Radu Magdin, political analyst and former advisor to prime ministers in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, identified and analysed the perspectives and challenges to the cohesion of EU in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, in an interview offered to Vladimir-Adrian Costea for the Geostrategic Pulse.
Vladimir-Adrian
Costea: For several months now, the Coronavirus pandemic has taken over the
global headlines, leaving in the background the concerns of the international
community. The EU member states continue to be affected by this virus. Under these
circumstances, will the EU still be the same after the tsunami caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic?
Radu Magdin: Every crisis over the past decades has put the European Union face to
face with some fundamental choices, which have marked its identity and course
of action. The crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic has multiple dimensions, and we
are just beginning to comprehend their complexities. In simple terms, we can
anticipate from the start that the EU, seriously affected by the pandemic, will
undergo major changes. Given its shortcomings, of which even its leaders are
aware, the EU finds itself especially in the position to self-assess its ability
to act and its short, medium and long-term priorities.
The overall
priorities of the EU as a whole, as well as of its member states, will be best emphasised
in the context of negotiations over the Union’s multiannual financial framework,
which caused strong reactions among its members ever since the first drafts circulated
before the COVID-19 pandemic spread. In the meantime, the European Commission resorted
to compromise, especially regarding the allocations for agricultural and cohesion
policies, which are crucial for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
The differences in the level of development of individual member states have
always caused major disagreements over matters of vision and priorities, and the
post-crisis efforts of social and economic recovery must take into account the
need to deal with these disagreements.
As far as the
capacity to take action is concerned, the crisis caused by COVID-19 has tested
the European Union, which initially had a slow response, but somehow recovered in
the process. In other words, the EU’s bureaucratic apparatus had a difficult
jumpstart, just as expected at a time when the EU member states had already
implemented severe measures on a national level, including closing the borders
and ceasing exports of medicines and essential medical equipment, decisions
unacceptable under different circumstances. Besides, the European Union doesn’t
have enough leverage on healthcare, and the absence of extensive challenges to
the public health of the entire bloc it did not sought to assume extend powers,
over time. There are no clear intentions to change this approach, but a broader
discussion on the European Union resilience to major challenges should take
into consideration the matter of healthcare systems as well.
Another subject
to think of when the crisis is over, is the EU’s role in the world and its ability
to stay relevant in the competition between great powers, a competition intensified
by the COVID-19 crisis; to what extent will we be able to talk about a Global
Europe, and how do we define this concept in unforeseeable circumstances.
The strength the European Union has globally cannot consist only in its ability
to respond to crisis (otherwise slow), but also in its ability to predict
dangers in time and create long-lasting alliances with likeminded countries, alongside
which the EU can succeed within multilateral formats.
To what extent
do the solidarity, cohesion and cooperation between the member states and the
EU institutions still remain principles that have helped the Union remain
united in front of these challenges?
Firstly, I would
like to highlight the essential differences between the three dimensions of the
relations between the EU member states on one hand, and the relations between
the member states and the European institutions on the other. Speaking of
cohesion, it is crucial to see the fact that it was a problematic matter for
the European Union even before the outbreak of the pandemic, given the well-known
major differences between the member states as far as their development is
concerned. These differences have grown during the Coronavirus pandemic, as the
social and economic systems, the resources, services, as well as the physical
and digital infrastructures of each country have been strongly tested by the
effects of the pandemic. It is true that the Coronavirus pandemic reached the
less developed countries of the EU later, which is explicable, and its effects continue
to be smaller. However, the cohesion, and most of all the mature discussions on
the budgetary allocations for the cohesion policy in the upcoming financial
cycle, should remain on top of the European agenda; and the crisis we are going
through should remain a lesson on the importance of consensus within the EU.
As regards the
cooperation and solidarity between the EU member states, on one hand, and between
the member states and the EU institutions, on the other, I believe these are
key principles for the elaboration and implementation of joint measures to alleviate
the sanitary crisis and to facilitate the economic and social recovery. In the
beginning, the EU member states have focused, naturally, on their internal
efforts to counter the crisis. Then, the intervention of the European Union
focused on restoring and building the confidence of the European citizens in
coordinated and solidary actions, hence the initiation of the rescEU, the
coordinated repatriations of the EU citizens, the launch of the largest
economic package in the world and the adaptation of future financing tools to
the demands in time of crisis. I believe that the European cooperation and
solidarity, transposed in sustainable and viable solutions, are the main
mechanisms that can get Europe out of the crisis and can restore the trust in
the European values, including at a time when the future of the EU is under
debate.
What are the
cleavages that have resurfaced in the EU during this time? To what extent did
the reaction of the EU contribute to enhancing/reducing tensions and
grievances?
The cleavages
that can be analysed in the context of the Coronavirus crisis are not different
from the ones that have always existed within the EU, and first of all, I am
referring to the weak cohesion between the member states and the major
differences between the health services at European level, which could have
proven catastrophic, should there have been a higher number of infected in
countries situated in the centre and east of the European Union. We have all seen how European countries with advanced health systems were
overwhelmed by the number of cases and we have imagined what could happen in
our area under similar circumstances.
In the context
of the Coronavirus crisis, the most important cleavages are those that are just
beginning to be visible. For example, economic cleavages will make the European
countries recover from the crisis differently, at a different pace and with
some social and political costs that are yet difficult to assess. The economic
support packages at the level of every country are still extremely important,
not only financially speaking but also as perspective and ability to generate
trust. This is why we take a look at Germany, which has launched both financial
support packages and clear policies of economic recovery.
At the same
time, the cleavages in education and respect for rules will make the
elimination of restrictions in the European countries have very different
effects and we shouldn’t rule out a second wave of infections, which will be closely
followed this time by a second wave of mistrust on a national level. Under
crisis, trust in leadership is the most important tool, which must be managed
very carefully. Should there be no trust in the leaders, the action taken will
always create tensions within society and will generate a breeding ground for
populism. Last but not least, I wish to emphasise that the existence of
educational cleavages makes us more vulnerable to disinformation and fake news
originating from within or from outside the country, and serving the same
purpose – to weaken the trust in a system and, in time, make room for destructive
leaders.
What were the
main steps undertaken by the EU to support the countries affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic? What kind of support do the EU institutions provide,
especially with regard to education and health?
The European
Union has mobilised support resources as it went along, including by adjusting
policies already existent, and that have proven restrictive in the context
generated by the Coronavirus pandemic. The immediate measures included the repatriation
of European citizens, especially by organizing flights from third countries,
emergency financial support (for the first time in history, the European
Commission activated the “escape clause” to allow exceptional financial support),
establishing a EU supply of medical equipment – the so called rescEU,
issuing recommendations regarding the measures to limit the spread of the
Coronavirus and testing strategies, and ensuring the movement of goods and people
under the circumstances created by the crisis.
The longer-term
measures are those which aim at rendering the regulations regarding state aid
more flexible, at allocating resources for the research and development of
specific treatments and, especially, at the economic recovery plan. The
European Commission proposed a 2.4 trillion Euro economic recovery plan, that
was declined by the Next Generation EU instrument – based on finances collected
from financial markets, as well as by the financing instruments designed as
part of the consolidating process of the EU’s long-term financial framework,
which is being negotiated on at a European level. I would also like to mention
the SURE instrument, a temporary support instrument to reduce unemployment
risks in an emergency situation. The instrument, which provides the member
states financing up to almost 100 billion Euros for the costs related to the
development, or extension of national technical unemployment programmes until December
31st 2022, with the possibility of a new extension, will be
available once all the member states provide their collaterals for the loans.
In terms of the
health strategy, between January and now the European Commission mobilised
almost 550 million Euros to develop vaccines, new treatments, tests and medical
systems that could help stop the spread of the Coronavirus. It is a very high amount,
and it is only natural that most of the EU’s medical efforts should focus on
research, taking into account, as I was saying, the limited of the Union in
this area. However, the European Commission allocated 3 billion Euros to
finance the instrument dedicated to emergency support and the joint rescEU
equipment reserve, Romania and Germany being the first countries to store it.
As far as
education in a broader sense is concerned, the efforts at the level of the
European institutions focus, for now, more or less successfully on countering
disinformation, by means of the tools they already have at the European level.
Besides, in this field, the Commission and the European External Action Service
cooperate with other EU institutions and member states, including by means of the
rapid alert system established in March 2019, as well as with international
partners from G7 and NATO. Hereinafter, we expect the measures announced on the
10th of June in this respect, namely strengthening the strategic
communication and public diplomacy in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and
everywhere else in the world, as well as the support given to the media and to
independent journalists, to be implemented. As far as classical education is
concerned, I am convinced that the efforts to strengthen this system on a
European level will contribute to the economic recovery on medium and long-term,
especially by supporting the requalification mechanisms and so on.
How do you see
the response of the EU and its member states to the latest challenges posed by
the COVID-19 pandemic?
The Coronavirus
pandemic is unprecedented. No other pandemic in European history has expanded
under the current connectivity and interdependency conditions. Faced with such
a threat, the EU countries reacted before the European institutions, as they
should have, to protect their citizens. From my point of view, the toughest
challenge was closing the borders, based on decisions taken at a national level
and then at a European level – in a sequence we would have never thought
possible. Once the borders were closed, the issues related to the
transportation of goods and people – an issue nobody thought we would be facing
nowadays – intensified both the first effects of the crisis and the public
discourse. Subsequently, the answer of the EU, although somehow late, was as
coherent as it could be under the circumstances and taking into account the
EU’s legal framework.
The crisis is
ongoing, so the only useful evaluations at this moment are sequence
evaluations, in order to figure out the next steps. Under the circumstances of
the pandemic, each European country will take the decisions it finds logical
from an epidemiologic and economic point of view. On a European level, however,
I believe that the approach should still be coordinated and active so that it
allows us to return to a relatively normal state and to some of the key
European debates, presently suspended or limited due to the crisis.
What are the
perspectives after the pandemic, in the context of an imminent social and
economic crisis? Do you believe in the possible emergence of a new political
crisis in the European Union?
According to the
main financial institutions, an economic crisis at the level of the European
Union is imminent. All predictions show a loss in the GDP and economic trade, factors
that inevitably lead to an economic crisis. An economic crisis is always accompanied
by a social crisis as the prospects of stability for the people fade, and
because of certain phenomena, such as unemployment, decrease of the purchasing
power, fluctuations of the exchange rate – which are already visible in Europe.
At the same time,
it is important to remember the fact that the possibility of a political crisis
at the level of the European Union has never been neglected. Under the current
circumstances, just as we have learned from the economic crisis in 2008, there
will be a proper environment for populist leaders, who will gain ground
“helped” by disinformation, among other. On the other hand, I still hope that the
populist discourse, built on the logic of finger-pointing to problems without
finding a solution, will not meet the expectations of the European citizens,
who will emerge off this crisis marked by serious losses and in search for real
solutions.
Who are the
players who find an economic and political opportunity in the fight for
resources and influence in the EU?
Closely related
to what I have said before, the players who will find political opportunities
in times of crisis are, first of all, the populist politicians, as well as
state and non-state actors engaged in a hybrid war for the destabilisation of
the European Union. As far as the economic opportunity is concerned, it is an
open issue to all European countries able to adjust and find ways to use the
European toolbox for the benefit of their own economies. The “winners” of this
crisis will be those who manifest a reasonable form of economic patriotism, who
will focus on consolidating European capabilities, but without sacrificing the
European solidarity, cooperation and integration.