The Western Balkans – Always Something “Different” from the Rest of Europe

The Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Kosovo”, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and, sometimes, Croatia and Slovenia) is an area in Europe which tries (or so it says) to share European values and join the great “European family” represented by the EU, but it faces a series of challenges. This is not a first; just like the Balkans, the area of the Western Balkans is somewhat particular, an area which knew how to test the entire world, and not just once.

We will only mention the pretext used to start World War I and the role of the breakthrough at Salonic in speeding up the end World War, as well as the significant role of the antifascist movements in Yugoslavia in defeating Nazi Germany during World War II.

Following the same “pattern”, the fact that the countries and “entities” in the region wish to join the EU represents a major challenge in itself. There is no need for many details and we can start from the need to offer an image on the candidates for accession – official and potential.

The first success story in the region is Slovenia’s. Since it joined the EU and NATO relatively quickly (2004), this country (almost) got rid of its “scarlet letter”, the symbol of being a part of the tormented Western Balkans. In 2007, Slovenia becomes a member of the Euro and Schengen areas.

At first, Croatia had a high price to pay for belonging to this area: a five years long civil war with many victims and atrocities committed by representatives of both belligerent ethnicities. If joining NATO was easier (the process ended in 2009), in order to join the EU a higher “price” had to be paid by Zagreb – it had to “fully cooperate” with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY), with a focus on collaboration for locating and transferring to the Tribunal a person suspected of having committed war crimes - general Ante Gotovina. It is true that, following the appeal, the ICTY exonerated the general even if it concluded that the Croatian side had indeed committed war crimes. Finally, in 2013, Croatia joins the EU.

The next most successful candidate is Montenegro, which practically started all negotiation processes at once and managed to join NATO in 2017. The European integration of this state was held back by slow domestic reforms and because of a long period of time when there was no significant progress in fighting corruption. Another concerning factor is Moscow’s possible “malevolent interference” in the internal affairs of the former Yugoslavian country and in its efforts to join the EU and NATO. The authorities in Podgorica and a number of western officials firmly believe that Montenegro is subjected to hybrid attacks from the Russian Federation (supported by a few Serbian entities, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church).

In 1990, Albania, a former communist country with a tough regime, started a long and difficult transition process marred by many social and economic crises. The NATO accession process was concluded in 2009, while the EU accession process, which officially started in 2009, only in 2014 is “rewarded” with Albania’s recognition as an official candidate to the Union; however, it is still facing significant challenges, both internal and (some) from the EU itself.

The biggest “issue” is “Kosovo”, which cannot be considered a country. At least, not a state with all the attributes. Almost half of the members of the UN and most of the countries in the EU recognised “Kosovo’s” independence. However, there are five member states which did not recognise “South Serbia’s” independence: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

However, the EU sees “Kosovo” as a potential candidate, and this is why it poses a second problem – the difficulty of giving it a name. As a compromise, some analysts use the term “entity”. Or, they simply refer to  “EU candidates” and the reunions often bear the name “EU Western Balkans Summit” …

EU Western Balkans Summit, Poznań, July 2019

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Closely linked to “Kosovo” is the issue of its mother country of the province, Serbia. Although it started negotiations to join the EU in 2014 and opened several negotiation chapters, Serbia has lately been warned more and more often and clearly that it would not be able to join the EU before settling the “Kosovo” file. However, at the level of the EU there is not a clear, coherent and agreed formula to settling it (especially taking into account the fact that the five member states mentioned above keep on refusing to recognise “Kosovo’s” independence). The only thing they seem to agree on is the need to have a “comprehensive and legally binding” agreement, which should be both durable and sustainable.

In its turn, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a sui generis country. It was established following a civil war and a peace agreement (Dayton-Paris/DPPA) which provided a dense and complicated formula that significantly burdens the functioning of the country. The conscience of the international community can only be put at ease by the fact that the DPPA stopped the loss of human lives, the suffering of the displaced and refugees and the massive material damages. However, today this country is “treading water” and is not getting any closer to EU integration. Well, at least not fast enough to satisfy its own citizens and its European partners. And this is (also) because of some of the amendments in the DPP agreement. Ever since 2008, BiH and the EU have had a provisional agreement regarding trade relations, which, in 2015, has been replaced by the Association and Stabilization Agreement, and in February 2016, BiH officially submitted its application to join the Union.

North Macedonia, a former Yugoslavian country as well, seems to have escaped the vicious circle of the 30-year-old dispute with Greece regarding its constitutional name. Following the “historic agreement” in Prespa, in June 2018, Athens stopped blocking its northern neighbour’s road to European and Euro-Atlantic integration, so, starting with March 2020, North Macedonia managed to join NATO and received the OK to start the EU accession negotiations.

North Macedonia and Albania tried, in 2019, to set a date for the start of the EU accession negotiations but they were practically blocked by France (by President Emmanuel Macron himself), which asked for a new “methodology”. Considering this, the EU agreed to develop (February 2020) such a new methodology, and the details would be discussed with the “partners” from the Western Balkans (during the summit which would take place in May in Zagreb).

However, these events were overshadowed by the pandemic caused by the new Coronavirus – SARS-CoV-2 (which causes the viral infection known as COVID-19), which has the potential to prolong and complicate the EU accession process of these aspiring countries and entities.

So, the main challenges of the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans are: the EU domestic reform, including Brexit and the requests regarding the revision of the enlargement process, the “Kosovo file”, the dysfunctionalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the low rate of reform in Albania and Montenegro, and … SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19. Other challenges this process faces are Russia’s “malignant” interests, China’s commercial and economic “offensive”, and Turkey’s comeback in the region. Some ill-willed analysts would add to the list the interests and competition between some of the EU members…

 The Current Stage of NATO’s Enlargement Process in the Western Balkans

We must mention from the beginning that Serbia does not wish to join NATO, that BiH’s accession process to NATO has been blocked for the past few years by the leadership in Banja Luka (The Republic of Srpska), which is now in power in Sarajevo as well, following the general elections in October 2018, and Kosovo, even if it wants to join NATO, cannot start the process, so long as it is not a real country, member of the UN and recognised by its mother country, Serbia.

The President of North Macedonia signing the Instrument of Accession

https://pretsedatel.mk/

In mid-March 2020, NATO members have finished ratifying North Macedonia’s NATO accession protocol (the last country to sign was Spain – 17.03), and the Macedonian president, Stevo Pendarovski, signed (20.03.2020) the Instrument of Accession, which basically is the last procedure of the authorities in Skopje before submitting the Instrument and going through with the ceremonies celebrating the event. On 27.03.2020, the Instrument of Accession was deposed in Washington, USA, being the depository of the North Alliance Treaty. The ceremony marking the occasion was live-streamed via Skype from Skopje and watched by the Macedonian minister of Foreign Affairs (Nikola Dimitrov) and the US ambassador to North Macedonia.

Deposing the Instrument means that the Republic of North Macedonia has officially become NATO’s 30th member (the first step had been taken in 1993 by a declaration from the parliament). On the same day, North Macedonia received congratulations from the US Secretary of State and from the Secretary General of NATO. On the 27th of March, in Skopje, the accession was marked by an honorary gun salute.

The ceremonies to raise the North Macedonian flag at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and at the Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk (USA) were planned for the 30th of March, and the Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs took part in his first videoconference with the NATO ministers of foreign affairs on 02.04.2020.

In November 2019, Serbia finalised the second stage of the NATO intensified Individual Partnership Action Plan for 2019-2021, which would stand as the legal basis for cooperation with NATO in all areas of common interest. Furthermore, meeting some objective needs, but also answering some of the criticisms coming from a few members of the civil society, in December 2019 the Parliament in Belgrade adopted the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, which attest Serbia’s military neutrality. They allow Serbia to cooperate with all interested military alliances and countries, including NATO and the Collective Treaty Security Organization(CTSO) formed under the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

This is why Washington is worried about the Serbians’ cooperation with the Russians in the fields of defence (military and military technology), security and civil protection (through the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in the city of Nis). A growing concern for the Americans is the Serbian weapons acquisitions (hybrid artillery systems and Pantzir-S air defence missiles systems, Mi-35 attack helicopters and Mi-17V-5 transport and attack helicopters) and the Russians’ weapons and military equipment donations to Serbia (six Mikoyan MiG-29s, 30 T-72 tanks and 30 BRDM-2 amphibious armoured patrol vehicles). This is why the USA warned Serbia that they could impose sanctions if it continues its military acquisitions from the Russian Federation.

However, NATO stated on several occasions that it is Serbia’s legitimate right to have various partners in the field of defence, including with regard to its military acquisitions.

Admiral James Foggo, Belgrade, December 2019

http://www.mod.gov.rs/cir/14803/sastanak-drzavnog-sekretara-zivkovica-sa-admiralom-fogom-14803

Both NATO and the members of the CTSO keep on cooperating with Serbia, probably because they wish to avoid isolating Serbia and to prevent it from entering Russia’s tutelage.

Kosovo has been closely cooperating with both NATO and its member states, while the Albanian establishment in Pristina have expressed on various occasions their wish to join the alliance. This wish is a no for Kosovo for various objective reasons: Kosovo is not a country because it is not a member of the UN, and Kosovo’s independence is not recognised by four of NATO’s members (Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain). This is why NATO as an organisation does not recognise Kosovo’s independence; however, all the members of the Alliance are adamant in contributing to the stabilisation of the situation, in ensuring the security and conditions suitable for building a democratic society and facilitating the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade for the identification of a sustainable solution. NATO is not part of the dialogue; this task was assigned to the EU and its members. However, lately, we have witnessed the USA getting more involved in this dialogue.

This is how Kosovo has in its territory an international peacekeeping force, under a UN mandate, led by NATO – the KFOR, which supports the reformation of Kosovo’s defence and security system, with the help of a NATO Advisory and Liaison Team (NALT). Among other things, NALT supports and trains the Kosovo Security Forces, which the Alliance sees as a civilian structure.

Because of the decision taken by the authorities in Pristina, in December 2018 (aside from the amendments of its own “constitution”), to change the KSF Ministry into the Ministry of Defence and the KSF into Kosovo’s Armed Forces, NATO is reconsidering its cooperation with the KSF. They have not been able to change their name yet (Kosovo Armed Forces), only their mandate, which includes tasks and assignments destined for the armed forces.

In this context, it is worth mentioning:

- Belgrade and the Serbs in Kosovo firmly oppose these two measures; they consider them illegal and contrary to Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council (10.06.1999) and to the the Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement (09.06.1999).

- Belgrade and the Serbs in Kosovo ask KFOR (NATO) to continue preventing the deployment of forces and the activity of the KSF in the four “Serbian Municipalities” in North Kosovo (Leposavić, North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok and Zvečan), unless they are approved by the municipalities.

- Initially (2017-2018), the USA opposed the two changes, which contradicted Kosovo’s Constitution.

- Several NATO member states firmly supported the changes.

- In 2019, the USA stated that they favoured the changes; however, they had to occur gradually over a longer period (approximately 10 years) and through dialogue with the Serb community in Kosovo.

- Several NATO members, which recognised Kosovo’s independence, believe the KSF is Kosovo’s army and invite them to join military training exercises and programmes. Furthermore, many of these countries continue to provide counselling and financial and material support for the training and endorsement of the KSF.

As far as BiH’s NATO integration is concerned, the Serb politicians and the ruling party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, leading the Republic of Srpska, have blocked it all through 2019. This blockade had an effect on the leaders of the other ruling bodies in BiH (the Croats and the Bosnians), who stopped the formation of the BiH Council of Ministers. The Serbs practically opposed the Membership Action Pan to join NATO, as well as sending the First Annual National Program to Brussels. After repeated negotiations and external pressure, they reached a compromise. They adopted a reformation plan instead of the First Annual National Program.

Of course, the political dispute continued and the Bosnians, the Croats and some of the Serb parties (members of the opposition in the Republic of Srpska and under a technical mandate at the level of the central institutions in Sarajevo) came up with the same FNBP, disguised under a different name. At the same time, the Serb parties in power in the Republic of Srpska and legitimised by the results of the 2018 general elections to assume the leadership of BiH institutions highlighted that the document made no reference to BiH’s intentions to join NATO. The compromise allowed the formation of a new Council of Ministers; however, it did not solve the country’s older problems.

Therefore, the only common option for all the countries in the Western Balkans outside the Union (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and “Kosovo”) is to join the EU, but not NATO.

The Current Stage of the EU Enlargement Process in the Western Balkans

BiH’s accession process to the EU has been blocked for years, because they did not fulfil some conditions: the harmonization of the electoral legislation – as to eliminate interdictions for the candidates who are of different ethnicity than the three constituent peoples, and allowing them to occupy official positions (the Sejdić-Finci case decided by the ECHR), or the failure to adopt legislation regarding BiH’s state owned properties. These failures have also blocked the closure of the Office of the High Representative in BiH. Unblocking the accession process to the EU happened not thanks to BiH’s progress, but because some of the EU member states came to the conclusion that BiH was incapable of fulfilling these conditions fast enough and that there was a chance the country would lose the popular support necessary for the integration. Thus, the Croatian and later the German-British initiatives in 2014 changed the rules, enabling BiH to continue its accession process with the promise that it would fulfil all the conditions.

Against this background, in December 2016, the authorities in Sarajevo received their first “questionnaire” from Brussels, which they sent back to the EU officials in February 2018. Despite Brussels’ request for more detailed information, BiH failed to clarify a series of issues (March 2019). This is why BiH is still a potential candidate but has failed to be an official candidate to the EU.

Serbia started negotiations to join the EU in January 2014 and so far it has opened 18 chapters out of 35. The most problematic is Chapter 35, which refers to the “normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo”. The authorities in Belgrade claim they are ready to open more negotiation chapters; however, the EU imposed the pace.

If in the beginning of the negotiation process the difficulties in the cooperation with the ICTY slowed the pace, at present this pace is set by the progress of the dialogue with Pristina and by the fears of some of the EU members regarding the intensification and diversification of the relations between Belgrade and Moscow. Practically, Serbia is accused of not having adhered to the international sanctions against the Russian Federation – adopted due to its role in the conflict in eastern Ukraine and because it annexed Crimea – but also of having developed and intensified its relations with Russia in various fields. Another sensitive subject for Serbia and the EU is the fact that Serbia signed a free trade agreement (October 2019) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), where Russia plays an important part. While the EU warned Serbia that the agreement must be terminated before it joined the EU, Serbia argued that many of the EU members had an economic and commercial cooperation with the Russian Federation and that the trade agreement would be terminated only on the eve of Serbia’s accession to the EU.

EU Western Balkans Summit, Sofia, May 2018

https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/es/eu-western-balkans-summit-in-sofia_6302_pk

The relations between Serbia and the EU have recently been overshadowed by the COVID-19 epidemic in Serbia, because the leaders in Belgrade said that the EU was late in answering Serbia’s requests for help in combatting the epidemic. Furthermore, president Aleksandar Vučić even accused the EU of denouncing its principles and expressed his firm conviction that the solidarity of the EU is dead. However, in the second part of March, the EU decided to offer Serbia financial aid, for emergencies as well as for combatting the epidemic on a medium term.

During this time, a quicker and more substantial aid came from China. Consisting in donations of protection equipment, ventilators and six experts on combatting the virus, it was highly mediatised. This is where Carl Bildt – a former Swedish prime minister and the President of the NGO “The European Council for Foreign Relations” – criticised Serbia, because President Vucic himself welcomed the Chinese plane transporting the aid when it landed on Belgrade International Airport (21.03.2020), and the event was highly mediatised. At the same time, on the 26th of March, when a plane came from China with aid paid for by the EU (the transport was organised by the UNDP), the event was not as mediatised as the fomer, and the shipment was welcomed by the prime minister Ana Brnabić, not by the president.

As far as Serbia’s accession process to the EU is concerned, it is not (yet) affected by the tensed relations between Belgrade and Brussels in the context of the COVID-19 epidemic, and the EU is making efforts to normalise the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, which is essential to the progress of the two on their way to European integration. The latest initiative to this regard is the assignment, in the near future, of a special emissary for dialogue (the most circulated name was that of the Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajčak) who would manage the dialogue directly and thus relieve the High Representative Josep Borrell. One of the fundamental objectives of the new mediator will be to implement the provisions of the agreements signed so far between Belgrade and Pristina while at the same time finding a compromise regarding the status of Kosovo and eventually mediating an agreement between the two, which must be “comprehensive and legally binding”.

Even if Kosovo is not a member of the UN, it is considered a potential candidate to the EU, and the EU documents treat it according to the agreements signed between Belgrade and Pristina (with asterisks and footnotes). Kosovo’s accession to the EU is based on a “stabilisation mechanism”, followed by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement which came into force in 2016. Even though it was close to liberalising its visa regime and fulfilled a series of conditions to that end, the decision was postponed several times at the insistence of several EU members, so that the citizens in Kosovo still need a visa to travel to an EU country, which is very frustrating for Pristina (Kosovo being the only “state” in the Western Balkans subjected to such a regime).

The leaders in Pristina have disregarded the recommendations of the EU not to overthrow the government led by Albin Kurti, which came to power in the beginning of February 2020, after long and difficult negotiations that followed the parliamentary elections in October 2019. Nevertheless, several parliamentary parties in Kosovo, led by the Democratic League of Kosovo and its leader Isa Mustafa, sided with Washington and voted a no-confidence motion to overthrow Albin Kurty’s government. Washington’s support for the motion came because the new prime minister refused to take into account the US’ recommendation (which came on various channels, and was accompanied by a series of “warnings”) to immediately eliminate the custom tariffs (100%) imposed by Kosovo (November 2018) on goods imported from central Serbia and BiH. Defying the US recommendations, the prime minister decided to impose the gradual lifting of the tariffs, and conditioned this action by Serba’s reaction (it should have eliminated all commercial and non-commercial barriers for Kosovo and give up the diplomatic campaign to revoke the decision regarding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence). It went so far that the initiators and supporters of the motion declared that the failure of the motion would result in the serious deterioration of the strategic partnership between the USA and Kosovo. In exchange, approving the motion affects the prestige of the EU and the Union’s relationship with Kosovo. On the eve of the motion, the French and German ministries of foreign affairs issued a joint communique where they requested Kosovo to postpone the vote until the end of the COVID-19 crisis; however, the political leaders in Pristina ignored this request.

There is a “light” at the end of the enlargement process, and it refers to Albania and North Macedonia.

On 24.03.2020, the EU General Affairs Council (GAC) met via videoconference and decided to take into account the repeated recommendations of the European Commission and start the EU accession negotiations for Albania and North Macedonia. The conclusions of the Council were adopted by a written procedure on the 25th of March. On the 26th of March the European Council validated, via videoconference, the decision adopted by the GAC and ordered a series of measures to implementing the decision.

The main provisions of the decision adopted by the European Council are:

- The enlargement of the EU will continue based on a new “methodology”, made public by the European Commission on 05.02.2020.[i]

- After having examined the Commission’s report in 02.03.2020 (on progress), the Council decides to open the accession negotiations with Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Albania and invites the Commission to develop the negotiation framework taking into account the new “methodology” as well. The first intergovernmental conference with the two countries (to start the negotiations) will take place after the preparation of the framework.

- Before the first intergovernmental conference, Albania has to fulfil a few more conditions, its key priorities being:

- The implementation of the electoral reform (according to the recommendations of the OSCE/OHR).

- The further implementation of the justice reform.

- Establishing the necessary structures to fight corruption and organised crime.

- Measures to repatriate the fake asylum seekers in EU member states.

The European Council tasked the Commission to monitor the implementation and continuation of the reforms by the candidate countries which have been allowed to start the negotiation process – Albania and North Macedonia.

Washington (through the voice of secretary of state Michael “Mike” Pompeo) welcomed the decision of the European Council to start negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. Besides, the USA have decided in 2019 to engage more in stabilising the situation in the Western Balkans, while focusing on normalising the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Matthew Palmer was assigned as Special Representative for the Western Balkans, and the ambassador to Berlin, Richard Grenell, was assigned the US President’s Special Envoy for Belgrade-Pristina.

The pragmatic American approach scored a first success (during the Munich Security Conference in 2019) when Belgrade and Pristina signed two agreements in principle to allow the resumption of the air and railway traffic between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as when the two sides reconfirmed their decision to build the Nis-Pristina free-way. So far, the only ongoing project is that of the free-way, while the other two agreements need more negotiations between the parties involved.

Two othe European mechanisms meant to accelerate the European integration of the candidates from the Western Balkans and collaboration between them are the “Berlin Process” and the French-German initiative to normalise the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The “Berlin Process” focuses on the reconnection of the economy and infrastructure of the candidates from the Western Balkans, while president E. Macron and chancellor A. Merkel’s initiative focuses on bringing Belgrade and Pristina to the negotiating table in order to find a real and sustainable compromise.

The Prospects of the EU and NATO Enlargement in the Western Balkans

As already shown before, we can only refer to an EU enlargement in the entire area of the Western Balkans, not to a NATO enlargement as well.

As far as NATO’s enlargement in the Western Balkans is concerned, no short or medium term changes are looming. Serbia will not want this process (and will act in order to consolidate its military neutrality), Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress will continue to be hindered by its “Serbian entity” (the Republic of Srpska) and Kosovo is out of the picture, as long as it still is not recognised by Serbia and is not a member of the UN.

North Macedonia started acting as a NATO member even before it joined the Alliance. While in the mid st of the COVID-19 epidemic, the authorities in Skopje decided take steps in order to join NATO’s Defence Planning Process and tasked the responsible structures with a view to draft two reports a year (January and June) on the matter. The following are among the responsible structures: the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, internal affairs, finances, economy, transport, health and the National Registry Office for Classified Information etc. Furthermore, the Working Committee for NATO Integration of the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia must propose, no later than 30.04.2020 (before it starts its consultations with the Alliance, in Brussels), the structure responsible for preparing and the new national security strategy, in accordance with NATO’s recommendations.

In the case of the EU enlargement, the European Commission is expected to adopt the negotiation framework with Albania and North Macedonia; however, we can already witness several effects of the new “methodology”: the Albania-North Macedonia “tandem” exists no more and there is a state of confusion regarding whether it should be applied to Serbia and Montenegro.

Under these circumstances, it looks like North Macedonia has the opportunity to start the negotiations before its former partner in the “tandem”, Albania, which must fulfil more conditions in order to set the date for the first intergovernmental conference. However, those conditions are difficult to fulfil, and the date to start negotiations with North Macedonia could be postponed indefinitely. On the other handsine die may be influenced by the results of its early elections. As for North Macedonia, the date to start negotiations can be influenced by the early parliamentary elections in this country. They had been planned for the 12th of April, but have been postponed because the country declared a state of emergency in order to more efficiently counter the COVID-19 epidemic. A victory of the current opposition and a stalling of the attainment of concrete and significant results in the fields of the justice reform and the enforcement of the rule of law could result in postponing the start of the negotiations. Besides, North Macedonia is currently benefiting from a wave of sympathy due to the enormous compromise it made when signing the Agreement in Prespa and agreeing to change its constitutional name.

In the current context (the difficulty of reunions, which practically take place via videoconference), one can estimate that the new negotiation frameworks could be submitted to the European Council no sooner than June this year. Most likely, every candidate will be able to discuss with the Commission on the framework. A first draft of the framework may be discussed in May, during the EU Western Balkans Summit. Anyway, the month of May is when the first report on the progresses of the Western Balkans candidates are due to be published. The details of the new “methodology” could be also made public in May.

It is highly unlikely that Serbia and Montenegro should agree with the new “methodology” in their accession process. Anyway, we have already witnessed blocking or delay mechanisms as far as the opening or closure of a negotiation chapter. These two countries are expected to continue negotiations, although in Serbia’s case, its confidence in the EU has been shaken by the latter’s hesitancy to show solidarity in the debut of the SARS-CoV-2 crisis in Serbia.

Kosovo’s integration remains a great unknown, especially after the main political parties chose to side with Washington and ignore the requests coming not only from Brussels but also from a series of European capitals (especially Paris and Berlin) with regard to the government led by A. Kurti.

Belgrade, a humanitarian aid shipment financed by the EU, 26.03.2020

https://twitter.com/FabriziSem/status/1243297894754549760/photo/3

Washington is expected to continue its endeavours for the accomplishment of the agreements regarding the resumption of the air and railroad traffic and the construction of the Nis-Pristina free-way, which the EU is also expected to continue support. The key, however, is restarting the dialogue.

At this time, there is no “magic formula” in sight for the expected agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. Besides, Serbia must hold parliamentary elections right after the state of emergency ends, and in Kosovo such an action is not possible because of the fall of the government led by A. Kurti. This situation can result in postponing the dialogue even if the main obstacle is surpassed – the tariffs on Serbian and Bosnian goods.

It would perhaps be worth mentioning that the blunders of the past two years related to the stagnation of the EU enlargement and, most recently, the EU’s reaction to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic have contributed to Serbia and the Republic of Srpska looking for a closer partnership with Russia and China, even though they still wish to join the EU. It remains to be seen whether the COVID-19 pandemic will have the power to postpone or cancel the first Serbian-Chinese bilateral military exercise, which is planned to take place this year in Serbia. Not to mention the fact that the Serbian-Chinese partnership during the pandemic has been named “the friendship of steel”, and the Serbian president called his Chinese counterpart “brother” several times, which he didn’t do with any of the European leaders despite the huge and constant support Serbia received from the EU during its European integration process.[ii]

Finally, instead of conclusions, the author offers some general observations.

The EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans is expected to continue, even if it is slow and subjected to many conditions due to the EU domestic reform and the effects of Brexit.

Very many analysts believe that the EU’s decision to open negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia was decisively influenced by the COVID-19 epidemic in Europe and by the need to prove to the candidates the Union’s solidarity in actions. Besides, at present the French president E. Macron is more preoccupied with properly managing the crisis in his own country than by the shortcomings in Albania’s and North Macedonia’s reforms.

Paradoxically, the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans, more precisely in Serbia and Kosovo, is held back by the competition between the Euro-Atlantic partners – the EU and the USA – since Washington is significantly involved in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, as well as in the overthrow of two governments in Pristina (which did not want to remove the extra tariffs).

The USA’s deep involvement in the Western Balkans resulted in Montenegro’s and North Macedonia’s swift accession to NATO, which considerably reduced the Russian Federation’s leverage over the political decisions in these two countries.

The presence and involvement of the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans remain vital. Otherwise, there is a risk the security situation in Kosovo and BiH will deteriorate and of instability transfer, including to the new NATO members, Montenegro and North Macedonia.

To all this we add China’s economic and commercial offensive and Russia’s “malevolent influence” in the Western Balkans, especially in Serbia and the Republic of Srspska.

[i] Enhancing the Accession Process – A Credible EU Perspective for the Western Balkans. Instead of chapters, they simply chose thematic clusters. The candidate must fulfil all the initial conditions from the chapters in those thematic clusters. The necessary condition (sine qua non) is the progress regarding chapters 23 and 24, referring to the rule of law. They will be the first and last chapters to approach. Any setback from these chapters will negatively influence negotiations from the other chapters. Furthermore, there is an increase in rewards and sanctions. The sanctions can represent financial cutbacks or the cessation or resumption of negotiations.

[ii] In the last decade of March 2020, the EU gave almost 93 million Euros for countering the effects of the COVID-19 epidemic in Serbia: 15 million for emergency actions (acquisitions and transport of necessary medical supplies to Serbia) and 78 million Euros for countering the economic and social effects of the epidemic. Overall, since 2014, the EU has given Serbia almost two billion Euros in grants to modernise the country. In medicine alone, the EU gave 200 million Euros worth of grants and offered a loan of 250 million Euros.