The Arab Spring that broke out ten years ago in Tunisia caused significant changes and keeps on affecting one of the hottest areas of the global political geography – the Middle East. On the other hand, this series of protests and traditional unrest in the region has been overshadowed, at least as far as the West is concerned, as a consequence of the current Coronavirus pandemic.

Cătălin Gomboș, journalist for Radio Romania News with a vast experience in matters related to the Middle East, provided us with a detailed analysis on the current stakes characterising the tense situation in the Middle East, in the interview he offered to the Geostrategic Pulse Magazine.

The Coronavirus pandemic has taken over, for a few months now, the headlines of the global media, leaving in the background the preoccupation of the international community. The prophecy of the US president George Bush Jr. following the September 11 attacks – “from now on the world will never be the same” – is frantically recurring. Today, after the COVID-19 tidal wave, we come across the same prophecy, but in a different causal context. However, nobody, intellectual elites in the Middle East included, asked themselves the question “will the New Middle East ever be the same?” I propose we try and find an answer in this interview. Will this Middle East be the same? How will it be? Or, where will it return?

Cătălin Gomboș: For years before the pandemic the Middle East was a fluid region, going through various changes, so with or without the pandemic it couldn’t have been the same. Not even some of the foreseeable outcomes could have been final. In Syria, for instance, Bashar Al-Assad was heading towards winning the civil war; however, with all the problems facing the country – millions of refugees, entire cities destroyed, a failing economy, the Kurds bent on keeping at least some degree of autonomy, Turkey determined to maintain a presence in Idlib etc. – it’s hard to believe that it would ever return to the sort of situation – a mainly stable dictatorship – that we’ve seen there before the conflict. On the contrary, even the Assad clan seems to be facing internal divisions now – the president’s cousin, Rami Makhluf, a tycoon involved in many shady undertakings who once seemed untouchable, publicly complained that he was stopped from leaving the country; and these fractures could spread to the Alawi community, which has been the main base of support for the regime. So, the internal dynamics of the region suggest that the Middle East cannot be the same anymore. Obviously, the pandemic is also leaving its mark on the region. Just like everywhere else in the world, the credibility of the governments is at stake, and if they don’t manage the crisis properly, they risk antagonizing their populations. This seems to be already happening in Iran, where there’s a deepening of the fractures seen during the past ten years between a hard-core of ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guards, on one hand, and an increasingly larger part of the population– the pro-reform middle classes and those hit by the economic crisis – on the other hand. Let’s not forget that besides the US sanctions, the country has been hit hard this year by the collapse of the oil price and the largest invasion of locusts in decades, which had a serious impact on the agriculture. On top of all that comes the economic costs of the pandemic and the way it has been dealt with by the authorities, who initially refused to consider any travel bans to and from China, Iran’s main trading partner, and also sought to cover up the impact of the pandemic, and they did that even by concealing the real number of dead.

Beyond the internal dynamics of the countries, we also have to take into account foreign powers, both regional and global. Iran’s influence is increasingly challenged in the region, even in places like Iraq, where it has wielded an enormous influence for years. It’s reasonable to assume that Tehran will find it difficult to maintain its sphere of influence - the so called Iranian Crescent that stretches from Mesopotamia, through the Levant, all the way to the Mediterranean Sea, but also in Yemen - since it requires funds, which are running low, human resources, who may be needed elsewhere, and not in the least the willingness of local elements to accept Iran’s guardianship. The other two major regional actors are not doing so good either – the Saudis are experiencing the effects of the pandemic and the fall of the oil prices to the fullest, and their turbulent de facto leader, Muhammad Bin Salman, might not be able to keep the promises that made him popular among the young. Turkey, on the other hand, is more and more isolated because of the decisions taken over the past years, and this isolation is very bad in the context of the economic and social crisis caused by the pandemic; moreover, we should not forget the troubles/conflicts that Erdogan has gotten himself into in Syria and in south-eastern Turkey, where the war with the PKK continues. As far as the global players are concerned, the crisis generated by the pandemic might discourage Russia, which following its success in Syria sought to get involved in the civil war in Libya. It’s true that one of Putin’s strategies in times of domestic tensions is to draw the attention outside the country and mobilise the people’s minds on an external conflict; however, it’s not clear whether he will be able to do this during an economic crisis. Let’s not forget that the crisis in Russia is worsened by sanctions and the fall in revenues from oil and gas exports. It’s also unclear what will happen with the US presence in the Middle East; it may be scaled back, considering that bringing home some troops may be seen as a much needed popularity booster, considering this year’s presidential elections and the fact that president Trump can no longer flaunt the booming economy, or the administration’s response to the pandemic and the civil unrest brought on by the George Floyd killing. However, scaling down doesn’t mean leaving the Middle East, and it’s highly unlikely that in a foreseeable future we will see the Americans withdrawing from more than - let’s say - the positions held in 2003, when they invaded Iraq.

There is also a third power which might seek to take advantage of the USA’s and Russia’s loss of interest and/or ability to get involved: China. It already has a strong presence in Iran, it’s significantly engaged in the construction of the port in Duqm (in Oman) that will allow bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, where the tensions between the Americans and the Iranians could lead at any time to the strangulation of the crude oil flow. Duqm – just like the entire southern contour of the Middle East – is part of the Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative. China seems to be less affected by the pandemic than the other two powers (at least that is what Beijing wants us to believe), so it may have some financial resources that would make it more attractive. What Beijing lacks is the military capability to support the Belt. So far, the US remains the only actor capable to project power outside its own territory and to maintain a truly global military presence, using naval and air forces that are by far the most powerful in the world.

This year marks a decade since the “Arab Spring”. However, looking back we notice that this spring turned into a barren autumn, or it sometimes continued its domino effect in the Maghreb via Algeria and Tunisia, in Sudan, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen. How would you describe, in short, the “status” of this “New and Great Middle East” forever under “crosswinds”?

I don’t believe the Arab Spring is truly over. The Middle East is a region where several vectors, both foreign and domestic, are constantly and simultaneously at work. Some seek to obtain economic and/or strategic benefits, others are interested in power, while a third category aim to change their respective societies according to a certain model. Some believe that model lies with Islam and they look back at the idealised society and age of Prophet Muhammad; others look at the Western societies. Basically, there is nothing new in this search for change that has been manifesting itself ever since the age of national revivals and the end of colonialism, and it has been brewing a lot earlier than that. The difference is that 60-70 years ago the models were Islam and socialism. The Arab Spring marked the beginning of a new stage of this search, after the failure of the former generations of reformists, who, after an initial momentum ended up establishing a series of decrepit dictatorships. If we are to look only at the results, yes, the Spring was more of a failure that left behind civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen, an even harsher dictatorship in Egypt – where in the end we only witnessed a change of guards within the military establishment that has been in power ever since the “free officers” led by Nasser mounted the coup d’état in 1952. In the rest of the countries the changes were less significant than the protesters would have wanted, with the notable exception of the very country where the Arab Spring started – Tunisia.

However, I do not believe that the Arab Spring ended in 2011-2012. 2019 was marked by revolutionary movements that had a certain amount of success in Sudan, where Omar Al-Bashir was overthrown, and in Algeria, where Abdelaziz Bouteflika was forced to give up his run for a fifth term as president. In Lebanon and Iraq, countries that have been somewhat democratic for years, we have witnessed large anti-system movements reprimanding the entire political establishment. The protests in Iran had an anti-system dimension as well, and even broke some taboos: the great ayatollah Ali Khamenei was compared to the Shah, whose overthrow led to the birth of the Islamic republic, and in addition to that, the 40 years old narrative of the foreign enemy was publicly rejected, and I’m thinking here about the footage of protesters who refused to walk over USA and Israel flags, which seem downright implausible for all those who followed Iranian affairs. And finally, even in the most conservative country in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, we are able to see a reform effort, which, true enough, is doubled by a campaign to consolidate the power of the crown prince, Muhammad Bin Salman, but is also a response to demographic changes (most of the population is made of young people) and grass-root level reform initiatives.

All these developments show that a change in mentalities has taken place the Middle East, at least for some of the population. Information is hard to control in a world as interconnected as our own, so ideas do reach the Middle East, people do learn about living in democratic societies, and whenever activists descend on the streets for their beliefs, even in other countries from the region, people do find out and this encourages them to seek the same rights.

How realistic is the assertion that the “big winner”, at least for now, in the competition for control over the region is Vladimir Putin’s Russia, as opposed to Donald Trump’s “America First”?

It seems to me a little far-fetched. Russia has managed a PR coup, it acted like a great power would, but if we take an in depth look, we’ll notice that its achievements are not that remarkable. First of all, Syria has been under Moscow’s influence for decades; it is what’s left after all the other regional partnerships have failed, during a long process that started once Egypt decided to turn to the West in the 1970s and continued, one way or the other, until Gaddafi was overthrown with the help of NATO. The Russians stepped in the Syrian conflict to save their last traditional stronghold in the Middle East – and it should be noted that this stronghold is not an entire country because Bashar al-Assad only controls a part of Syria, and that part is mostly damaged and politically unstable. The East is controlled by the Kurds and its de facto autonomy is guaranteed by the US military presence – a first made possible by the civil war – in the North there are the Turkish troops, and Israel is periodically raiding the country from over its border in order to prevent the Iranians to take a foothold. Russia’s intervention per se isn’t much of a display of strength either, and its success was brought by the use of modern air force against rebels equipped with light weapons. Anyone could win a war if they have 20 fighter jets that bomb everything, without any regard for civilians and cannot be touched; however, 20 fighter jets do not make you a great power. Let us remember that awkward moment when the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov had to be towed when it was sent to the Mediterranean Sea.

The Americans on the other hand, managed, without mobilizing too many forces, to successfully coordinate the war against the Islamic State (a campaign started by the Obama Administration), to get into Syria and to return to Iraq, several years after withdrawing from the country. Even a complete withdrawal from Syria and Iraq would mean, as I have already mentioned, a return to where they were in 2003, when the USA had been dominating the Middle East region for years.

I believe the episode regarding Turkey’s offensive against the Kurds in north-eastern Syria is far more relevant, since US forces in the area were forced to step back by one of their allies.

Paraphrasing the old French saying Le roi est mort, vive le roi! we might say, at least according to official statements that the “Islamic State/Daesh is dead”. How plausible is the fact that another “caliph” may still exist or might awaken tying a new knot in the barbaric terrorist thread hidden behind religious garments?

The strain of Muslim radicalism displayed by the Islamic State group isn’t a new; its emergence can be traced more than seven decades ago, and the first great jihad that mobilized extremists and helped them get organized took place in Afghanistan, in the 1980s; by the 1990s we were witnessing its current, anti-Western forms, with insurgencies in Algeria and Egypt, terrorism in France and Al-Qaida’s first attacks. It’s hard to believe that this ideology will just disappear in the foreseeable future or that various radical movements will no longer be able to recruit followers, as long as social inequities will continue to push young people in the arms of extremist preachers. The Salafi community will likely be a recruiting pool because its religious approach is similar with that of the Jihadis.

The Islamic State itself has shown that it is a group with a remarkable power of survival. It started as the organization established by the Jordanian Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi to fight the Americans in Iraq; even if at one point in the late 2000s it seemed to have been defeated, the group managed to come back and get over the demise of an entire string of leaders – from Zarqawi to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, some more famous, some almost unknown. Nobody believes that once the group disappeared the so called caliphate had been destroyed, – it went underground in Syria and Iraq, where it kept on attacking, and once the pandemic spread it became more active, which proves it’s capable of taking advantage of any instability and demobilization of those who try to eliminate it. Besides, the Islamic State continues to operate outside the former caliphate as well, in places like Afghanistan. So, at least for now, the Islamic State remains a threat. I believe it is highly unlikely that it will regain the power it once had in Syria and Iraq; however, it’s possible that over the next few years we will see them establishing so called emirates, and manage to hold on to territories in some areas, for instance in parts of the post-withdrawal Afghanistan or in an Yemen abandoned by the Saudis, or even in West and East Africa.

“The Deal of the Century” launched by the Trump administration seems to have ended without the traditional hand shake between partners and is doomed to be forgotten deep in the rift that cut across the road to a viable and durable solution to the Palestinian dossier. Especially after the lengthy government crisis that Israel has experienced for the past year and in view of the future US presidential elections, what kind of “deals” could be discussed about in the foreseeable future? Be tem disguised under what international law defines as “peace treaty”? To what extent do you think the Palestinians will agree to go through the ordeal of the “Oslo Accords” once again?

I wouldn’t say that Oslo produced a trauma, but that a process representing the greatest opportunity for peace was derailed by extremists on both sides – think of Rabin’s assassination or the waves of Palestinian terrorist attacks, by narrow-minded political leaders who played the populist card (such as Benjamin Netanyahu) or by Yasser Arafat’s hesitations and mistakes.

This being said, I believe Trump’s plan was dead before it was even born, because the Palestinians and the Arab street will never agree to it. I cannot see how the stalemate will be overcome in the short term. For now, the relevant Israeli politicians don’t really talk anymore about Oslo and the return to the borders in ’67, and the Palestinians are not only fractured, but many of them stopped supporting their officials, whom they accuse of corruption and, in some cases, of fraternising with Israel. I believe that, in order to achieve a lasting peace, the parties should really want this and accept compromises, and this is where the foreign partners that they count on should play a role by exerting pressure. As far as compromises are concerned, the Palestinians should probably give up their right to return, because I cannot imagine how this could be achieved on the ground. Israel, on the other hand, should withdraw along the 1967 borders, and, maybe, hold on to some of the largest settlements in exchange for some land for the Palestinians. There is another solution - one state; however, this is even less likely at this moment, because it will take generations to achieve harmony.

It will take time before one of these solutions will work; at the moment, I believe the priority is Gaza, where the situation is truly dramatic because of the Israeli-Egyptian blockade.

To Syria, the current year is the calendar year for presidential elections. In this connection, the Western media is talking about certain differences between Vladimir Putin - who demands the adoption of the new Syrian constitution before the scrutiny, and Bashar Al-Assad - who rejects this condition under the pretext that Syria already has a valid constitution. How do you see the Syrian conflict in the near future, since the International Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has, for the first time, officially accused the Damascus regime and president Assad of having repeatedly used chemical weapons against his opponents?

The most spectacular development we could see in Syria is the withdrawal of the US troops and a shift of the fighting to the Kurdish area. If such a withdrawal does not take place, I believe the situation will largely remain the same – the East controlled by the Kurds under US protection, the North-West protected by the Turkish forces while Assad’s troops would inch forward when allowed to, with the support of Russian air force and Iranian proxy militias, and a not very stable governmental area controlled by Assad’s forces.

Does violence remain the only option with a view to live alongside contradicting interests of the political actors in the Middle East?

No, it doesn’t, by no means. As everywhere else, people wish for a better life – which involves peace as well. Lebanon and Algeria have proved that there can be a solution to bloody conflicts and that some stability can be achieved. The Gulf countries prove that prosperity is another factor that can bring stability, Jordan has proved that a relatively open and allied to the West society is possible, while Tunisia (and not only) has proven that democracy is possible. Many things can be achieved with some money, political will and vision. However, they cannot be achieved overnight.

NB: Cătălin Gomboș lived and studied in the Middle East in the 1990s, and between 2003-2017 he travelled to the region several times, mainly Iraq, where he was a correspondent for Radio Romania both in Baghdad and embedded with the Romanian army units deployed in the South of the country. He is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences – University of Bucharest, and has a master’s degree on “Middle East –Languages and Cultures in Contact” from the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures – University of Bucharest. His thesis was about “Salafi Jihad”. He received several honours and awards, including “Young Journalist of the Year - 2008”, awarded by Freedom House Romania and the “Manfred Woerner” Euro-Atlantic Association Award for war correspondence.