the new political situation clarifies these circumstances considerably. The fight between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party remains the fundamental backbone of the British political life, despite the turbulences generated by the Brexit crisis. The Conservative Party in particular reasserts its domination over the right-wing parties, due to the populism of the new prime minister. The Labour Party will likely have greater difficulties, so the liberal democrats will remain a credible option for the party’s centre. Just as Johnson made use of the Trump effect to overcome his competitor, a Macron effect could play against the left-wing Corbyn, thus alienating the Blair wing of the Labourites. For now, though, the eventuality of an early election would probably reconfirm the British two-party system. Let’s not forget that the chapter of the European elections is governed, both at the level of the electoral mechanism (through the exact distribution of European votes) and at the level of the psychological behaviour of the voters (European elections are often seen as “low-stake”, more of a protest vote than a strategic one) by a logic which is different from that of the parliamentary elections.

The State City of Singapore, a Model for Post-Brexit Development

Even if the Brexit didn’t permanently dismantle the structure of the British two-party system, that doesn’t mean that the survival of the two largest parties provides a viable solution to the future of the country or delivers the right ideological solution for the post-Brexit horizon. The truth is that the existence of a consensual post-Brexit doctrine even within the Leave camp seems impossible, given the many different ideologies that make it up. This can mainly be seen when summarizing the post-Brexit scenarios on Great Britain’s new international status. No other pattern of development illustrates the separation of the three ideological concepts of the anti-European bloc more clearly than the one that looks to the “Asian Tigers“ as a possible source of inspiration to redesigning Great Britain’s economic relationship with the rest of the word.

Given the latest evolutions in the British domestic politics, the main objective of the new government is to leave the EU on the 31st October 2019, even without an agreement. Starting from this and the EU’s refusal to resume the negotiations on the Brexit deal, a no-deal seems more plausible. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland leaving the European Union without a deal means going back to the multiple trade agreements governed by the World Trade Organization. A total, violent rupture involved by a withdrawal without a deal was, a few months ago, the radical solution for some British officials such as the populist Nigel Farage; now, it is a political project “adopted” by the conservative establishment. This revival isn’t due to the new prime minister exclusively. The Conservative Party sees in the economic freedom offered by a no-deal only the opportunity of the complete renovation of the British economy and trade. The Euro-sceptic tradition prevalent amongst conservatives is clearly rooted in Tatcherism. In this mind-set, the British exceptionalism (a narrative commonto the three Euro-sceptic traditions) works through a voluntary liberal policy consistent with the “great global trade nation” spirit of Great Britain that will see a total separation from the interventionist continental agenda against which – ever since the middle of the ‘80’s – the conservative Euro-scepticism was built. The development scenario that summarizes this new Thatcher liberal utopia is tauntingly called Singapore on Thames[28]: the implementation of a concept similar to that of Singapore or Hong Kong, with a minimum set of rules and a drastically lowered fiscal burden (Singapore has the lowest corporate taxes in the world). State intervention, especially as far as social support, will also be more involved. Described by the conservative MP Owen Paterson as a winning formula “low-tax, low-spend, low-regulation”[29], the Singapore model is very attractive to many of the key members of the Conservative Party. In case of a no-deal (such a scenario is of course unimaginable in the case of a deal that ensures a common commercial framework with the EU), this scenario offers a voluntarism perspective of the revival of the British Empire trade history, a spirit branded in the anti-European narrative, which is nothing more than a narrative of the British uniqueness and “exceptionalism”.

However, this model cannot be accepted by the left, to whom the British “exceptionalism” is set in the very model of social welfare originating from the Beveridgian welfare state born after the 2nd World War. Similarly, protectionism and the view against the European multicultural and globalization formula stemming from the populist formations (especially UKIP and Brexit Party) are incompatible with the model of an open, ultraliberal economy. If the Singapore model ca be adopted as an economic model, it cannot be replicated at the political level unless Britain forsakes the Westminster democracy: the magnetism of the Asian city-state is not only based on the promise of an advantageous fiscal regime, but also on the promise of political stability ensured by a technocratic, non-democratic, pro-business government. Separating the economic model from the political one is truly a proof of immaturity of the conservative elites, but beyond this it shows the ideological singularity of each of the three traditions: they all wrongly believe they have a monopoly on the anti-European concept. Brexit is not a monolithic though. Johnson’s voluntarism will probably translate into exiting the EU; no matter how the exit will take place, though – with or without a deal (more difficult in case of a no-deal), the United Kingdom post-Brexit risks to become, on medium term, a space that cannot be governed and more polarised than ever.

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