In an unstable geopolitical environment, where the international landscape is marked by growing tensions, the reformation process of the European Union after Brexit cannot ignore the way the Member States seek to relate themselves to the security and defence dimension.

   After a long service in the Romanian diplomacy - where he served as secretary of state for Euro-Atlantic Integration, ambassador of Romania to the Netherlands (1999-2001), permanent representative to the United Nations (2003-2008) and, later, to the European Union (2008-2015), as well as ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2015), Mihnea Motoc served as minister of defence from 2015 to 2017.

   He is currently serving as deputy head of the European Political Strategy Centre and special adviser on European defence and security affairs to the president of the European Commission. In the interview offered to Vladimir Adrian Costea for the Geostrategic Pulse Magazine, Mihnea Motoc analysed the prospects and challenges to the global strategic forecast, starting from the role and objectives of the EU in the field of European defence and security.

   Vladimir-Adrian Costea: Mr. Mihnea Motoc, we are currently trying to identify and understand the new challenges posed by Brexit. What are, as of now, the main prospects and challenges regarding the post Brexit global strategic prediction of the EU?

   Mihnea Motoc: It will probably take some time until we will be able to fully, understand them despite all the contingency plans that have been worked on extremely exigent over the past few years. It will be difficult to finalize them this year, during a transition period, and – except for the fact that Great Britain becomes a third country to us – the reality is that it is still “business as usual” for both the British and us (and this situation may very well last for two more years). The EU loses a major diplomatic, strategic, military, financial and technological player, but this does not change its course and global priorities, the more so since their future relationship will be a close partnership and will continue to entail a high degree of alignment (Great Britain is not leaving Europe). On the contrary, there are many fields, such as European defence, where the post-Brexit EU can state new, or even higher ambitions.

   What are the main objectives and courses of action set by the Commission for this year? To what extent has Brexit influenced the Commission’s strategic priorities?

   The strategic objectives of the Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen cover the 2019-2024 term. Some, such as the European Green Deal and the digital package, are transformative paradigms, which practically mobilize all policy areas; other cardinal directions will be strengthening the global player profile including by reviving multilateralism, an economy for the people, protecting the European way of life, reviving democracy in Europe. The high level of interdependence in today’s globalised world is reflected in the geopolitical articulation of the Commission, meaning that the foreign policy issues will be systematically included on the agenda of the College, and the formulation of any policy will be done in correlation with their external dimension. The first 100 days of office in 2020 have already brought considerable breakthroughs on most of these workstrands. I cannot see how Brexit can influence the shaping of the Commission’s strategic compass.

   Articulating the EU budget continues to represent a particular stake. What are the prospects of managing the United Kingdom’s contribution to the EU budget, estimated at 12-14 billion Euro?

   Great Britain is the second net contributor to the EU budget, and the 27 Member States have to take over its contribution. A number of Member States find it difficult to accept a similar or a larger contribution to the future budget, or, for that matter, a bigger overall figure for that budget, following Brexit. The draft prepared by the Commission promotes a formula, allowing for both the coverage of the gap generated by Brexit, based on increased national contributions and redeployments within the EU budget, and adequate financial allocations for new policies and priorities introduced on the European agenda over the past years by the Member States as well as a larger share for European financial appropriations, which are vital to keeping Europe competitive and relevant on a global scale.

   What are the most sensitive issues regarding the financing of investments in the EU’s security and defence? Where does the EU need to make adjustments to its budget and actions?

   I would like to address mainly the issue of investments in the area of defence, where I could identify four domains where things are sensitive: prioritising European financing, its size, aspects of legality and of ethics of this financing, respectively. When I talk about the sensitivity of prioritising investments in the field of defence, I take into account the fact that the selection must support the strategic course intended for the revival of the European Defence (in short, strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy). The investments must support the prime actors in the European defence industry, in order for them to be able to withstand the global competition in the field, as well as the small and medium size innovative enterprises. They must support the Member States whose defence industries differ very much, as well as cover the current capability deficit (including strategic enablers), and they must support the development of the defence capabilities for the future, which will imply transitioning to a fundamentally different generation of technology. These capabilities will be difficult to access under the prevailing paradigm where most of the generation of defence assets and technologies takes place strictly at national level. The investments must support conventional research and, increasingly so,  “disruptive research”.

   To meet all these different requirements, the Commission has included in the EU’s draft budget a proposal to allocate adequate funding to European defence, military mobility and relevant components of the research programmes. A reconfiguration of the budget exceeding the scale of a mere adjustment could effect significant changes to the type and magnitude of the level of ambition for European defence, or at least to the timeframe for the for implementing the goals set.

   Regarding the legal aspects, the Commission has been receptive to suggestions aimed at consolidating safeguards of compliance with international law, in relation to any programme which is financing defence research and development out of the EU budget. It is also worth flagging up here the complexity of different national regimes of arms export control, an area largely beyond the Commission’s competence.

   Finally, and especially with regard to the achievements generated by the applications of Artificial Intelligence in the area of defence, assurances and safeguards have been provided to the effect that human control of the deployment of resulting capabilities and technologies is preserved.

   How do you see the way the debate regarding the EU’s multiple reform scenarios is currently articulated? To what extent do the EU Member States still have the energy and wish to redefine the future of the European construction?

   These are very appropriate questions, at a time, when the interplay between the Community method and the inter-governmental approach experiences certain shifts. Whereas, for now, it may look as several European policies are heavily shaped in national frameworks. I am convinced that the debate regarding the ways to increase the democratic legitimacy of the European institutions and the consolidation of European governance will follow its natural course, under the influence of two factors: (1) the existence of an institutional framework for approaching these matters (the Conference on the Future of Europe) and the ideas generated at the level of the European institutions (which are mainly included in the programmatic documents of  the Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen); (2) the multiplication of crises and challenges – especially technological – on a global scale, which will all require an European response.

   To what extent is the evolution of the conflicts in the Middle East a catalyst for redefining the cooperation between Brussels and Washington? How can the EU get involved, beside NATO, in managing the situation in the Middle East?

   The EU is very well placed for playing a major part in dealing with conflicts in the Middle East, also due to the area’s historical and geographic vicinity to Europe. The EU has the potential and the tools to facilitate and diplomatically mediate negotiations between the parties concerned, and has the ability and readiness to provide post-conflict assistance. Its position has constantly been principled and focused on strict compliance with applicable international law, as well as on the belief that there can be no other solutions but negotiated ones to conflicts in the area.

   This being said, the conflicts in the Middle East place the EU – perhaps more than any other foreign policy issues – in a difficult position when the articulation of a common European position is necessary. To this limitation, one has to add the difficulty for the EU to bring military resources to bear. While it is true that long lasting solutions to conflicts cannot be reached exclusively by military means, the absence of the military component from the range of instruments used to end a conflict does not make an efficient mediation easy. We need flexibility, enhanced versatility and adaptability, since political peace processes initiated in the area – to a great extent without notable evolutions, lately – are confronted with significant changes as of recently. This is a region where a more pragmatic and “muscular” policy would be required, where the continuous, backed up and multidirectional European presence is a must, taking into account the risk that solutions to the conflicts are articulated without European involvement, or the possible appearance of a political void which sooner or later gets filled in. In many of these conflicts, the configuration of the local or global powers involved, and the relations between them, proxies and local players have the tendency to change frequently. The Middle East is a good example for the numerous changes in the behaviour of the major global powers: high degree of unpredictability, ubiquitous rivalry, an international character and manifestation centred on self-interest.

   In the light of these aspects, yes, the Middle East has the potential to redefine the cooperation and the relationship between global players, in general. The Transatlantic relationship, for its part, is going through a period of adaptation to this new normal of the global action, but it is important to mention that its fundamental parameters of partnership and congruent values cannot and will not be altered for that reason only.

* The opinions expressed in this interview belong to the interviewee and should not be seen as necessarily reflecting the position of the European Commission.