What was expected (especially from the three presidents - Recep Tayyp Erdogan, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin) happened, even sooner than the most optimistic expert evaluations. Exactly two weeks after its launch, the operation ”Peace Spring” in northern Syria, meant to remove the Kurdish ”terrorists” from the northern border between the Syrian Kurdistan and Turkey ended, because ”it was no longer necessary”, as Recep Tayyp Erdogan said. The first reaction to this “historical” announcement came from the US president Donald Trump who, urbi et orbi advertised lifting all the sanctions against Turkey with one warning-amendment - they would be reinstated, should his Golden Horn ally relapse for some reason and let the “Peace Spring” flow again.

How was this possible?

Theoretically the answer is very simple. On the 3^rd of October, reunited in Sochi for the umpteenth time, the Kremlin leader and his counterpart in the “White Palace” agreed, in only four hours of “friendly negotiations” on a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the end of operation “Peace Spring” and the long term implementation of an unanimously acceptable solution for the Gordian knot that is the Kurdish issue in the context of the Syrian civil war. To sum up this analysis, and for an informal and documentary purpose we hereby provide the full translation of the document, as published on the Kremlin’s official site, as well as an interpretation of each and every point in the document.

1.      “The two sides reiterate their commitment to the preservation of the political unity and territorial integrity of Syria and the protection of national security of Turkey.”

Interpretation: Both the Russian Federation and Turkey agree to act in a way that doesn’t lead to the fragmentation of the Syrian territory, including by ensuring the perpetuation of foreign forces and interests. Turkey confirms once again that it doesn’t plan future annexations of territories that legally belong to the Arab Republic of Syria.

2.      “They emphasize their determination to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations and to disrupt separatist agendas in the Syrian territory.”

Interpretation: The Russian Federation is willing to continue its campaign against terrorism and to stand beside Ankara in its approach on Kurdish terrorism.

3.      “In this framework, the established status quo in the current Operation Peace Spring area covering Tel Abyad and [Ras al-Ain] with a depth of 32km (20 miles) will be preserved.”

            Interpretation: The status quo established by the operation “Peace Spring” is, rhetorically speaking, just an euphemism destined to legitimise the indefinite stay of Turkish military forces on Syrian territory under their control (Turkey) at the signing of the Sochi agreement.

4.      “Both sides reaffirm the importance of the Adana Agreement. The Russian Federation will facilitate the implementation of the Adana Agreement in the current circumstances.”

            Interpretation: The Russian Federation doesn’t agree with the repeated Syrian protests against re-accepting the Adana agreement before Turkey withdraws its military presence from Syria. Russia also implicitly opposes all the international voices disagreeing with Turkey’s regional policy.

            Observation: The Adana agreement is a document signed by the former Syrian and Turkish presidents, Hafez Al-Assad and Suleyman Demirel, according to which Syria agreed to cease hosting and supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Ocalan, and to allow Turkey to conduct anti-PKK raids five kilometres inside the Syrian territory.

            While in Sochi, Turkey agreed to mixed Russian-Turkish patrols - a compromise actually, a change in the Adana agreement, since these mixed patrols wouldn’t cover an area more than ten kilometres wide inside the Syrian territory, which is a severe reduction of the initial claims for the security area - to have a width of around 30 kilometres.

5.      “Starting 12.00 noon of October 23, 2019, Russian military police and Syrian border guards will enter the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border, outside the area of Operation Peace Spring, to facilitate the removal of YPG elements and their weapons to the depth of 30km (19 miles) from the Turkish-Syrian border, which should be finalized in 150 hours. At that moment, joint Russian-Turkish patrols will start in the west and the east of the area of Operation Peace Spring with a depth of 10km (six miles), except Qamishli city.”

            Interpretation: The Russian Federation demands that the Government in Damascus and its forces and militias partner up with the Russian police to evacuate the Kurdish military forces from their whereabouts.

6.      “All YPG elements and their weapons will be removed from Manbij and Tal Rifat.”

            Interpretation: The Kurdish “allies” will be forced to give up two of their previously owned strategic strongholds.

7.      “Both sides will take necessary measures to prevent infiltrations of terrorist elements.”

            Interpretation: This is a vague article that doesn’t clearly say what the locations that should be protected from terrorist actions are, especially in the “security area”. One may interpret that the Russian forces will assist the Turkish ones.

8.      “Joint efforts will be launched to facilitate the return of refugees in a safe and voluntary manner.”

            Interpretation: It is another unclear and questionable article of the agreement, since it doesn’t say whether the Syrian refugees in Turkey will be relocated in the “security area”, just like Erdogan said, or will be free to go back anywhere in their home country.

9.      “A joint monitoring and verification mechanism will be established to oversee and coordinate the implementation of this memorandum.”

            Interpretation: Each of the two parties will make sure that the other honours its promise, which to the Russian Federation means the Kurdish and Syrian issues and to Turkey means returning the refugees to their homes.

10.  “The two sides will continue to work to find a lasting political solution to the Syrian conflict within Astana Mechanism and will support the activity of the Constitutional Committee.”

            To sum up the historical Sochi agreement that will certainly be followed by more such “historical” agreements, one should keep in mind that, over the few hours they spent together in the Black Sea resort, the Kremlin tsar gave the Hellespont sultan - who wished for it more out of pride than fear - a solution to the Turkish existential problems (“the security area” in the north-eastern part of Syria and, at the same time an easy exit from the overflowing Peace Spring which was a continuation of the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations). All the military operations against the Kurds represent another step towards the validation of Turkey as a great regional power.

What surprised in all this Levantine “big deal” was the fact that the “missing player”, Bashar Al-Assad, silently agreed to Syria’s fate decided in Sochi. Moreover, he confirmed with a declaration according to which “the Syrian people are ready to cooperate with all the entities fighting the Turkish aggressor” – meaning the Kurdish minority. This minority sacrificed the lives of 11,000 fellow citizens and believers to defeat the caliphate lead by the schizophrenic imam Al-Baghdadi, a victory candidly claimed by … Donald Trump but forgotten for the mere fact that “the Kurds did not participate in the Normandy landing” and because the “USA cannot betray a NATO ally (that is Erdogan) for the sake of the Kurdish people.” The words of the resident in the Oval Office include a very serious and threatening warning that the French call a bon entendeur salut that translates into “a word to the wise is enough!”

All speculations aside, one should not ignore the fact that, if the Sochi agreement can be considered an important victory for Turk Silahli Kuwetleri - the Turkish Armed Forces - it isn’t necessarily a loss for Syria led by Bashar Al-Assad, even if its provisions are below the voiced Syrian expectations. The arrangements between Putin and Erdogan leave room for changes, which will certainly occur. These changes are meant to meet Bashar Al-Assad’s demands regarding the deployment of his armed forces in the northern part of the country, as well as expectations of the Kurdish rebels who will be allowed to keep - whether “Bantustan-like” or not - the so called administrative autonomy proclaimed before the defeat of the Islamic State.

Shortly after the Sochi summit, on the 23^rd of October there was another “historical” moment, when the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen said that, on the 30^th of October, in Geneva the UN would launch the “Syrian-led, Syrian-owned, credible, balanced and inclusive Constitutional Committee [made of] a diverse and broad pool of individuals - Government and Opposition representatives - that would take a first meaningful step towards a durable solution in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 [that calls for] a ceasefire and a transition period, and further expresses its support for free and fair [Syrian] elections.” Commenting on his communiqué, the UN Special Envoy said that the Geneva process, corroborated with the agreement between Putin and Erdogan “represented an important step towards giving up the weapons in favour of political negotiations to pacify Syria in the foreseeable future”, which he thinks was “quite impressive.”

Of course all this, and most importantly the end of the Turkish military operations in northern Syria are very encouraging even if Geir Pedersen’s “impressive future” might not yet be that close.

 

Operation “Peace Spring” is over. What is the outcome?

 

At a first glance, the outcome of the Turkish military intervention in the Kurdish north and north-eastern part of Syria is somewhat confusing, since this operation, that lasted only two weeks, left behind a mixture of changes in the tactical framework of the Syrian civil war as well as a series of issues either unsolved or favouring a new possible deterioration of the already uncertain situation.

The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the Turkish Armed Forces, the 9^th most powerful in the world, didn’t manage to seize but a few scattered enclaves in the targeted territory, which was, with the exception of two cities - Tel Abyad and Ra’s Al-Ain - a rural area full of villages with no particular strategic or economic relevance.

Secondly, but not less important is the remark that the conflict zone has known a dramatic change as far as the equation of the Russian and US military and political presence in Syria is concerned. On one hand, if before the operation “Peace Spring” the USA had at least ten military bases (17 to 20, according to different sources) spread between the far west and the far east of the Syrian Kurdish territory, today we basically cannot talk about a US military presence in Syria. On the other hand, after a long line of political, military and diplomatic ups and downs, the Russian Federation can be seen as the power that controls the whole Syrian front and to a large extent, the geopolitical and geostrategic evolutions in Syria and the Middle East.

We are also referring to the fact that, for the first time since the beginning of the Syrian civil war eight years ago, Bashar Al-Assad’s army returns to the north-eastern part of the country that is considered Syria’s main grain provider and the area where its main energy and water resources lie.

This outcome must include Turkey’s failure to create a “safe zone” as planned (along the entire northern Syrian border, 30 kilometres deep in the Syrian territory). This raises serious questions as far as another of Erdogan’s projects is concerned - relocating in this “safe zone” over one million Syrian refugees, hosted as refugees on Turkish territory.

A humanitarian conclusion is yet to be drawn. According to the Norwegian NGO Norwegian Refugee Council, the military operations led to the death of 235 civilians – 22 of these children, to 677 wounded and 300,000 refugees, out of whom 4000 left for the Iraqi Kurdistan adding up to the 270,000 Syrians already hosted by the government of the autonomous region of Kurdistan.

Thus, the Turkish intervention proved to be a move that dried up the “peace spring” without bringing the prospects of a long term peace under the protection of the olive branch.